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Joint ventures are a widely used form of interfirm collaboration, which possess some 
characteristics of both mergers, in which two or more firms come permanently under 
common control and cease to be distinct, and agreements, which impact the 
competitive behaviour of firms that remain independent of each other. Due to their 
hybrid economic nature, it has always been controversial what types of joint ventures 
should be regarded as mergers under competition law, and how the fact that the 
parent firms remain independent outside the cooperation should be incorporated into 
traditional merger analysis. In the EU, only full-function joint ventures are treated as 
mergers under the Merger Regulation. However, unlike amalgamations and 
acquisitions, these joint ventures are subject to an additional analysis under Article 
101 TFEU to the extent that they lead to the coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the parents. 
 
This thesis aims to critically analyse this approach to the substantive appraisal of 
joint ventures under the EU merger control regime, based on its consistency with the 
general rules of EU competition law and with relevant economic theories, in a 
comparative perspective with the US competition law regime. In this regard, the 
thesis shows that (i) the full-functionality criterion assuming that full-function joint 
ventures are autonomous from an operational viewpoint has some negative 
implications for the competition analysis of joint ventures; and (ii) the fact that the 
parent firms retain activities in the joint venture’s market, or in other markets, does 
not seem to be properly incorporated into the analysis under the Merger Regulation. 
This thesis seeks to propose some alternatives and solutions with respect to these 
problematic issues and, thereby, contribute to the body of knowledge and debate 
about joint ventures which have been, and will be, one of the most intricate and 
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I. Problem Review 
  
Joint ventures have been a significant business phenomenon all over the world in the 
last half-century. With their increasing popularity as a form of interfirm 
collaboration, they have played a vital role in both global and regional economies by 
impacting the growth of many industries and the globalisation process. This role 
raises the importance of adopting a competition law approach to these collaborations, 
which will help to effectively address their anticompetitive effects without unduly 
hindering their formation or operation. Nevertheless, this is not a simple task due to 
the complicated economic nature of joint ventures that makes them one of the most 
intricate topics in competition law.
1
   
 
Indeed, from a competition law point of view, collaborations among firms
2
 are 
traditionally divided into two main categories. The first category consists of 
agreements, including cartels. In the context of a cartel agreement, there is no 
significant integration between the parties’ activities, ie each party retains its separate 
operations in the market after the conclusion of the agreement. However, under the 
agreement, they undertake to behave in a specific way such as fixing prices or 
limiting outputs. Therefore, agreements are generally considered to affect the 











 In the context of mergers, two or more 
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 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘firm’ and ‘undertaking’ are used interchangeably unless 
the context indicates otherwise. 
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4
 For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘merger’ and ‘concentration’ are used interchangeably 
unless the context indicates otherwise. 
5
 In this thesis, the term ‘amalgamation’ refers to the full-merger of two or more firms into one single 
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independent firms are brought permanently under common control and, thereby, 
form a single economic entity in terms of competition law. Hence, unlike 
agreements, mergers give rise to a lasting change in market structure by increasing 
market concentration, and/or by establishing some structural vertical or conglomerate 
links among firms from different markets.
7
   
 
Joint ventures, however, do not completely fit into either of these two categories 
because they may have both structural and behavioural aspects at the same time.
8
 
They may have structural aspects as they lead to an efficiency enhancing integration 
of the parties. They are also considered to have behavioural aspects, because each 
party retains some independent activities either inside or outside the joint venture’s 
market, into which the cooperation in the context of the joint venture may spill over.  
 
The degree of the behavioural and structural aspects of a joint venture generally 
depends on the degree of integration it leads to, its allotted function and the 
competitive relationship between its parents. Accordingly, in various cases, the 
behavioural aspects of joint ventures prevail, while in other cases their structural 
aspects do. That said, it may be very difficult to distinguish these two aspects from 
each other due to their extensive interaction and overlap, particularly in the case that 
the joint venture leads to a significant integration of the parents. 
 
This hybrid economic nature of joint ventures, in comparison with cartels and 
mergers, gives rise to two main problems in approaching this phenomenon under 
competition law. The first problem concerns which competition rules should apply to 
the formation of a joint venture. In most jurisdictions including the European Union 
(EU), mergers and agreements (cartels) are subject to different competition rules, 
which are specifically targeted at each of them. In the EU competition law regime, 
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agreements are subject to an appraisal under Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
9
 while mergers are analysed under the 
Merger Regulation.
10
 This regime does not, however, include a specific rule that 
applies only to the formation of joint ventures. Therefore, the question herein 
concentrates on whether the creation of a joint venture should be treated as a merger 
or an agreement. Given the fact that there are significant differences between the 
substantive and procedural rules that apply to mergers and those applicable to 
agreements, how to answer this question is of great importance in the EU. Once this 
question is answered, a follow-up question would be how the fact that the joint 
venture is under the joint control of two or more firms that retain independent 
activities outside the cooperation should be taken into account, in a situation viewed 
as a merger.   
 
The second problem, which is closely linked to the first, arises in determining which 
substantive test should apply in relation to the activities of legally established joint 
ventures. The first question in this regard is whether the conduct of a joint venture 
should be deemed as conduct by a single firm or as collusion between two or more 
independent firms. The second question, however, is whether a joint venture and its 
parent(s) should be viewed as forming a single economic unit under the relevant 
competition rules. The answers to these questions are also extremely important, 
because unilateral conduct is generally subject to a less strict test than that applied to 
collusion among firms, and also because they determine whether the parents can be 
held liable for an infringement by the joint venture. Nevertheless, due to the 
complexities inherent in the nature of joint ventures, it is very difficult to give an 
answer to these questions that would apply in all cases. 
 
Bearing in mind all of the aforementioned problems in relation to the nature of joint 
ventures, this thesis focuses on how EU competition law currently approaches the 
first problem, ie the competition assessment of joint ventures that should be regarded 
as mergers, and examines to which extent this approach could be improved 
particularly as far as its compatibility with the economic nature of joint ventures is 
                                                          
9
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. 
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concerned, and also in terms of its consistency both in itself and with the general 
rules of EU competition law.   
 
Currently, in the EU, only full-function joint ventures that are assumed to perform all 
the functions of an autonomous entity are treated as mergers and, like amalgamations 
and acquisitions, they are analysed under Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation that 
prohibits mergers, which significantly impede effective competition. Nonetheless, it 
is recognised that special consideration must be given to the impact of these joint 
ventures on competition between the parent firms outside the joint venture, which is 
not an issue of concern in the case of amalgamations and acquisitions. Therefore, 
full-function joint ventures are also subject to appraisal under Article 101, in 
combination with Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation, to the extent that they lead 
to the coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parent firms outside the joint 
venture. This approach to the substantive analysis of joint ventures under the Merger 
Regulation, however, leads to some inconsistencies and complications, which 
aggravate the problems inherent to the complicated economic nature of joint 
ventures.  
 
Firstly, although the level of integration is the primary factor that shapes the 
structural aspects of joint ventures, which bring them closer to mergers, the EU 
regime utilises the full-functionality criterion that focuses on the autonomy of joint 
ventures, in order to make a distinction between joint ventures for merger control 
purposes. In this regard, this criterion particularly excludes partial function 
production joint ventures, which significantly integrate the economic activities of the 
parents and, therefore, have almost the same effects as mergers on the structure of 
the parties. Such an exclusion from the scope of the Merger Regulation has important 
substantive outcomes, given the fact that Article 101 allows for a stricter approach 
than that under Article 2(3) and that it can also be enforced by the national 
competition authorities and national courts of Member States. The application of 
such different substantive and procedural rules complicates adopting a unified 
substantive approach to operations with similar effects. 
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Secondly, assuming that full-function joint ventures are autonomous of their parents, 
in determining the scope of the Merger Regulation, appears to contradict the joint 
control requirement and the general approach taken with respect to the autonomy of 
these joint ventures under both the Merger Regulation and Article 101. This 
inconsistency gives rise to some complications and uncertainties regarding the 
substantive analysis of the formation and operation of full-function joint ventures, 
and makes it difficult for firms to predict and adopt the safest policy from a 
competition law perspective, in structuring, and dealing with, their joint ventures. 
    
The current EU merger control policy also seems to be problematic regarding the 
assessment of the fact that the parents retain separate activities outside the joint 
venture. Considering that ‘coordination’ under Article 2(4) basically refers to the 
same economic situation as ‘coordinated effect’ under Article 2(3), the application of 
Article 101 to ‘coordination’ results in inconsistency, and unnecessarily complicates 
the analysis of joint ventures under the Merger Regulation. More importantly, the 
application of two different tests, Article 2(3) and Article 101, in relation to the joint 
venture’s market implies a stricter approach to a partial integration of the parents in 
the market than to their full-integration.   
 
These problems make it necessary to give a new and critical look to the substantive 
appraisal of joint ventures under the EU merger control regime. In this respect, this 
thesis intends to elaborate on these problems and suggest a more consistent and 
integrated legal framework for the analysis of joint ventures treated as mergers, 
which can eliminate such problems and, thus, can significantly improve the current 
situation in the EU.    
 
II. Scope and Objectives of Research 
 
A- Centre of Gravity of Research 
 
As emphasised above, this thesis essentially aims to critically analyse the approach 
towards the substantive appraisal of joint ventures under the EU merger control 
regime. In this context, it seeks to answer two main questions. The first and 
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preliminary question is whether the full-functionality criterion is appropriate to 
identify joint ventures that should be treated as mergers from a substantive 
perspective. The primary intention herein is to explore the substantive implications 
of the assumption that full-function joint ventures are autonomous from an 
operational viewpoint, and of the exclusion of partial function joint ventures, 
particularly production joint ventures, from the Merger Regulation. Based on these 
implications, the thesis discusses possible alternative criteria which may be more 
suitable for drawing the boundaries of merger control as far as joint ventures are 
concerned, and which may be more compatible with the principles that should apply 
to the substantive analysis of these collaborations under the Merger Regulation. 
 
The second question of this thesis, however, is how the formation of joint ventures 
should be appraised under the Merger Regulation, having regard to the current 
approach to full-function joint ventures. This question can be divided into four sub-
questions: (i) whether and how the fact that joint ventures are controlled by two or 
more firms should be incorporated into the analysis under both Article 2(3) and 2(4) 
of the Merger Regulation; (ii) whether and how the fact that the parents retain some 
activities in the joint venture’s market should be considered in analysing the impact 
of the joint venture on competition in that market under Article 2(3); (iii) whether 
Article 101 is the only and most effective test to address the risk of coordination 
among the parent firms, considering the possibility that Article 2(3) may also be 
applicable to those concerns; (iv) how the risk of coordination between the parent 
firms should be analysed in relation to markets other than those of the joint venture. 
In examining all these issues, the thesis mainly considers how they are currently 
addressed by the European Commission (Commission) and the EU courts, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the General Court of the European 
Union (General Court). However, in making recommendations on these issues, the 
possible reflections of any shift from the full-functionality criterion to an integration-





B- Ancillary Issues 
 
1. Substantive Appraisal of Partial Function Joint Ventures 
 
This thesis does not intend to answer the question of how joint ventures falling 
outside the Merger Regulation should be analysed under Article 101. Nevertheless, it 
aims to explore the competition assessment of partial function joint ventures 
according to Article 101, in order: (i) to show how this analysis is different from that 
of full-function joint ventures, in other words, to identify the outcomes of being 
subject to the Merger Regulation from a substantive point of view; (ii) to understand 
the rationale behind the distinction between full-function and partial function joint 
ventures; and (iii) to find out which partial function joint ventures, if any, should be 
included in the scope of the Merger Regulation. In this context, the thesis explains 
the practice and guidelines of the Commission and the EU case law that relate to the 
analysis of partial function joint ventures, but it does not make any recommendations 
in this regard.  
 
This thesis does not discuss the assessment of partial function joint ventures under 
Article 102 which prohibits abuse of a dominant position. Nor does it discuss how 
these joint ventures are assessed by the national competition authorities and courts of 
the EU Member States. 
 
2. Procedural Issues as to the Treatment of Joint Ventures in the EU 
 
Given the focus of this thesis on substantive issues, it is beyond its scope to 
elaborately examine the procedural rules that apply to full-function joint ventures 
under the Merger Regulation and its procedural consequences, and to criticise the 
full-functionality criterion and propose alternatives from a procedural perspective. 
 
That said, it should be remembered that in the EU, the applicable procedural rules 
also have some important outcomes that affect the substantive assessment of joint 
ventures. Firstly, because partial function joint ventures are not notifiable, the 
Commission’s practice gives much less guidance as to the competition analysis of 
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these joint ventures compared to that of full-function joint ventures. More 
importantly, the fact that, unlike full-function joint ventures, partial function joint 
ventures are also subject to the jurisdiction of the Member States may result in the 
application of different competition rules to them by the Commission, national 
competition authorities and national courts. These procedural rules, therefore, bring 
about uncertainties about the legality of partial function joint ventures. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that these procedural differences seem to form a central 
consideration in determining which joint ventures must be treated as mergers. 
Therefore, these differences should be borne in mind in assessing the suitability of 
the full-functionality criterion from a substantive viewpoint. For this purpose, this 
thesis gives a brief overview of these procedural rules, to the extent that it helps to 
comprehend the aforementioned issues.   
 
3. Analysis of Joint Ventures under US Competition Law 
 
This thesis explores United States (US) competition policy
11
 on joint ventures in 
order to assess the EU regime from a comparative perspective. Indeed, the US 
regime is generally considered as one of the most influential regimes in the world, 
due to the long and phenomenal experience of the actors of this regime including 
courts, enforcement authorities, academics and practitioners.
12
 In this context, how 
joint ventures are classified for the purpose of merger control and how they are 
analysed under US competition law may provide significant grounds to evaluate the 
EU approach and make recommendations in this respect. 
 
In the US, courts and particularly enforcement authorities generally use the degree of 
integration among parent firms as a criterion to determine which joint ventures 
should be analysed in the same way as mergers, and how joint ventures outside this 
category should be approached. However, in comparing this policy with that of the 
EU, it should be borne in mind that: (i) in contrast to the full-functionality criterion 
                                                          
11
 In the US, competition law is generally known as antitrust law. However, in the EU, the term 
‘antitrust’ is used to refer only to competition law issues falling within Article 101 and Article 102 
TFEU, but not to merger control. Therefore, in this thesis, the term ‘competition’, instead of 
‘antitrust’, is used to refer to all competition law issues in the EU and the US.  
12
 Maher M Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 227. 
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in the EU, the integration-based criterion in the US is not statutory; (ii) this criterion 
does not necessarily determine which US competition statute will apply to the 
formation of a joint venture; and (iii) unlike under the EU regime, the procedural 
rules applicable to mergers and agreements do not differ significantly in the US.  
 
This thesis only looks into the analysis of joint ventures under US federal 
competition law. It does not aim to research such analysis under state competition 
laws.  
 
4. Treatment of the Conduct and Operation of Joint Ventures 
 
The assessment of the conduct and operation of joint ventures is not a central issue 
for this thesis. Nevertheless, there is a strong interconnection between how the 
formation of a joint venture is analysed and how its conduct and operation is treated. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the issues associated with the operation of joint 
ventures as an ancillary issue in order to show the consistency between these two 
stages of competition analysis, which is an important consideration in examining the 
suitability of the current approach under the EU merger control regime. In this 
regard, the thesis intends to explore how the Commission and the EU courts link the 
full-function character of a joint venture to the analysis of: (i) whether the conduct of 
a full-function joint venture falls under Article 101, and (ii) whether the joint venture 
and its parents form a single undertaking within the sense of Article 101. It also 
addresses these questions in relation to partial function joint ventures in order to 
completely comprehend the outcomes of being deemed full-function.  
 
In order to produce a more coherent and integrated approach to joint ventures which 
are treated as mergers, this thesis also aims to make some suggestions on how to 
assess the relationship of a joint venture with its parents under Article 101. 
Considering that this issue is currently controversial in the EU,
13
 these suggestions 
may also contribute to the debate in this respect.  
 
                                                          
13
 See Case T-76/08 El du Pont v Commission [2012] ECR II-0000; Case T-77/08 Dow Chemical v 
Commission [2012] ECR II-0000; Alison Jones, ‘The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU 




In dealing with all the central and ancillary issues presented above, this thesis relies 
on various legal, economic and business management propositions and solutions that 
have been developed by legislators, courts, authorities, academics and practitioners. 
Having regard to these propositions and solutions, this thesis offers its own 
interpretations, propositions and solutions that make it original as a doctoral thesis. 
 
As a document-based and doctrinal piece of research involving some comparative 
elements, this thesis relies on resources that can be divided into four groups. 
 
The first group of resources includes EU competition legislation, particularly Article 
101 TFEU and the Merger Regulation, and also US competition legislation, 
particularly section 1 of the Sherman Act
14
 and section 7 of the Clayton Act.
15
 For 
some arguments, the thesis makes its own interpretation of the wording of these 
legislative statutes. 
 
The second group of resources encompasses reported judicial decisions in both the 
EU and the US. Given the broad language of those statutes in both jurisdictions, the 
judicial interpretation generally gives the most important guidance about how they 
are applied. Compared to the EU, court decisions are of greater significance in the 
US due to the litigation-oriented character of the US enforcement regime. This thesis 
includes the evaluation of various court decisions concerning its central or ancillary 
issues, and draws its own conclusions based on these decisions. 
 
The third group of resources involves administrative decisions and guidelines in the 
EU and the US. In the EU, the Commission has published various guidelines in 
which it explains its position on the assessment of full-function and partial function 
joint ventures, and other relevant issues. The most important of these are the 
Jurisdictional Notice,
16
 the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
17
 and the Cooperation 
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 15 USC secs 1-2. 
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 15 USC secs 12-27. 
16
 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 




 In addition to these guidelines, this thesis assesses numerous 
Commission decisions together with various papers and reports published by the 
Commission. Considering its domination in the EU merger control regime, all of this 
guidance provided by the Commission serves as a main basis for many of the 
arguments and recommendations made in this thesis.  
 
In the US, the enforcement authorities, the Antitrust Division of the US Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), do not play the dominant 
role that the Commission enjoys in EU merger control. However, the guidance given 
by these authorities is still of great importance. In particular, Antitrust Guidelines on 
Collaborations among Competitors (Collaboration Guidelines)
19
 constitute a 
significant document regarding the appraisal of joint ventures in the US. The thesis 
explores these guidelines and the decisions adopted by the authorities in respect of 
joint ventures in order to make some interpretations and conclusions about the US 
approach. 
 
The final group of resources used by this thesis are academic works, including books, 
articles, commentaries, speeches etc, devoted to the analysis of joint ventures as an 
economic and business phenomenon, and to the substantive appraisal of this 
phenomenon in EU and US competition law.        
 
IV. Outline of Chapters  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters including this introduction chapter. 
 
The second chapter explores the nature of joint ventures as a business and economic 
phenomenon, in order to enhance the understanding of the analyses, discussions and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17
 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/5. 
18
 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2010] OJ C11/1 (new Cooperation 
Guidelines). For the previous Cooperation Guidelines, see Commission Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/2 
(2001 Cooperation Guidelines). 
19
 DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors’ 64 Fed Reg 54483 
(1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm> accessed 05 April 2013. 
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proposals contained in the later chapters of the thesis. In this respect, the chapter 
defines the concept of ‘joint venture’, classifies it based on several criteria, and 
explains its economic role along with its advantages and disadvantages as a form of 
interfirm collaboration. This chapter does not extensively discuss the legal distinction 
between full-function and partial function joint ventures and leaves this issue to the 
following chapters. 
 
The third chapter explains how full-function joint ventures are appraised under the 
EU merger control regime. It describes the full-functionality criterion by giving a 
historical background; provides a brief overview of procedural issues; shows how the 
effects of these joint ventures are analysed under the Merger Regulation; and 
discusses the treatment of their conduct and operation under Article 101. This 
chapter includes the interpretation of the approaches of the EU courts and 
particularly the Commission on various issues that form the core of this thesis. These 
interpretations are used as a foundation in the sixth chapter.   
 
The fourth chapter describes the competition assessment of partial function joint 
ventures by the Commission and the EU courts under Article 101. Because there 
have not been many Commission decisions since the abolition of the notification 
regime by Regulation 1/2003,
 20
 the chapter mainly follows the guidance set out in 
the Cooperation Guidelines. This chapter also includes some interpretations of, and 
propositions related to, the Commission’s practice, which are relied upon in the sixth 
chapter. 
  
The fifth chapter explains the treatment of joint ventures in US competition law. In 
order to provide a proper comparison of the EU and US approaches, this chapter 
firstly describes the main characteristics of US enforcement regime, and the 
correlation between section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Then, it shows the approaches of the enforcement authorities and courts to the 
application of the merger standard to joint ventures, and to the analysis of the 
conduct and operation of joint ventures. 
                                                          
20
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1 
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The sixth chapter is dedicated to the implications of the analysis of the current 
approach to joint ventures under the EU merger control regime, and to the discussion 
and proposal of alternative approaches and solutions based on these implications and 
other findings in the previous chapters. 
 
The seventh chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis.  
 




NOTION, TYPES AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF JOINT VENTURES 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to explore the phenomenon of joint venture in order to provide a 
better understanding of the later chapters, and also to show the importance of joint 
ventures for the general economy, which contributes to the necessity of adopting an 
appropriate approach to them under competition law. In this respect, it firstly defines 
the term ‘joint venture’ for the purposes of this thesis. This definition helps to 
distinguish joint ventures from other interfirm collaborations, and to analyse the 
competition rules of the EU and the US in relation to them. The chapter, secondly, 
explains the classification of joint ventures according to certain criteria. Since the 
distinction between full-function and partial function joint ventures is explained 
elaborately in the third chapter, herein it is mentioned just briefly. This second part 
therefore focuses on categorising joint ventures by the competitive relationship 
between their parents and by their allotted function, which are indicative of their 
economic impact. The third part of the chapter, however, explains the economic role 
of joint ventures, ie their functions in respect of specific industries, motives behind 
their formation and their drawbacks as a business model. These explanations also 
help to set the scene for the analysis in the later chapters. 
 
II. The Concept of Joint Venture  
 
There is a lack of a single universally agreeable definition for the term ‘joint 
venture’.
1
 It is defined in a variety of ways by both different disciplines and different 
commentators. In the broadest sense, the term is used to refer to any form of 
collaboration between two or more firms to carry out some commercial goals.
2
 
                                                          
1
 Joseph Kattan, ‘Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the 
Rewards of Innovation’ (1993) 61 Antitrust Law Journal 937, 937.  
2
 Robert Pitofsky, ‘Joint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of 
Penn-Olin’ (1969) 82 Harvard Law Review 1007, 1007; Joseph F Brodley, ‘Joint Ventures and 
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Pursuant to this definition, virtually all types of commercial transactions between 




This broad definition may make sense from a business standpoint. However, it is not 
useful for competition law purposes because it does not facilitate distinguishing 
between joint ventures and other types of collaborations, including amalgamations 
and acquisitions and loose contractual agreements.
4
 Therefore, commentators usually 
prefer narrower definitions for the competition assessment of joint ventures. Some 
commentators highlight integration as a feature that draws a line between joint 
ventures and other collaborations.
5
 This approach is also adopted within the report of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concerning 
competition issues in joint ventures.
6
 In the report, the term joint venture is defined 
as ‘participating firms agreeing by contract or otherwise to combine, other than by 
merger, significant productive (tangible or intangible) assets, and to do this by going 




This definition may be conducive to separating joint ventures from simple 
contractual agreements such as distribution and licence agreements. Nonetheless, it 
still does not consider some important aspects of joint ventures that make them 
special in terms of competition law. In particular, it seems insufficient to clarify the 
distinction between joint ventures and amalgamations and acquisitions, which also 
require the integration of the parties.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Anthony Woolich, ‘Joint Ventures in the European Union’ in Martin Mankabady (ed), Joint ventures 
in Europe (3rd edn,Tottel Publishing 2008) 2. 
3
 Pitofsky, ‘Joint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws’ (n 2) 1007; ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 
(6th edn, ABA Publishing vol 1 2007) 433-34; Woolich (n 2) 2. 
4
 Brodley (n 2) 1525.  
5
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(n 2) 2. According to Chang, Evans and Schmalensee, ‘a joint venture emerges when two or more 
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Schmalensee, ‘Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy towards Joint Ventures’ 
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6
 OECD, ‘Competition Issues in Joint Ventures’ (2001) 
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7
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In this regard, through taking into account the distinctive features of joint ventures, 
Brodley provides a more elaborate definition for competition law purposes. He 
considers an integration of operations between two or more independent firms as a 
joint venture, provided that it satisfies four conditions. These conditions are that: (i) 
the operation concerned is performed by an entity separate from its parents (ii) this 
entity is jointly controlled by the parent firms that are not under common control; 
(iii) each parent makes a significant contribution to the entity; and (iv) it results in 
new production capacity, a new technology or product or entry into a new market.
8
 
Goyder also defines joint ventures in a similar way. His definition encompasses the 
first three conditions of Brodley’s definition, while providing a different fourth 
condition which requires a formal decision that allocates to the entity responsibility 




The condition, common in both definitions, which requires a significant contribution 
by the parents, refers to the structural aspect of joint ventures that separates them 
from loose agreements, such as distribution, subcontracting or licence agreements. 
Such a contribution indicates the seriousness of the parties in integrating their 
economic operations. In general, this integration is capable of creating efficiencies, 
which forms the primary basis for approaching joint ventures more permissively 
under competition law, particularly compared to cartel agreements.
10
 The condition 
requiring the creation of an entity separate from the participants may also facilitate 
distinguishing joint ventures from contractual agreements, in which the parties do not 




The joint control requirement, however, primarily refers to the behavioural aspect of 
joint ventures that draws a line between them and amalgamations and acquisitions. 
This condition makes it necessary to examine the impact of the continuing 
relationship between the parents in the context of the joint venture on their activities 
                                                          
8
 Brodley (n 2) 1526. 
9
 D G Goyder, Joanna Goyder and Albertina Albors-Llorens, Goyder’s EC Competition Law (5th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 461.  
10
 Robert Pitofsky, ‘A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures’ (1985) 54 Antitrust Law 
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outside the joint venture, which is not normally an issue in the case of amalgamations 
and acquisitions. It also excludes some business organisations, including professional 
sports leagues, credit card networks and joint selling or buying agencies, in which 
none of the member firms is able to exercise decisive influence over the business 
policies of the entity concerned. In the US, where joint control is generally not 
considered as a core element in defining joint ventures from a competition law 
perspective, these organisations are also regarded as joint ventures.
12
 As can be 
inferred from the later chapters of this thesis, the fact that the parents have the ability 
to decisively influence the operation of the joint venture undoubtedly results in 
certain competition issues, which may not arise in the event of the aforementioned 
organisations. Chapter 5 below indicates that treating these two different situations in 
the same way appears to lead to some complications in relating to the competition 
assessment of joint ventures in the US. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the 




Accordingly, these three common conditions are the fundamental elements of joint 
ventures that make them special from a competition viewpoint. The fourth condition 
provided by Brodley, the creation of new capabilities in terms of production, 
technology, product, or entry into a new market, is not a distinctive feature of joint 
ventures. Rather, it indicates economic benefits that a joint venture may bring about. 
In particular, this condition may give rise to the exclusion of the joint use of existing 
facilities, due to the fact that they have relatively less potential to create these 
benefits.
14
 Similarly, the fourth condition of Goyder’s definition seeking a formal 
allocation of functions to the joint venture is not directly relevant to the competition 
analysis, and may unduly exclude some operations from the concept of joint venture. 
In this respect, the fulfilment of the three conditions common to the definitions given 
by Brodley and Goyder should be sufficient for a collaboration to be considered as a 
joint venture. 
 
In the light of all these explanations, the term joint venture may be defined to cover 
the creation of a jointly controlled entity which is separate from its parents and to 
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which the parents contribute significantly in terms of assets, capital and staff. This 
definition is also in line with the Commission’s approach. 
  
III. Types of Joint Ventures 
 
A- Full-Function Joint Ventures vis-à-vis Partial Function Joint Ventures 
 
EU competition law makes a distinction between full-function and partial function 
joint ventures in order to determine the applicable substantive and procedural rules to 
the joint venture in question. Accordingly, full-function joint ventures are treated as 
concentrations and are subject to the Merger Regulation. In contrast, partial function 
joint ventures are considered to be simple agreements, and are examined in 




The concept of full-functionality is defined in Article 3(4) of the Merger Regulation 
as ‘performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic 
entity’. This definition firstly requires that the joint venture is provided with a 
management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and with the necessary resources 
in terms of finance, staff and assets. Secondly, it provides that the joint venture has 
autonomy to enter into business relationships with third parties and to deal with its 
parents on an arm’s length basis.
16
 A more elaborate explanation on the full-
functionality criterion and the applicable substantive tests is given in the next 
chapter.  
 
B- Economic Classification of Joint Ventures  
 
1. Horizontal Joint Ventures vis-à-vis Non-Horizontal Joint Ventures 
 
Competition concerns that may arise from a joint venture normally depend on 
whether it is characterised as horizontal.
 
Two different criteria may be used for the 
                                                          
15
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
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 See Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
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purpose of this categorisation. Firstly, a joint venture may be considered as 
horizontal, if the parent firms are either actual or potential competitors in the market 
in which it is intended to operate.
17
 These horizontal joint ventures are generally 
viewed more dangerous than other types, since they lead to the loss of direct 
competition between their parent firms.
18
 Therefore, this categorisation has the same 





Nevertheless, such classification does not address the risk of coordination between 
the parent firms with regard to markets other than those of the joint venture. In order 
to cover these horizontal competition concerns, secondly, joint ventures may be 
classified as horizontal if the parent firms are actual or potential competitors in the 
joint venture’s market or in any other market related to that market.
20
 This definition 
seems to be used implicitly in the Cooperation Guidelines.
21
   
 
These two definitions for horizontal joint ventures overlap with each other to the 
extent that the parents are competitors only in the joint venture’s market. If the 
horizontal relationship between the parents extends beyond the joint venture’s 
market, the joint venture is likely to raise more serious competition concerns because 
it may result in both an increase in market concentration and a risk of coordination.   
 
Non-horizontal joint ventures may also be divided into two categories, vertical and 
conglomerate, based on two different criteria. A joint venture, first of all, can be 
classified as vertical if it is intended to operate in markets vertically related to those 
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 These joint ventures are usually used by parent firms as a way of 
supplying or purchasing final or intermediary products. In this respect, they may 
result in a reduction in the production and transactional costs of the parents, but at 
the same time may cause foreclosure concerns.
23
 Alternatively, joint ventures may be 
characterised as vertical if there is a buyer-seller relationship among the parents.
24
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the existence of such a vertical relationship does 
not normally provide a distinctive incentive for firms to set up a joint venture and 
does not lead to serious competition concerns and, therefore, it may not be suitable 




Based on the position of the parents with regard to the market of the joint venture, a 
conglomerate joint venture may be defined as one whose parents do not operate 
either in the joint venture’s market or in markets vertically related to that. These joint 
ventures normally raise less serious concerns in relation to the joint venture market 
compared to horizontal and vertical joint ventures. Yet, they may give rise to spill-
over effects with respect to other markets where the parent firms are in competition. 
Conglomerate joint ventures, defined as requiring the absence of any horizontal or 
vertical link between the parties in relation to either the joint venture’s market or any 
other market, however, do not normally lead to these effects. They are generally the 
least dangerous type of joint venture from a competition law perspective.  
 
Some joint ventures may comprise either two, or possibly all, of the horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate aspects described above. This may be the case particularly 
where the joint venture has more than two parents. For example, a joint venture 
established for the production of a pharmaceutical product may involve two 
participants operating at the production level, one participant engaged in the 
distribution of the product, and one investor participant that does not operate in any 
market related to that of the joint venture. It is more difficult to analyse the effects of 
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2. Classification of Joint Ventures by Function 
 
The function allotted to the joint venture by its parents is usually indicative of its 
effects on competition. Various categories are used by commentators in classifying 
joint ventures by function, including R&D, production, marketing, purchasing, 
selling, distribution, commercialisation and standardisation.
27
 However, in this thesis, 
joint ventures are divided into four main groups according to their predominant 
function, as: (i) R&D joint ventures; (ii) production joint ventures; (iii) sales joint 
ventures; and (iv) purchasing joint ventures.
28
 Joint ventures may fall into only one 




a) R&D Joint Ventures  
 
In the context of R&D joint ventures, parent firms pool their intellectual properties, 
financial assets and other resources for developing new or improved products or 
processes, or for gaining some technical knowledge.
30
 The function of many R&D 
joint ventures is limited to carrying out a specific R&D project. These so-called pure 
R&D joint ventures
31
 usually provide that the resulting innovation is licensed or 
assigned to the parent firms if the project ends successfully. However, in most cases, 
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R&D joint ventures are very common in a number of industries, especially in high-
technology industries which are mainly characterised by dynamic competition.
33
 In 
these industries firms usually choose the joint venture format for R&D purposes, in 
order to remove free riding problems, or to share risks or costs in projects requiring 
huge investment. Such joint ventures usually introduce new, improved or cheaper 
products which otherwise would not emerge, and they also eliminate the duplication 
of the same R&D effort, thereby avoiding the loss of social welfare.
34
 Nonetheless, 
in some cases, R&D joint ventures may result in less developed products or higher 
prices, compared to a situation in which each parent independently conducts the 
R&D. These joint ventures may also reduce competition outside the joint project as a 




b) Production Joint Ventures  
 
Production joint ventures refer to those into which parent firms combine their 
resources in order to jointly produce a final product or inputs to a final product.
36
 
These joint ventures serve as a particularly effective way for small firms to overcome 
capacity constraints and achieve economies of scale.
37
 They may also lead to 
substantial efficiencies by integrating complementary assets and technologies.
38
 This 
integration may enable parent firms to produce a new or improved product that none 
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Parent firms may utilise production joint ventures in order to learn from each other’s 
know-how. In some cases, their expectations from a production joint venture may be 
particularly to obtain the necessary knowledge about the characteristics of the market 
they plan to enter independently in the future. The NUMMI joint venture between 




Despite these benefits of production joint ventures from a business perspective, they 
may give rise to social losses by providing firms with market power that allows them 
to increase prices by way of reducing output, or of charging high prices for the 
products transferred from the joint venture to the parents.
41
 These concerns 
essentially form the grounds for the application of competition rules to production 
joint ventures.
42
   
 
c) Sales Joint Ventures  
 
Firms also set up joint ventures to engage in joint selling of products or services. 
These joint ventures often also include the distribution and advertising of the 
products. Therefore, they are sometimes called distribution or marketing joint 
ventures. 
 
Sales joint ventures, in general, may allow firms to reduce their distribution and 
transaction costs, penetrate new markets, or offer a one-stop shop and improved 
services to customers.
43
 Actually, joint sales agencies and distribution agreements are 
also used by firms in order to obtain those benefits. However, the joint venture 
format may be preferable from a business viewpoint, particularly where a more 
extensive integration is needed to achieve the target, and/or where firms intend to 
retain a significant degree of control over these integrated operations. 
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Because sales joint ventures may enable competitors to fix prices and reduce output, 
they are normally treated more suspiciously compared to the other types of joint 
ventures. This treatment may be softened in cases where the joint venture involves 
integration leading to significant efficiencies.
44
   
 
d) Purchasing Joint Ventures 
 
Purchasing joint ventures serve the joint buying of products or services, although 
joint buying agencies or agreements are more commonly used for this purpose. 
Jointly purchased products are, in most cases, raw materials forming an input to the 
parents’ own production.
45
 However, these joint ventures may also relate to final 
products. For instance, competing firms engaging in the retailing of certain products 
may establish a joint venture at the wholesale level in order to jointly purchase those 
products. 
 
Purchasing joint ventures are usually formed by small and medium-sized firms to 
increase their buying power, thereby enabling them to successfully negotiate with 
sellers to purchase products with more favourable conditions. Even larger firms may 
need to combine their buying activities particularly when importing products.
46
 
Therefore, purchasing joint ventures generally result in a reduction in costs and the 





Nonetheless, these joint ventures may threaten competition by approximating the 
costs of parent firms to each other and facilitating information flow between them. 
They may also give the parents buying power that may reduce competition in the 
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IV. Economic Role of Joint Ventures 
 
This part first describes the role of joint ventures with regard to some specific 
industries, including the high-technology, network, airline and mining industries, and 
the relationship between international joint ventures and globalisation. Finally, it 
explains the economic motives behind joint ventures and their drawbacks as a 
business model. 
  
A- Joint Ventures in Specific Industries 
 
1. High-Technology Industries 
  
High-technology industries are generally accepted as encompassing the 
telecommunications, biotechnology, computer and computer software, electronics, 
aerospace, pharmaceutical and semi-conductor industries.
49
 These industries play a 
crucial role in economic growth. The data of Eurostat shows that the total turnover of 
approximately 800,000 enterprises operating in these industries across the EU 
reached virtually 1.5 trillion Euros in the 2000s.
50
       
 
The high-technology industries may be differentiated from other industries according 
to the speed of innovation. In these industries, due to rapid technological changes, 
the life cycle of products is much shorter than in other industries.
51
 Therefore, they 
are often characterised by dynamic competition based on innovation, rather than by 
classical price competition.
52
 The producers of new technologies meeting the 
expectations of customers frequently gain a significant first mover advantage and, 
thus, significant market power. However, because of the short life of the product, 
such market power may decrease rapidly if the firm cannot predict future trends and 
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pursue an innovation policy accordingly.
53
 This requires firms to continuously 




Nonetheless, given the uncertainties resulting from the rapid pace of technological 
development, allocating a great amount of financial resources to R&D, which largely 
form sunk costs, usually poses high risks.
55
 The formation of a joint venture is a 
popular way used by firms to minimize these risks.
56
 In particular, firms prefer to set 
up R&D joint ventures to share the sunk costs of R&D and decrease the uncertainties 
and risks of forecasting future trends. Pooling the complementary technologies and 
expertise of the participants facilitates achieving these objectives.  
 
Because of the high frequency of innovation in the high-technology industries, the 
objective of joint ventures is often not limited only to a specific R&D project. 
Rather, many joint ventures integrate all the R&D activities of the parents in the 
market. Firms may even allot other business functions including production, 
advertising and distribution to such joint ventures in order to provide the rapid and 
effective entry of new products to the market.
57
 The joint venture Sony-Ericsson, 
between Sony Corporation and L.M. Ericsson, may be given as an example of such a 
joint venture. In 2001, these two firms integrated their world-wide operations of 
developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing and distributing mobile phones into 
a new company, Sony-Ericsson. By doing this, they aimed to be able to compete 
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In the high-technology industries, the creation of a joint venture is a particularly 
important tool for small firms to overcome their lack of expertise and finance, and 
high entry barriers. However, as in the example of Sony-Ericsson, large firms also 
participate in joint ventures to reduce investment risks and retain or increase their 
competitiveness.
59
 Many large firms build a network of joint ventures with different 
firms for different high-technology products. For example, in addition to Sony-
Ericsson in the mobile phone industry, Sony has participated in various joint ventures 
including Intertrust
60
 in the area of digital rights management, and SonyNec
61
 in the 
market for optical data storage disk drive products. 
 
2. Network Industries 
 
Networks are an increasingly widespread phenomenon in today’s economy as a 
result of rapid technological development, the rising complexity of needs, and the 
liberalisation trend in certain sectors such as telecommunications, energy and 
railways. A ‘network’ may be defined as ‘a mixture of facilities and rules which 
allow a firm or a group of firms to exchange or share transactions, data, electronic 
impulses, information, energy, and physical traffic’.
62
 Telephone, the Internet and 
ATM systems are some classical examples of networks. 
 
Network industries have a distinctive characteristic which economists call ‘network 
externality’ or ‘network effect’. Network externalities refer to situations where the 
network becomes more valuable to its users when another user participates in it.
63
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For example, telephone networks or the Internet are more valuable to their users if a 
great number of people use them. In these examples, network externalities arise 
directly.
64
 However, these effects may exist indirectly where the large number of 




Network externalities may result in economies of scale and scope on both the supply 
and the demand side.
66
 For instance, in the case of credit card networks, such as Visa 
and MasterCard, the average cost incurred by the network per membership decreases 
as the number of member banks increases. On the other side, this increase in the 
number of member banks makes the membership more beneficial to each bank.   
 
In most cases, networks entail various horizontal and vertical links between different 
firms. This creates another type of externality such that an action of one firm gives 
rise to some negative results, borne not by these firms but by other firms.
67
 
Therefore, cooperation among firms has an essential role for the proper functioning 
of these industries. In some cases, a physical integration of the facilities of 
competitors may be necessary to provide better services to customers.
68
 For example, 
in order to offer customers a more widespread network, telephone firms have to 




The need for cooperation in network industries is also of importance in relation to 
innovation. In the absence of cooperation, the risk of free riding by other firms is 
likely to decrease the incentive to innovate.
70
 Moreover, cooperation may be 
significant where the innovation becomes valuable if others firms in the network also 
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 Hence, the refusal of any firm to cooperate may discourage other firms 




In many network industries, firms also need to cooperate with respect to the 
standardisation of technical and operational rules in order to enhance the 
interoperability between the products of firms in the network.
73
 Such standard-setting 





Achieving the necessary cooperation through a series of contracts is often highly 
costly for firms and also becomes unwieldy as the network expands in size.
75
 In this 
respect, joint ventures play an increasingly important role in network industries as 
they diminish the costs resulting from a series of horizontal and vertical agreements 
between firms in the network.
76
 Furthermore, joint ventures allow small firms which 
do not have the necessary finance and expertise, to provide network services on their 
own, to combine their complementary assets and, thus, to compete with large firms.
77
 
Even large firms may need to set up a joint venture to make a network more 




Firms may limit participation in a network joint venture. This may be the case, for 
example, if the objective of firms in forming the joint venture is to create a network 
that will compete with other networks. However, in many cases, firms intend to 
make the joint venture open to participation from other firms. Where the 
participation of all firms in the joint venture is essential for the success of the 
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network, firms generally prefer the latter type. It should be borne in mind that in such 
cases, the entity concerned may not be considered as a joint venture because it loses 
its characteristic of being under the joint control of two or more firms, within the 




For example, in 1998, Nokia and Ericsson, two large mobile phone manufacturers, 
and Psion, a developer and manufacturer of handheld portable computers and 
modems, set up the joint venture Symbian, for the purpose of developing the 
operating system of Psion to establish industry standards. Symbian was jointly 
controlled by all three parents.
80
 However, in the same year, Motorola also became a 
shareholder in Symbian. As a result, Symbian lost its joint venture character because 
the parents no longer exercised joint control over it.
81
 Indeed, in 2008, a new 
independent non-profit organisation called the Symbian Foundation, which has many 




3. Air Transport Industry 
 
The air transport industry was deregulated in 1978 in the US, and in the following 
decades in Europe and other parts of the world.
83
 This deregulation trend has led to 
more competition in the industry because of new entries intensifying competitive 
constraints on incumbent airline firms by lowering prices. In addition, the rising 
globalisation in the airline industry, supported by deregulation and international 
agreements between countries, has forced airline firms to operate at a global level.
84
  
As a result, firms have needed to cooperate in order to achieve the necessary cost 
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reductions and retain or improve their market position in the international market. In 




Airline alliances, in general, enable participant firms to operate more efficiently, and 
achieve economies of scale, scope and density
86
 by improving their use of capacity, 
or by reducing costs through eliminating the unnecessary duplication of operations.
87
 
Furthermore, through alliances, firms may overcome regulatory barriers to operating 
in foreign markets, including restrictions on foreign ownership and capacity under 
bilateral air service agreements, and limited access to airport infrastructures.
88
 
Alliances also allow firms to offer a better quality of services to consumers, such as 
providing better frequent flyer programmes, a larger network and better ticketing 
services.
89
 In addition to these industry-specific benefits, alliances may be an 
effective tool for small firms, as in other industries, to cope with the uncertainties 




Airline alliances may encompass a broad spectrum of cooperation forms. Code-
sharing, for example, is a fundamental element of airline cooperation. This form of 
cooperation enables each participant to sell space independently under its own airline 
designator code on a peculiar flight, thereby expanding its flight network without 
physically operating its own aeroplane.
91
 Airline alliances may also include 
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cooperation on revenue and cost sharing; pricing; frequent flyer programmes; route 
and schedule planning; marketing and sales; travel agents and other commissions; 
branding/co-branding; integration and development of information systems, 




The degree of integration in airlines alliances differs according to the objectives and 
commitment of the participants. Customer expectations, an uncertain operating 
environment, the regulatory framework, and managerial preferences are decisive 
factors in this respect.
93
 Some alliances, called ‘market alliances’, require a relatively 
low level of integration, limited to code-sharing, joint frequent flyer programmes and 
joint advertising.
94
 Star and Oneworld are typical examples of such alliances.  
 
Airline firms sometimes need stronger and wider integration in order to provide the 
targeted cost reduction, network expansion and other operating synergies, and, thus, 
to retain or improve their position in the competitive air transport industry. 
Amalgamations and acquisitions would be a viable option for firms to achieve these 
objectives.
95
 However, regulatory restrictions, such as those on foreign ownership, 
may limit the use of these options.
96
 Moreover, brand image is an important 
component for large airline firms that have carried national emblems for many years. 
Therefore, they may not favour amalgamations and acquisitions in which they lose 
their individual brand image.
97
 Joint ventures constitute a good vehicle for firms to 
provide strong integration, whilst overcoming such regulatory and brand-related 
problems. 
 
The first large airline joint venture was established between KLM, a Netherland flag 
carrier, and Northwest Airlines, a US flag carrier. The parties integrated their cargo 
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and passenger transportation operations between Europe and the US into the joint 
venture and began to act as a single carrier. The joint venture comprised code 
sharing; revenue and cost sharing; joint pricing; coordination of capacity; 
coordination of network development, marketing and sales activities; fully combined 
frequent flyer programmes; and coordination of a number of infrastructure activities, 
such as ground handling, catering, and maintenance.
98
 Similar joint ventures were set 
up between British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia,
99
 and between Lufthansa, 
United Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)
100
 for the transatlantic 




An attempt to set up a more extensive joint venture was made by KLM and Alitalia 
in 1999. Whilst retaining their separate identities, they combined all their passenger 
and cargo services, except for maintenance, ground handling and charter flights, into 
two separate ventures, one for scheduled passenger services and one for cargo 
services. These joint ventures were not formed as separate corporate entities with 
legal personality, in order to prevent the risk of not being entitled to operate on 
international routes covered by bilateral air transport agreements. A ‘Network 
Organizer’ was jointly appointed to manage these two joint ventures. The 
Commission analysed this alliance, determined it to be a full-function joint venture 
and cleared it.
102
 However, this alliance lasted for a very short time as KLM 




In addition to these joint ventures relating to the main operations in the air transport 
industry, airline firms also form joint ventures to conduct upstream, downstream or 
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 The joint venture DSS World Sourcing, established 
between Delta Air Lines, Singapore Airlines and Swissair to jointly purchase some 
equipment, may be given as an example of those covering upstream operations. This 
joint venture includes the joint purchasing of items ranging from in-flight amenities 




Joint ventures relating to maintenance and engineering are also common in the air 
transport industry. Some examples of these joint ventures are the joint venture 
Aerotechnic Industries S.A, between Air France and Royal Air Maroc;
106
 the joint 
venture X-Air Services, between Sabena and TNT Airways;
107
 and the joint venture 




Airline firms also need to cooperate with firms which have expertise in the fields of 
IT and telecommunications. For example, Lufthansa and Siemens set up the joint 
venture Synavion, which provides electronic data processing services to airports.
109
 
Similarly, Delta Air Lines formed a joint venture with AT&T to meet its internal 
computing requirements.
110
   
 
4. Mining Industries 
 
The mining industries generally encompass those based on natural resources 
including metals (eg iron, aluminium, gold, zinc), minerals, coal and crude oil and 
gas. Due to the fact that in most countries natural resources inherently belong to 
state, governmental influence is noticeably high in these industries. In the past, in 
many countries, mining operations were carried out by governmental bodies. 
However, the recent decades have witnessed some restructuring reforms in the 
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mining industry in numerous developed and developing countries.
111
 The 
governmental bodies dealing with mining operations have mostly been converted to 
private companies which have then been privatised. Nonetheless, governments are 
still active in the mining industry by virtue of having significant shares in leading 
mining companies, and by maintaining the power to grant firms licences to perform 
mining activities.  
 
Joint venture is an old phenomenon in the mining industries. In the iron and steel 
industry, for instance, joint ventures have been used since the end of World War 
II.
112
 The research of Fusfeld on the US iron and steel industry in 1957 revealed that 
there was a network consisting of at least seventy-five joint ventures that dominated 
the entire industry in the US.
113
 Similarly, Stuckey found that in 1979 approximately 
sixty joint ventures in the upstream aluminium industry controlled 66 % of the 




Mining joint ventures can be observed all over the world. Due to the depletion of 
resources in their home countries, American, European and Japanese firms, in 
particular, began to search for new resources. Therefore, the number of international 
mining joint ventures has increased in regions with prosperous resources, including 
Canada, Australia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet Union region.
115
 In 
Australia, for example, a large part of the exploration in the mineral industry has 
been conducted through joint ventures.
116
 In 1983, Stuckey revealed that joint 
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In many cases, the primary objective behind mining joint ventures is to gain access to 
new resources or markets.
118
 These joint ventures generally involve a large firm 
having the necessary financial and technological capabilities and a small firm 
holding the exploration right of the resource.
119
 In particular, Western firms establish 
joint ventures with local firms in developing countries in order to reach their 
resources. In fact, foreign firms often do not have any alternative means, since most 
developing countries require local participation in the exploration of natural 




The formation of a joint venture enables local firms to effectively benefit from 
foreign firms’ technology, expertise and financial and commercial skills in respect of 
the extraction, marketing and distribution of resources.
121
 In many cases, the host 
government itself also has a lack of sufficient technological expertise and 
commercial ability to extract and market the resources. Therefore, joint ventures 
between host countries and multinational firms are also widespread in the mining 
industries.
122
 This is the case, for example, in the oil and natural gas industry.
123
 The 
multinational firm in this respect may also be a state-owned company operating in 
the industry. The joint venture MMG, between China National Petroleum 
Corporation, owned by Chinese Government, and KazMunaiGaz, owned by Kazakh 
Government, for the exploration, extraction, and processing of crude oil and natural 
gas in Kazakhstan, may be given as an example of such a joint venture.
124
 Another 
example is the joint venture Salah Gas, between Statoil controlled by the Norwegian 
State, Sonatrach belonging to Algerian State and BP, a multinational oil firm, for the 
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Exploration activities generally involve some political, geological and financial 
risks.
126
 Investing in a developing country which does not have a stable political and 
economic structure poses serious risks (eg the risk of expropriation) in itself for 
foreign firms. Hence, joint ventures usually serve as a suitable tool to share these 
risks. Sharing costs, creating efficiencies by combining complementary assets and 
overcoming high entry and exit barriers also form some of the reasons for 
establishing joint ventures in those industries.
127
   
 
Most mining industries have an oligopolistic structure. For example, according to the 
study of Fusfeld, the iron and steel industry in the US was dominated by two groups 
of large producers that controlled 50 of 53 intra-industry joint ventures.
128
 Such a 
network of joint ventures may be used by firms to sustain oligopoly in the 
industry.
129
 Firstly, as is apparent in other industries, a network of joint ventures can 
facilitate collusion between mining firms in respect of planning and conducting 
mining operations.
130
 Furthermore, joint ventures between the leading firms of the 
industry may enable them to control all substantial reserves and, thus, create entry 
barriers for new or other incumbent firms by limiting their access to the necessary 
resources.
131
 However, joint ventures may still be considered less dangerous, from a 
competition standpoint, than a full-merger of the parents in the market. In 
Inco/Falconbridge,
132
 for instance, the Commission noted that the formation of a 
partial function joint venture in the nickel mining industry was less anticompetitive 
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B- International Joint Ventures and Globalisation 
 
The last several decades have witnessed a globalisation trend in many industries. As 
explained, with regard to the industries mentioned above, the reasons for this 
globalisation wave may vary from one industry to another. However, it may be stated 
that the liberalisation trend and adoption of regulations inducing foreign investments 
all over the world, and the rise in the understanding of the benefits of operating 
internationally among managers have generally played a crucial role in this trend.  
 
Due to this globalisation wave, firms have needed to establish global business 
strategies for surviving in respect of the international competition. A successful 
global strategy, in this regard, entails the expansion of business operations beyond 
the boundaries of the home country, adaptation to the local characteristics of 
domestic markets, and the global integration of business operations in different 
countries.
134
 Joint ventures constitute a popular business model for multinational 
firms to achieve these objectives. Indeed, the vast majority of joint ventures are 
established by firms from different countries. According to the data gained by 
Moskalev and Swensen from the study of the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum 
Alliances/Joint Ventures database, almost 60 % of 60,446 joint ventures reported 




As stated above in relation to the mining industries, international joint ventures 
usually involve a multinational firm from an industrialised country and a local firm 
(or government) from a host developing country. However, the function of 
international joint ventures is often not limited merely to the exploration and 
extraction of raw materials. It is possible to observe many international joint ventures 
set up for different purposes ranging from production to R&D and distribution. 
 
Many multinational firms from industrialised countries have spread their operations 
into emerging markets including China, India, Russia, Brazil and Eastern European 
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countries. This trend has increased the number of international joint ventures in these 
areas. Due to economic growth, firms from these emerging markets have become 
new multinationals,
136
 and have set up joint ventures in other countries.
137
     
 
When entering into a foreign market, firms may prefer to form joint ventures over 
wholly-owned subsidiaries for many reasons. Firstly, the formation of a joint venture 
with a local firm may lead to more favourable treatment from the host government. 
In this way, they may obtain a licence to operate or import, or the right to purchase 
land, or they may benefit from tax or tariff reductions. Local participation may also 
provide a more favourable approach from the local bureaucracy and public towards 
foreign investments.
138
 This may facilitate overcoming any bureaucratic difficulties 
and prevent any uncertainties and delays in the operation.  
 
Collaboration with local partners also enables multinational firms to adapt their 
product or service to the culture, customer preference and other characteristics of the 
host country’s market and get access to the local distribution channels.
139
 In addition, 
these joint ventures allow foreign firms to share the costs and risks of operating in 
developing countries, which are inherently more risky area than elsewhere in the 
world for foreign investments.
140
 On the other hand, if local participation does not 
provide any complementary capabilities, multinational firms usually prefer wholly-
owned subsidiaries when entering a new market.
141
   
 
The formation of joint ventures with multinational firms also presents various 
advantages to local firms from developing countries. Benefiting from the technology 
and management know-how of multinational firms is one important incentive for 
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them to get involved in such joint ventures.
142
 Local firms may also obtain access to 




Not all international joint ventures are established between multinational firms and 
local firms from developing states in order to operate in a limited geographic area. 
There are also many international joint ventures that perform activities world-wide 
without any geographic limitation. These joint ventures are generally set up by 
multinational firms, both from industrialised countries, to improve their position in 
the global market. The joint venture Sony-Ericsson mentioned above
144
 is one 
example of this kind of joint venture.  
 
C- Motives behind Joint Ventures 
 
The motives pursued by firms in participating in a joint venture have a significant 
influence on its design and characteristics and, therefore, are closely linked to its 
effects on competition.
145
 Accordingly, the analysis of these motives is necessary to 
understand the nature of joint ventures in terms of competition law. There are several 
theoretical economic approaches that explain economic rationale for the formation of 
joint ventures. The transaction cost approach, developed mainly by Williamson, 
suggests that the incentive to minimise transaction and production costs is the 
prevailing factor for firms in choosing a business model.
146
 According to this 
approach, joint ventures are preferred by firms primarily because they reduce these 
costs. Another explanation for the use of joint ventures is proposed by the strategic 
behaviour approach that focuses on the effects of strategic behaviours on the 
competitive positioning of a firm.
147
 According to this approach, firms decide on 
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whether to use the joint venture format based on whether it would maximise their 




Harrigan, however, classifies the motives for joint ventures as internal, competitive 
and strategic.
149
 This classification is actually similar to the distinction between the 
transaction costs and strategic behaviour theories. It can be stated that the transaction 
cost theory refers to the internal motives, whilst the strategic behaviour theory refers 
to the competitive and strategic motives to explain the reasons for joint ventures. 
Despite the fact that these two theories use different criteria to explain firms’ 
motives, they overlap and complement each other in many aspects. Furthermore, 
there are some other explanations for the use of joint ventures.
150
 Therefore, it is 
herein relied on the transaction cost and the strategic behaviour theories, and other 
theories, in order to analyse the motives behind joint ventures.  
 
In this context, these motives may be divided into six categories, which are: (i) 
providing transactional efficiencies; (ii) accessing complementary assets; (iii) 
reducing risks; (iv) achieving economies of scale; (v) entering into a new market; and 
(vi) acquiring market power. These motives may overlap with each other in part, and 
firms may have either one or all of these motives to set up a joint venture.  
 
Most of these motives are similar to those for amalgamations and acquisitions. 
However, the joint venture model is generally preferred over these, because the 
parties can combine their operations only to the extent that it is necessary to achieve 
their targeted objectives. This is particularly the case if firms have ideas, know-how 
or expertise that may be used in an area unrelated to their core business.
151
 However, 
if the parties’ intention is to integrate all or most of their core business activities, 
amalgamations or acquisitions may be a better option for them.  
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1. Providing Transactional Efficiencies  
 
Joint ventures may be used as a means of avoiding high transaction costs stemming 
from conducting a complex business operation through formal agreements that 
include many uncertainties.
152
 In a long term business relationship, it may be difficult 
to anticipate all future contingencies and to address all of them in the agreement.
153
 If 
one party makes agreement-specific investments, it may lose its bargaining power 
against the other party, due to the fact that it is likely to become more reliant on the 
continuation of the agreement to recoup these investments. In this case, such a party 
may face the risk of opportunism and, thus, may demand more favourable terms 
thereby increasing the costs for the other party, or it may refuse to make the 
necessary investments.
154
 Transaction costs may also increase where the parties need 
to enter a complex series of agreements for the project concerned. Negotiating and 
drafting these agreements may give rise to wasting time, effort and financial costs, 
which might even result in the failure of the project.  
 
Through providing the partial integration of the parties, the joint venture format 
offers some advantages in overcoming these problems. First of all, it is easier to deal 
with problematic issues within the management of the joint venture in due course 
rather than anticipating and specifying them in drafting an agreement. The fact that 
each parent makes investments in the joint venture and shares profits normally 
decreases the likelihood of opportunism.
155
 Furthermore, managerial control enables 
the parents to monitor the activity of the joint venture and, thus, reduce any 
information imbalance that intensifies the effects of opportunism.
156
 Joint ventures 
may also eliminate uncertainties and delays resulting from concluding a series of 
agreements, by increasing the speed of the transaction between the parents. This is 
extremely important, particularly in the high-technology industries in which the 
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speed of technological change is very high, and in the network industries which 
require continuous cooperation between firms.
157
     
 
2. Accessing Complementary Assets and Skills 
 
Due to the rapid pace of technological development and increasing global 
competition, not only small firms but also large firms do not possess all of the 
necessary technologies, expertise and assets to sustain their competitive position in 
the market.
158
 Therefore, accessing the complementary assets and skills of other 
firms constitutes a common rationale for the formation of joint ventures. This is 
particularly the case where firms need each other’s technology to conduct R&D for a 
new product. In these cases, R&D joint ventures may be used to integrate such 
complementary technologies.
159
 Such joint ventures form an effective way of 
technology transferring
160





Technology transferring through joint ventures may also be the case, where one party 
holds a technology, and the other party possesses the necessary assets and 
capabilities to enable production by using this technology, and/or to market or 
distribute the resulting products. In these cases, joint ventures may be chosen over 
licence agreements by firms in order to obtain the transactional efficiencies 
mentioned above. The joint venture format may also be advantageous since 
managerial control allows the parties to benefit more effectively from each other’s 
knowledge and skills. Furthermore, it may be profitable to the owner of the 
technology in cases where the innovation has the potential to become a huge success. 
 
Joint ventures may also serve the integration of complementary assets and skills 
other than technology. For example, a firm may have a product but may lack the 
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necessary skills to market it, whereas another firm without the capability to 
manufacture this product may have high level marketing skills.
162
 In this case, these 
firms may realise synergies by combining these complementary skills.  
  
Access to complementary assets and skills is a particularly common incentive for 
forming joint ventures with non-competitors.
163
 For instance, a firm operating in a 
service industry may need to cooperate with another firm specialising in computer 
software, to improve its service quality and reduce operating costs. The joint venture 
between Delta Air Lines and AT&T may be given as an example of such a joint 
venture.
164
 However, competitors also set up joint ventures for this purpose, where, 





3. Reducing Risks  
 
Another common motive behind joint ventures is to efficiently share the risks and 
costs involved in a business operation. Although this motive applies especially to 
small firms, large firms also often prefer joint ventures for highly risky projects that 
include great uncertainties and require significant investments. For example, mining 
projects, particularly oil and gas exploration operations, may be viewed as risky even 
for large multinational firms because of the low success rate of the operation as well 
as the high level of investment.
166
 Expanding operations into new geographical 
markets, particularly into developing countries, involves many political and 
economic risks for foreign firms. The formation of a joint venture with a local firm 
may decrease these risks by providing faster entry and success in the market and, 
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Spreading risks and costs may also be an important incentive for both small and large 
firms to engage in R&D. In particular, in the high-technology industries, 
uncertainties about the results of R&D, future success and the short life cycle of 
products, makes these activities very risky and costly.
168
 In some circumstances, an 
innovation may not be protected sufficiently by intellectual property laws or may be 
easily reverse engineered by competitors.
169
 This creates free riding problems that 
increase the risks in investing in R&D. In such cases, setting up an R&D joint 
venture with competitors may be an effective way to reduce these risks. These risks 
may also arise where all the sellers of a homogenous product benefit from the 
marketing efforts of a seller on the general characteristics of the product.
170
 The 
formation of a joint venture between these sellers may be one way to deal with this 
problem. 
 
4. Achieving Economies of Scale 
 
In industries which are characterised by economies of scale (and/or economics of 
scope), joint ventures are widely used to achieve substantial cost savings. In 
particular, small firms with limited production capacities combine their production 
operations to increase their output, thereby minimising the production cost for per 
unit. Where the demand for the product is low, even larger firms may not be capable 
of achieving economies of scale through internal growth.
171
 Amalgamations and 
acquisitions may also be used by firms as a vehicle to attain economies of scale. 
However, for this purpose, joint ventures may be chosen over these models, due to 
the fact that they may eliminate some uncertainties and difficulties resulting from the 
latter, and that they may also provide the opportunity to end the cooperation if the 
joint venture does not achieve as expected.
172
    
 
In addition to the production level, economies of scale may be achieved at the R&D 
and distribution levels. For example, an R&D joint venture may avoid the costs of 
                                                          
168
 Kattan (n 1) 939; Johnson and Houston (n 153) 73. 
169
 Kitch (n 162) 963; Kattan (n 1) 942-43; Chang and others (n 5) 238.  
170
 Kitch (n 162) 963; Chang and others (n 5) 238. 
171
 Glaister and Buckley (n 159) 304. 
172
 P Mariti and R H Smiley, ‘Co-Operative Agreements and the Organization of Industry’ (1983) 31 
Journal of Industrial Economics 437, 444-45.  
73 
 
duplicating the same process and perform more efficient research.
173
 Purchasing and 
sales joint ventures may also give rise to cost-reductions in transactions with third 
parties, by increasing bargaining power while decreasing the number of agreements 
concluded for the operation.  
 
5. Entering into New Markets 
 
A traditional objective for establishing a joint venture is to enter new product or 
geographical markets, in most cases foreign markets. Multinational firms use the 
distribution channels and market knowledge of local firms, through joint ventures, in 
order to make a faster and stronger market entry. Where there are legal barriers to 
foreign firms, the formation of joint ventures with local firms may be the only way to 
avoid such barriers. These barriers are explained more elaborately in the previous 




In some circumstances, joint ventures may also be useful when entering a specific 
region in the home country. This is particularly the case where a stand-alone entry to 
such a geographical market is not profitable because of the high transportation costs 
or the lack of knowledge about customer choices and demand for the product in the 
region. For example, in the cement industry, the transportation costs of supplying 
products to distant areas may make it difficult to compete with local manufacturers. 
Building a new plant in the region may also not be efficient if the demand for the 
product is limited. Therefore, setting up a production joint venture with a firm 
already operating in the region may enable firms to achieve a quicker and stronger 
entry. The joint venture between Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson, where the parties 
built a plant for the production of sodium chlorate in the Southeastern US, is a well-




Joint ventures may also be attractive to firms which aim to access new product 
markets. This may be particularly the case where the market is concentrated and 
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characterised by high entry barriers.
176
 In this regard, the formation of joint ventures 
may help all firms, but especially small firms, to overcome these entry barriers.  
 
6. Acquiring Market Power 
 
The motives explained above generally relate to the creation of efficiencies, ie the 
procompetitive effects of joint ventures. On the other hand, the purposes of firms 
forming joint ventures may be merely to coordinate with their competitors more 
effectively or to eliminate an important competitor, thereby increasing their market 
power.
177
 For example, the studies of Fusfeld in the iron and steel industry and 
Stuckey in the aluminium industry show that creating a network of joint ventures 
may be used to facilitate collusion among active players in the industry, and to 
discourage new entries.
178
 Similarly, vertical joint ventures may enable firms to 
prevent or hinder the access of competitors to an input or customers and, thus, gain a 
better competitive position against them. These motives mainly indicate the 
anticompetitive effects of joint ventures. In the following chapters, the analysis of 
these effects is given more elaborately.     
 
D- Drawbacks of Joint Ventures as a Business Model 
 
Despite having the potential benefits described above, joint ventures are, in some 
respects, cumbersome organisations with significant drawbacks. From a competition 
law perspective, it is essential to analyse these drawbacks and understand the reasons 
behind the rules and structures used by the parties to overcome them, and why firms 





Chang, Evans and Schmalensee divide the disadvantages of joint ventures into three 
main groups: divergent objectives, externalities and organisational problems.
180
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According to Harrigan, however, the primary drawbacks of joint ventures include 
loss of control, strategic inflexibility, competition law problems and sovereignty 
conflicts.
181
 Through considering these categorisations, the dangers in using joint 
ventures may generally be explained under three headings: (i) divergence in 
objectives; (ii) trust problems; and (iii) ineffective management structure.   
   
1. Divergence in Objectives 
 
Even if firms reach a mutual understanding in setting up a joint venture, this does not 
eliminate all conflicts between their objectives with regard to the operations and 
strategies of the joint venture. These conflicts have the potential to lead to deadlocks 
in the joint venture’s management, and prevent the parent firms achieving all of their 




This may be the case especially in respect of international joint ventures involving 
multinational and local firms. Therein, the objective of the multinational firm is 
normally to use the joint venture in a way which creates optimal benefit to its entire 
global business, while the local firm is only concerned about maximising the 
profitability of the joint venture’s business.
183
 This difference in objectives may 
result in conflicts in certain areas. For example, the multinational firm may not be 
willing to permit the joint venture to export its products into other markets where it 
has already manufactured and distributed the products as part of its global business, 
since this would reduce its profits in those markets.
184
 In contrast, such market 
expansion is likely to be in the interests of the local firm because it increases the 
profits of the joint venture.
185
 Similar conflicts of interest may emerge in the areas of 




A conflict of objectives can even arise in the context of joint ventures between firms 
from the same country. Chang, Evans and Schmalensee give a theoretical example of 
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such a situation in relation to R&D joint ventures. They explain that where the 
parents agree to form an R&D joint venture for developing a new technology which 
could have different forms, there may be disagreement between them on the selection 
of the form of technology to be developed, particularly if the relative profit 




2. Trust Problems  
 
By participating in a joint venture, each parent forgoes some control over capital, 
technology or other assets or skills in favour of other parents.
188
 Such loss of control 
may be tolerated if there is some level of trust between the parent firms.
189
 However, 
establishing such trust may be particularly difficult if the parents are, or become, 
competitors in advance of or after the formation of the joint venture. In such cases, 
one firm may fear that the other firm may access its customer portfolio, know-how or 
other trade secrets, and use these to acquire a competitive advantage against it.
190
 As 
a result, in the absence of trust among the parties, they are likely to refrain from 
participating in the joint venture and choose another business model, or, to set up a 
joint venture with more trustworthy but less capable firms for the operation 
concerned.  
 
3. Ineffective Management Structure 
 
Many organisational problems in joint ventures arise from the fact that they are 
jointly controlled by at least two firms.
191
 Therefore, unlikely solely controlled 
entities, joint ventures must have more complicated managerial mechanisms to carry 
out their day-to-day operations.
192
 Informal negotiation, rather than hierarchical 
command, is the prevailing way of resolving conflicts in the decision-making 
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processes of joint ventures.
193
 In poorly structured joint ventures, this may result in 
deadlocks in the decision-making mechanism, and slow down the daily operations.  
 
Since the decision-making bodies of the joint venture consist of the members 
appointed by the parent firms, it is normally expected that they will give priority to 
the interests of the parents over those of the joint venture. In this respect, to maintain 
the continuation of the joint venture, such bodies may act in a way which benefits all 
of the parents, even if this causes some loss of profit for the joint venture.
194
 
Accordingly, the more the management of the joint venture is autonomous of the 
parents the more likely it is that it will operate effectively. Nevertheless, the lack of a 
sufficient level of trust and conflicts of interest usually deter the parent firms from 
structuring such a management.      
 
Many joint ventures involve participants with different corporate cultures. This may 
give rise to serious conflicts in understanding business problems and solving them, 
and, therefore, adversely affects the effectiveness of the joint venture’s management. 
This may be the case especially in international joint ventures whose parents usually 
have different cultural backgrounds influenced by those of their home countries.
195
 
Nonetheless, cultural conflicts may also arise in the case of joint ventures between 
firms from the same country. Serious cultural clashes may cause the failure of the 
joint venture. The failures of Taligent, a joint venture, formed between Apple and 
IBM to develop a fully object-oriented operating system, and the joint venture, 





V. Concluding Remarks  
 
Joint ventures are a special form of interfirm collaboration in which the parties 
integrate their operations into a separate entity, while remaining independent outside 
this integration. They therefore possess some characteristics of both amalgamations 
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and acquisitions and loose contractual agreements, but at the same time differ from 
these two categories.  
 
The economic effects of joint ventures may change according to their type. From an 
economic standpoint, joint ventures may be classified by using two different criteria. 
Firstly, based on the competitive relationship between the parents and between them 
and the joint venture, they may be divided into two groups: horizontal and non-
horizontal (vertical and conglomerate). Secondly, according to the economic 
functions they perform, joint ventures can be categorised into four main groups: 
R&D, production, sales and purchasing joint ventures. As explained in the following 
chapters, these categorisations are essentially taken into account in setting out the 
principles for the analysis of joint ventures.  
 
Joint ventures have become very popular in various industries, particularly the high-
technology, network, airline and mining industries, which are characterised by the 
need for strong cooperation among industry players. A great number of these joint 
ventures involve multinational and local firms. These international joint ventures 
have contributed to both the integration of markets and the globalisation process, by 
decreasing entry barriers to domestic markets and by leading to the dissemination of 
products and technologies across different countries. In the aforementioned 
industries and many other industries, joint ventures are also commonly used to 
reduce transaction and production costs, access complementary assets, and share 
risks. In addition to these efficiency-based motives, firms may form joint ventures 
for anticompetitive purposes. 
 
Although popular from a business viewpoint, joint ventures have some drawbacks 
that may cause the failure of the operation and discourage firms from using them in 
the first place. The main source of these drawbacks is the fact that the parent firms 
have to share control over the integrated operations of the joint venture. Therefore, 
for a joint venture to last longer there must be some level of trust between the 
parents, and also coherence in their objectives and corporate cultures, which facilitate 
reaching a mutual understanding in operating the joint venture. The lack of trust, 
divergence in objectives and cultural clashes increase the risk of deadlocks in the 
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management of the joint venture, thereby resulting in its failure. These drawbacks 
and the ways provided in which firms overcome them should be taken into account 
in the competition analysis of joint ventures, particularly in assessing the relationship 
between the joint venture and its parents, in other words, the former’s autonomy 
from the latter.              
 
In short, joint ventures play a critical role for specific industries and in the general 
economy. This increases the significance of adopting the right approach to the 
competition analysis of joint ventures, which does not unduly prevent or hinder these 
inherently fragile organisations, while properly addressing their anticompetitive 
consequences. The later chapters intend to analyse the suitability of the current EU 





THE TREATMENT OF FULL-FUNCTION JOINT VENTURES UNDER THE 




This chapter aims to explain the substantive appraisal of full-function joint ventures 
under the EU merger control rules, which constitutes the centre of gravity of this 
thesis. It firstly describes the previous criteria used in categorising joint ventures for 
the purposes of merger control, in order to provide a better understanding of the 
rationale behind the current regime regarding full-function joint ventures. Then, it 
defines the concept of full-functionality based on the Jurisdictional Notice
1
 and the 
Commission’s decisions.  
 
Given the fact that they have also some important consequences in relation to the 
substantive assessment, this chapter thirdly gives a brief overview of the procedural 
issues in EU merger control. The following part of the chapter, however, explains the 
analysis of full-function joint ventures under Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation 
and Article 101 TFEU, in combination with Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation, in 
different subparts. Finally, the chapter discusses the assessment of the conduct and 
operation of full-function joint ventures. 
     
II. Previous Criteria to Classify Joint Ventures for Merger Control Purposes 
 
A- Joint Ventures as a Partial Merger prior to Regulation 4064/89  
 
Until the adoption of Regulation 4064/89
2
 there had not been any specific provision 
or regulation regarding merger control in the EU.
3
 The absence of such a specific 
                                                          
1
 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C95/1. 
2
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [1989] OJ L395/1, corrected version [1990] OJ L257/13. 
3
 The omission of a merger control provision in the EEC Treaty, the predecessor of TFEU, was a 
deliberate choice, because, at that time, mergers were considered as an important tool in enabling 
community firms to adjust to the size of the common market, and to compete with non-community 
firms. See Commission, ‘The Problem of Industrial Concentration in the Common Market’, 
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rule led to a discussion about whether Articles 101 and 102 (Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty at that time) could be used to control mergers. The 1966 Memorandum 
of the Commission was the first elaborate examination regarding the applicability of 
these provisions to mergers. Therein, the Commission clearly set out that Article 102 
prohibiting abuse of dominant position would be the only rule in challenging mergers 
on competition grounds.
4
 The Commission concluded that Article 101 did not apply 
to concentrations on the basis that it was directed at agreements, and was thus not 
suitable for the assessment of concentrations, which bring firms ‘under a single 





Therefore, in these early periods, the primary question with regard to the substantive 
appraisal of joint ventures was which types of joint ventures, if any, would be 
qualified as mergers and exempted from Article 101. In the 1966 Memorandum, the 
Commission stated that Article 101 would continue to be applicable to joint ventures 
where, apart from concentration, the parent firms had entered an agreement within 
the meaning of Article 101(1), or the joint venture had as its purpose ‘a co-ordination 
of the market behaviour of firms remaining economically independent’.
6
 
Accordingly, the Commission, in its further practice, recognised that joint ventures 
could be immune from Article 101 in exceptional cases where they constituted a 
‘partial merger’. For a joint venture to be deemed as a partial merger, the 
Commission required that (i) ‘the parent companies completely and irreversibly 
abandon business in the area covered by the joint venture’, and (ii) ‘the pooling of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Competition Series No 3 (1966), reprinted in Frank L Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: 
The Law and Policy of the EEC (2nd edn, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1994) 691-713; 
Karen Banks, ‘Mergers and Partial Mergers under EEC Law’ (1987) 11 Fordham International Law 
Journal 255, 257. 
4
 The ECJ also approved the application of Article 102 to mergers. See Case 6/72 Continental Can v 
Commission [1973] ECR 215. For more information on merger analysis under Article 102, see also 
1966 Memorandum (n 3) Part III paras 16-27; Banks (n 3) 263-78; Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures 
in Europe (n 3) 74-131.   
5
 The 1966 Memorandum provides several reasons for the inapplicability of Article 101 to 
concentrations. Firstly, the uniform application of the same rule to both concentrations and restrictive 
agreements would result in the prohibition of either too few cartels or too many concentrations 
because restrictive agreements are normally prohibited as a rule, whilst concentrations are banned 
exceptionally if they lead to excessive market power. Secondly, individual exemption provisions 
under Article 101(3) are not appropriate for merger analysis. Thirdly, the application of the absolute 
nullity provided in Article 101 to concentrations may give rise to undesirable consequences. 1966 
Memorandum (n 3) Part III paras 5-13. 
6
 ibid Part III paras 14-15. 
82 
 
certain areas of business [...] not weaken competition in other areas, and particularly 







 the Commission applied the partial merger test in avoiding the 
application of Article 101 to a joint venture. In this case, the parent firms combined 
their distribution networks and assets in relation to certain petroleum products into 
the joint venture for fifty years, and withdrew completely from the joint venture’s 
market. Although the parents remained independent in some other markets, the 
Commission provided that any cooperation between the parents in these markets 
through the joint venture was unlikely because the markets were technically and 
economically distinct from that of the joint venture. However, SHV/Chevron was an 
exceptional decision.
9
 The Commission usually viewed joint ventures as cooperative 





The applicability of Article 101 to joint ventures as well as acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings was also discussed by the ECJ in Philip Morris in 1987.
11
 In 1981, 
Philip Morris, active in the cigarette industry, acquired from Rembrandt one-half of 
                                                          
7
 The Commission also stated that Article 101 would not apply to situations where ‘the parent 
companies transfer[ed] all their assets to the joint venture and themselves bec[a]me no more than 
holding companies’. Such total integration was considered as a merger. See Commission, ‘Sixth 
Report on Competition Policy’ (1977) point 55. One example of this sort of merger, cleared by the 
Commission, was the IMI/Heilman case. See Commission, ‘Seventh Report on Competition Policy’ 
(1978) point 31.     
8
 Case IV/26.872 Commission Decision 75/95/EEC [1975] OJ L38/14. 
9
 Following SHV/Chevron, there had not been any formal decisions in which the Commission treated a 
joint venture as a partial merger, notwithstanding that the Commission took two informal decisions to 
that effect. See Commission, Ninth Report on Competition Policy (1980) point 131; Commission, 
Twelfth Report on Competition Policy (1983) point 100. See also Banks (n 3) 293. 
10
 In De Laval/Stork, the Commission provided that the withdrawal of the parents from the joint 
venture’s market would be irreversible, only if the parents had transferred their existing capacity and 
expertise into the joint venture in a way of eliminating them, not only as actual competitors but also as 
potential competitors from the market. Case IV/27.093 Commission Decision 88/110/EEC [1977] OJ 
L59/32. Furthermore, in KEWA, the Commission decided that a joint venture established between 
potential competitors to enter a new market would be subject to Article 101. Case IV/26.940/b 
Commission Decision 76/249/EEC [1976] OJ L51/15. For other decisions where the Commission 
viewed the joint venture as not constituting a partial merger, see eg Bayer/Gist-Brocades (Case 
IV/27.073) Commission Decision 76/172/EEC [1976] OJ L30/13; Vacuum Interrupters Ltd (Case 
IV/27.442) Commission Decision 77/160/EEC [1977] OJ L48/32; GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators 
(Case IV/29.428) Commission Decision 77/781/EEC [1977] OJ L327/26; Rockwell/Iveco (Case 
IV/30.437) Commission Decision 83/390/EEC [1983] OJ L224/19. 
11
 Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487. 
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its wholly-owned subsidiary, which had controlled Rothmans International (RI) 
operating in the cigarette industry. Upon this sale agreement and the partnership 
agreement between the parties in relation to RI’s affairs, Philip Morris gained the 
ability to influence the strategic decisions of RI. The Commission objected to this 
acquisition on the grounds that it infringed both Articles 101 and 102. As a result, in 
1984, Philip Morris and Rembrandt made a new agreement under which Philip 
Morris owned a direct minority shareholding in RI which did not enable it to 
influence the management of RI. The Commission posited that under those 
circumstances, there was no basis for the application of Article 101 or Article 102 to 
the acquisition of an equity stake by Philip Morris.
12
 The competitors of Philip 
Morris and RI, however, brought a case against this clearance by the Commission 
before the ECJ. 
 
The ECJ approved the decisions of the Commission with respect to both the 1981 
and 1984 agreements. The Court identified the main issue therein as ‘whether and in 
what circumstances the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competing 
company may constitute an infringement of Article [101 and 102 TFEU]’.
13
 The 
Court went on to accept the applicability of Article 101 to the acquisition of the 
minority shareholding in question, because the parties remained independent after the 




With regard to the application of Article 101, the Court set out guidance for 
determining whether the acquisition concerned had the object or effect of restricting 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1). The Court recognised that the 
acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competitor may ‘serve as an instrument 
for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question’.
15
 It added that 
such an influence would be more likely if the investing company had gained ‘legal or 
de facto control of the commercial conduct of the other company’, or if the 
                                                          
12
 Commission, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy (1985) points 98-100. 
13
 Philip Morris (n 11) para 30. 
14
 ibid para 31. 
15
 ibid para 37. 
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acquisition had granted the investing company ‘the possibility of reinforcing its 




These considerations led to controversy about whether the Court acknowledged the 
application of Article 101 to mergers in general.
17
 However, since in its judgement 
the Court relied on the fact that the parties remained independent, it would be 
difficult to claim that it clearly allowed the application of Article 101 to acquisitions 
of sole control of competitors.
18
 The judgement explained that Article 101 could 
apply to acquisitions of minority shareholdings which would result in joint control 
over the acquired firm, ie a joint venture situation. Given the emphasis of the Court 
on the possibility of coordination between the parties, the judgement did not seem to 





B- Distinction between Concentrative and Cooperative Joint ventures under the 
Original Version of Regulation 4064/89 
 
Although the dictum of Philip Morris was not sufficiently clear, it was used by the 
Commission to threaten the use of Article 101, besides Article 102, in challenging 
mergers, if the European Council (Council) failed to adopt a regulation for this 
purpose.
20
 Upon the insistence of the Commission, in 1989, the Council finally 
issued Regulation 4064/89 which set out special substantive and procedural rules for 
merger control.
21
 Recital 23 of the Regulation provided that it was only aimed at 
                                                          
16
 ibid para 38-39. 
17
 Banks (n 3) 307-08; Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe (n 3) 56. 
18
 Banks (n 3) 308-09. 
19
 The Philip Morris judgement is still used as an important precedent in the application of Article 101 
and 102 to acquisitions of minority shareholdings. See Commission, ‘Antitrust Issues Involving 
Minority Shareholding and Interlocking Directorates’, OECD Working Party No 3 on Co-operation 
and Enforcement (February 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2008_feb_antitrust_issues.pdf> accessed 
05 April 2013. See also Barry E Hawk and Henry L Huser, ‘“Controlling” the Shifting Sands: 
Minority Shareholdings under EEC Competition Law’ in Barry E Hawk (ed), Mergers & Acquisitions 
and Joint Ventures (Juris Publishing 2004) 153-82. 
20
 James S Venit, ‘The “Merger” Control Regulation: Europe Comes of Age ... or Caliban’s Dinner’ 
(1990) 27 Common Market Law Review 7, 12-13; Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe (n 3) 
58.  
21
 The Commission for the first time proposed a draft for merger regulation in 1973. See [1973] OJ 
C92/1. For the evolution of this draft to Regulation 4064/89, see [1982] OJ C36/3; [1984] OJ C51/8; 
[1986] OJ C324/5; [1988] OJ C130/4; and [1989] OJ C22/14. 
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concentrations defined as ‘operations bringing about a durable change in the 
structure of the undertakings concerned’. It emphasised that operations ‘which have 
as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of independent 
undertakings’, however, were considered to have a cooperative nature and were 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Based on this approach, the Regulation 
introduced the concentrative-cooperative distinction in order to determine joint 
ventures falling into its jurisdiction. Under this classification, concentrative joint 
ventures were to be treated as concentrations under the Merger Regulation, while 
cooperative joint ventures were subject to the Article 101 regime. 
 
To be considered as a concentrative joint venture and analysed under the Merger 
Regulation, a joint venture had to satisfy two conditions, one positive and one 
negative. According to the positive condition, a joint venture had to be full-function, 
ie perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis.
22
 
The negative condition, however, required that the joint venture must not give rise to 
the coordination of the competitive behaviour of the undertakings that remained 
independent of each other. The application of this condition by the Commission 
changed in the course of time. In the 1990 Notice, for this condition to be met, the 
Commission required the absence of a risk of coordination among the parent firms as 
well as between them and the joint venture. The Notice presumed that there would be 
a risk of coordination if all the parent firms or only one of them remained active or 
potential competitors with respect to the joint venture’s market. It also recognised 
that such a risk could arise, depending on the facts of each case, if the parents 





However, the practice of the Commission following the 1990 Notice departed from 
the aforementioned approach in some aspects.
24
 The Commission continued to 
                                                          
22
 Commission Notice regarding the concentrative and co-operative operations under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [1990] OJ 
C203/10, paras 16-19 (1990 Notice). For more detailed information about the elements of this 
condition, see III/B below.   
23
 1990 Notice (n 22) paras 20-36. 
24
 For more information regarding this earlier approach of the Commission, see Barry E Hawk, ‘Joint 
Ventures under EEC Law’ (1992) 15 Fordham International Law Journal 303, 319-21; Fine, Mergers 
and Joint Ventures in Europe (n 3) 160-71; Matthew P Downs, The Notice concerning the Assessment 
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presume the presence of the risk of coordination where at least two parent firms 
remained active in the joint venture’s market. However, the Commission appeared to 
treat joint ventures as concentrative where only one parent retained activities in the 
same market as the joint venture.
25
 It posited that in such cases no meaningful 
competition must be expected between the parent firm and the joint venture as the 
former would act as the industrial leader of the latter.
26
 This approach was also 
reflected in the 1994 Notice which replaced the 1990 Notice.
27
 The Commission 
therein stated that in analysing whether a joint venture was concentrative, any 
coordination between the parent firm and the joint venture would be considered ‘only 
in so far as it was an instrument for producing or reinforcing the coordination 




In brief, the phenomenon of partial merger was transformed into the concept of 
concentrative joint venture in Regulation 4064/89. Due to the willingness of the 
Commission to treat joint ventures as concentrative by limiting the situations 
considered to result in coordination, a greater number of joint ventures fell into the 
category of mergers compared to the pre-regulation period. However, similar to the 
partial merger test, the concentrative-cooperative distinction provided that a joint 
venture was analysed either according to the merger test under the Merger 
Regulation or according to Article 101within the framework of Regulation 17/62.
29
 
As a result, firms usually sought to structure their joint ventures as concentrative in 
order to benefit from the more lenient test and the faster procedure under the Merger 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of Cooperative Joint Ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty: An Assessment (Leuven 
University Press 1995) 33-40; James Venit, ‘The Treatment of Joint Ventures under the EC Merger 
Regulation- Almost through the Thicket’ in Barry E Hawk (ed), Mergers & Acquisitions and Joint 
Ventures (Juris Publishing 2004) 521-27.    
25
 See Thompson/Pilkington (Case IV/M.86) [1991]. 
26
 Venit, ‘The Treatment of Joint Ventures’ (n 24) 525-527; Frank L Fine, ‘Revised Notice on the 
Distinction between Concentrative and Co-operative Joint Ventures’ (1994) 15 European Competition 
Law Review 291, 292-93. 
27
 Commission Notice on the distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1994] 
OJ C385/1. 
28
 ibid para 8. 
29
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17/1962: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty [1962] OJ 13/204, replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 






 This task was, nevertheless, not so simple, because in spite of the 
guidelines provided by the Commission, the analysis of the risk of coordination 
between the parent firms contained significant uncertainties which gave rise to an 
increase in the legal costs of firms as well as the misallocation of administrative 




III. Definition of Full-Function Joint Ventures 
  
The distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures was widely 
criticised mainly on the grounds that it lacked clarity and was an artificial 
categorisation, which led to the application of different substantive tests and 
procedures to operations with similar effects on market structure.
32
 Based on these 
criticisms, the Commission included a reform regarding joint ventures into 
Regulation 1310/97, amending Regulation 4064/89.
33
 According to this reform, all 
full-function joint ventures would be viewed as falling within the Merger Regulation, 
regardless of whether they would result in the coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the parent firms. If the creation of a full-function joint venture had the 
object or effect to lead to such coordination, it would be analysed pursuant to Article 
101 under the Merger Regulation. As a consequence of this amendment, the presence 
of coordination which had been a condition relevant to the jurisdiction of the Merger 
Regulation became an independent consideration taken into account in the 
substantive analysis of full-function joint ventures under the Regulation.
34
 This 
                                                          
30
 Alyssa A Grikscheit, ‘Are We Compatible?: Current European Community Law on the 
Compatibility of Joint Ventures with the Common Market and Possibilities for Future Development’ 
(1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 968, 993-94; Bernard Bensaid, David Encoaua and Antoine 
Winckler, ‘Competition, Cooperation and Mergers: Economic and Policy Issues’ (1994) 38 European 
Economic Review 637, 642-43; Geert A Zonnekeyn, ‘The Treatment of Joint Ventures under the 
Amended E.C. Merger Regulation’ (1998) 19 European Competition Law Review 414, 416. 
31
 Hawk (n 24) 322-23; Venit, ‘The Treatment of Joint Ventures’ (n 24) 530. 
32
 See Commission, ‘Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation’ COM (96) 19, 24; Anand S 
Pathak, ‘The EC Commission's Approach to Joint Ventures: A Policy of Contradictions’ (1991) 12 
European Competition Law Review 171; Hawk (n 24) 322-324; Grikscheit (n 30); Edurne Navarro 
Varona, Andres Font Galarza, Jaime Folguera Crespo and Juan Briones Alonso, Merger Control in 
the European Union: Law, Economics and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 38-39.  
33
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [1997] OJ L180/1. 
34
 Nonetheless, the Commission’s practice prior to Regulation 1310/97 as to evaluating the possibility 
of any coordination may be utilised in analysing the likelihood of coordination according to Article 
101, in combination with Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation.   
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In this regard, full-functionality is currently the only criterion to identify joint 
ventures falling under the Merger Regulation. However, obviously, the Commission 
must firstly determine whether the operation in question amounts to a joint venture, 
ie whether the entity concerned is jointly controlled by two or more independent 
firms. Thus, this part explains how the Commission and the EU courts analyse both 
joint control and the full-functionality criterion, respectively.  
 
A- Joint Control 
 
Since the adoption of Regulation 4064/89, joint control has been considered as a 
condition in determining whether the entity in question constitutes a joint venture 
within the meaning of the Merger Regulation. In the Jurisdiction Notice, the 
Commission provides detailed guidance about the meaning of joint control based on 
its existing practice and the EU case law. The Notice stipulates that ‘joint control 
exists where two or more undertakings have the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence over another undertaking’.
36
 Decisive influence herein means the power to 
block the strategic decisions of an undertaking. In this regard, because in joint 
venture situations two or more firms have the power to block strategic decisions, 
these firms must reach a common understanding in determining the commercial 




Joint control is regarded as clearly existing where both parents are equally 
represented in the decision-making bodies of the entity concerned. This is normally 
the case if both firms hold 50 % shares in the entity. However, in this scenario, there 
must not be any formal agreement empowering one of the parents with more voting 
                                                          
35
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. See also Commission, ‘Green Paper on the review of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89’ COM (2001) 745 final, paras 100-24. 
36
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 62. Such definition was also accepted by the General Court in 
Cementbouw v Commission. Case T-282/02 [2006] ECR II-319, paras 42. See also Case T-
76/08 El du Pont v Commission [2012] ECR II-0000, para 69; Case T-77/08 Dow Chemical v 





rights or with a casting vote to be used in the event of a tied vote.
38
 Equality in voting 
rights may also arise if two minority shareholders that collectively own a majority of 
voting rights establish, and transfer their voting rights to, a holding company in 




Even in the absence of equality between the parent firms in voting, joint control may 
arise, where in the statute of the company or in an agreement, minority shareholders 
are provided with specific veto rights.
40
 It is not necessary that these veto rights grant 
their holders the power to exercise decisive influence on the day-to-day operations of 
the joint venture. Rather, it is enough that the minority shareholder has a veto right to 
block strategic decisions related to the business policy of the entity concerned.
41
 
Strategic decisions in this sense normally include those related to the budget, the 
business plan or the appointment of senior management. Decisions regarding major 
investments may also be considered as strategic depending on the nature of the 
market. The existence of a veto right in relation to any of the strategic decisions is 
sufficient to confer joint control regardless of whether such a veto right is actually 




The Commission also acknowledges that in certain circumstances joint control may 
exist on a de facto basis. Firstly, even if one parent is legally able to take all strategic 
                                                          
38
 The Commission recognises that a casting vote may not prevent the existence of joint control where 
it can be exercised only after a series of stages of arbitration and attempts at reconciliation or in a very 
limited field. Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 82. Furthermore, in RTL/Veronica/Endemol, the 
Commission decided that joint control existed, even if RTL had a casting vote right due to the fact that 
the other parent Endemol provided a contribution to the joint venture, which was vital for its 
operation. The Commission stated that this contribution made RTL dependent on Endemol for 
determining the strategic policy of the joint venture so that the exercise of the casting vote by RTL 
would be unlikely. Case IV/M.553 [1995] para 11. 
39
 The joint exercise of voting rights by minority shareholders may also be provided by an agreement 
under which they undertake to act together in using their voting rights. Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 
75.    
40
 ibid para 65. Veto rights may be set out by means of a specific quorum required for strategic 
decisions to be taken. For example, where an 80 % majority of votes is necessary to adopt strategic 
decisions, shareholders holding more than 20 % will have the right to veto these decisions. Secondly, 
the statute of the joint venture or any other agreement may require the affirmative votes of certain 
minority shareholders in order for a strategic decision to be taken. ibid. 
41
 Situations of joint control based on such veto rights are sometimes called ‘negative control’. 
42
 ibid para 67. Veto rights provided to minority shareholders to protect their financial interests as 
investors are not sufficient to confer joint control due to the fact that they are not related to strategic 
decisions. Therefore, veto rights concerning issues such as changes in the statute, an increase or 
decrease in the capital, or the liquidation, sale or winding-up of the joint venture do not form joint 
control. ibid para 66. 
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decisions, it may still depend on a minority shareholder that provides a significant 
contribution, which is crucial for the operation of the entity in question. This 
contribution may be a huge investment or the transfer of an intellectual property right 
or license right which is required for the joint venture to operate in the market. In 
such situations, the majority shareholder may not be able to enforce its position, and 
may have to reach an agreement with the minority shareholder on strategic 
decisions.
43
 In RTL/Veronica/Endemol, the Commission stated that even if RTL had 
a majority shareholding and a casting vote, it could not enforce its position since 
Veronica-Endemol supplied the programmes that were vital for the operation of the 




Secondly, de facto joint control may arise between minority shareholders, if one of 
them makes a contribution that is crucial for the other to reach its goals in 
participating in the joint venture. The Commission provides that in these cases, 
strong common interests exist between the minority shareholders in a way which 
urges them to act together in using their voting rights regarding the strategic 




Merely passive investments are not normally deemed by the Commission to be 
significant contributions on the basis that they are not directly related to the operation 




 it held that ABM, as a merely 
financial investor, had a different interest in getting involved in the joint venture 
from those of the other two strategic investors, Hutchison and RCPM, which 
provided a crucial contribution to the joint venture. Accordingly, the Commission 
found that Hutchison and RCPM, each owning 35 % of shares, had joint control over 
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 ibid para 78. 
44
 RTL/Veronica/Endemol (n 38) para 11. 
45
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 77. 
46
 ibid 79. 
47
 Hutchison/RCPM/ECT (Case COMP/JV.55) [2001]. 
48
 ibid paras 14-21. 
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It should be noted that the necessity of coalitions between minority shareholders to 
take strategic decisions, on its own, is not assumed to confer joint control in the 
absence of strong common interests forcing them to act in the same way.
49
 For 
instance, where a firm has just three shareholders each holding one third of the 
voting rights and a simple majority of votes is required to take strategic decisions, the 
majority can be provided by the coalition of any two of these shareholders. In this 
case, joint control does not exist if there is no strong commonality of interests 
between the shareholders. 
 




The full functionality criterion essentially requires that the joint venture has an 
independent character which enables it to perform the functions normally carried out 
by undertakings in the same market. This independence requirement is considered to 




With respect to the self-sufficiency element, the Commission provides that the joint 
venture must have the necessary internal resources including staff, assets and finance 
to operate independently in the market.
50
 Accordingly, the joint venture first of all 
must have an independent management dedicated to its day-to-day operations. The 
personnel must be normally employed by the joint venture.
51
 However, outsourcing 
the necessary personnel and expertise from third parties may not change the full-
function character of the joint venture if it is common practice in the industry 
concerned.
52
 This may be the case even if the necessary personnel are seconded by 
the parent firms to the joint venture, provided that the contract is made on an arm’s 
                                                          
49
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 80. 
50
 ibid para 94. 
51
 See ENW/Eastern (Case IV/M.1315) [1998] para 9. 
52
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 94. See also Lonza/Teva (Case COMP/M.5479) [2009] para 7. 
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length basis under normal commercial conditions.
53
 The joint venture may also be 
considered as full-function if it receives its personnel from its parent firms only for a 
start-up period.
54
 In RSB/Tenex/Fuel Logistics,
55
 the Commission stated that in order 
for the full-functionality criterion to be met, the parent firms must submit a concrete 




To be full-function, the joint venture must also have access to the necessary financial 
resources and tangible and intangible assets, including the intellectual property rights 
required for operating in the market. The joint venture does not necessarily have to 
have the legal ownership of these resources. In Dupont/Hitachi, the Commission did 
not question the full-functionality of the joint venture even if the parent remained the 
legal owner of the production facilities to be used by the joint venture, on the 





 the Commission decided that the fact that the joint 
venture would operate based on the infrastructure legally owned by the parents did 
not undermine its full-functionality, due to the fact that they were made available 
unconditionally for access by the joint venture.
59
 Furthermore, the Commission may 
consider the joint venture as full-function, even if it is intended to use the facilities 
and equipment of the parent firms, as long as according to the specific features of the 






                                                          
53
 See Thomson/Deutsche Aerospace AG (Case IV/M.527) [1995] para 10; Elf/Texaco/Antifreeze 
(Case IV/M.1135) [1998] paras 6-7. 
54
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 1) para 94. See also Voest Alpine Industrieanlagenbau GmbH/Davy 
International Ltd (Case IV/M.585) [1995] para 8; Dupont/Hitachi (Case IV/M.994) [1997] para 8; 
BP/Chevron/ENI/Sonangol/Total (Case COMP/M.6477) [2012] para 11. 
55
 Case IV/M.904 [1997]. 
56
 ibid para 9.  
57
 Dupont/Hitachi (n 54) para 10.  
58
 Case COMP/JV.19 [2000]. 
59
 ibid paras 13-16. See also PPC/Wind (Case COMP/M.2565) [2001] para 11. With regard to 
intellectual property rights, it is sufficient that the necessary intellectual property rights and know-how 
are licensed to the joint venture for its duration. See eg Thomson/Deutsche Aerospace AG (n 53) para 
10; Union Carbide/Enichem (Case IV/M.550) [1995] para 11. 
60
 Dupont/Hitachi (n 54) paras 9-10. Similarly, the full-function status of the joint venture may not be 
questioned if it is funded by the parents only for an initial period. See Hochtief/Geosea/Beluga 
Hochtief Offshore (Case COMP/M.6315) [2011] para 14. 
93 
 
b) Commercial Autonomy 
 
In order to have full-function character, the joint venture must also be capable of 
exercising its own commercial policy independently of its parents. However, it is 
accepted that this condition does not require that the joint venture enjoys autonomy 
in relation to the adoption of the strategic decisions defined above. In Cementbouw, 
the General Court held that an opposite conclusion would result in a situation where 
a jointly controlled undertaking could never be considered as a full-function joint 
venture.
61
 Rather, the concept of autonomy herein is understood as requiring that the 
joint venture is essentially independent of its parents in determining its commercial 
policy, in relation to selling to, and purchasing from, third parties, and that it deals 
with its parents on an arm’s length basis. In this regard, such commercial decisions 
concerning day-to-day operations are normally supposed to be taken by the 
independent management of the joint venture without potentially being subject to the 
exercise of a veto right by any parent firm.
62
 Such commercial autonomy is 
considered to indicate that the joint venture has its own access to or presence in the 
market, ie it is not merely ancillary to the business operations of the parent firms. 
Thus, joint ventures which have only one specific function, such as R&D, production 
or distribution, are in principle not viewed to be full-function, since they do not have 




The analysis of whether the joint venture has commercial autonomy may be 
essential, particularly if the parent firms retain significant activities in the markets 
where the joint venture is intended to operate. The future presence of the parents in 
these markets does not necessarily affect the full-function character of the joint 
venture, as long as it has an independent management dedicated to its day-to-day 
operations and the necessary finance, staff and assets to operate in the market. In 
Wegener/PCM,
64
 for instance, the Commission did not question the full-functionality 
of the joint venture engaged in publishing national-regional newspapers, even if the 
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parent firms retained, to a significant extent, activities in the same market as the joint 
venture. In this decision, the Commission mainly relied on the fact that the joint 
venture would have its own editorial board, a team of dedicated full-time employees, 
and its own management independent from those of its parents, and set the prices for 




The absence of any future competition between the parent firms with regard to the 
joint venture’s market, however, may be used positively by the Commission as 
evidence supporting the commercial independence of the joint venture.
66
 In any case, 
as explained below, the presence of the two parent firms in the joint venture’s market 
is taken into account in relation to the appraisal of the risk of coordination under 




With regard to commercial autonomy, the Commission primarily focuses on the 
vertical relationship between the joint venture and its parents which operate in 
upstream or downstream markets. Accordingly, if a joint venture relies, to a 
significant extent, on sales to, and purchases from, its parent firms and has limited 
capacity to deal with third parties, its full-function character may be questioned.
68
 In 
analysing such a relationship, the Commission takes into account a number of 
different situations. 
 
First of all, the Commission acknowledges that the reliance of the joint venture 
almost entirely on supplies to or purchases from its parent firms does not normally 
undermine its full-function character, as long as this is only for an initial start-up 
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 In these situations, the parties must submit evidence that the exclusivity will 
continue for a start-up period.
70
 In the Jurisdictional Notice, the Commission 
stipulates that the initial period must not normally exceed a period of three years.
71
 
Nevertheless, a longer period may be deemed as initial according to the specific 
characteristic of the industry concerned. In Areva/Urenco, the Commission held that 
even if for a considerable period the joint venture would sell the equipment 
concerned, only to its parent firms, such a period could be viewed as an initial period 




If the joint venture is intended to make sales to its parent firms on a lasting basis, the 
Commission primarily takes into account the relative proportion of sales made to its 
parents compared to the total production of the joint venture.
73
 In this regard, the 
Commission, in principle, presumes that the joint venture has full-function status if it 
achieves more than 50% of its turnover with third parties.
74
 Below this threshold, the 
Commission evaluates the commercial autonomy of the joint venture on a case-by-
case basis. The Jurisdictional Notice states that for the joint venture to qualify as full-
function it may be sufficient that only 20 % of the joint venture’s predicted sales 
goes to third parties, provided that the joint venture does not give preferential 
treatment to its parents and deals with them at arm’s length on the basis of normal 
commercial conditions.
75
 If less than 20 % of the joint venture’s sales are intended to 
be to third parties, it is normally unlikely that the joint venture will be considered to 
be full-function. In Electrabel/Energia Italiana/Interpower,
76
 the Commission found 
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that the joint venture was not full-function, because only between 5 % and 15 % of 




Nonetheless, in certain situations, the Commission may take a more flexible 
approach in considering the proportion of sales to third parties. For example, in 
Siemens/Italtel,
78
 the Commission did not question the commercial independence of 
the joint venture, even if it would rely entirely on sales to one of the parent firms, on 
the grounds that, in the foreseeable future, that parent firm would be the only buyer 
in the market due to its monopoly.
79
 In addition, the Commission acknowledges that 
the fact that a joint venture makes use of the distribution system of one or more of its 
parent firms does not normally undermine its full-function character, provided that 




With respect to purchases made from the parent firms, the Commission first of all 
analyses whether any significant value is added by the joint venture to the products 
or services in question. In Union Carbide/Enichem, the Commission decided that 
even if the joint venture was to purchase some products almost entirely from its 
parent firm, such exclusivity would not affect its full-function character because 
these purchases were of minor importance for the joint venture’s operation.
81
 
Similarly, in Saudi Aramco/MOH,
82
 the Commission found that the fact that the joint 
venture would make 90 % of its total crude oil purchases from its parents did not 
undermine its full-function status on the basis that significant added value was 
involved in the crude oil refining activities of the joint venture.
83
 Furthermore, some 
decisions suggest that the Commission may not put into question the full-function 
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The full-function character of a joint venture, nevertheless, will be questionable if it 
acts in the same way as a joint sales agency for its parent firms, ie if it adds only a 
little value to the product concerned.
85
 However, the Commission provides an 
exception to this rule. Accordingly, if the joint venture carries out the normal 
functions of a trading firm in a trade market, it is principally deemed as full-
function.
86
 The Commission defines trade markets as those ‘characterised by the 
existence of companies which specialise in the selling and distribution of products 
without being vertically integrated in addition to those which are integrated, and 
where different sources of supply are available for the products in question’.
87
 In this 
respect, in order for a joint venture to be full-function it must have all the necessary 
facilities, such as outlets, transport fleets and sales personnel, and must be likely to 





It should be noted that despite this comprehensive guidance by the Commission, the 
distinction between the concepts of commercial autonomy and joint control does not 
seem sufficiently clear and leads to some complications. The implications of this 




Since the concept of concentration only covers operations resulting in a ‘lasting 
change’ in the structure of the undertakings concerned and, thereby, the market 
concerned,
89
 full-function joint ventures must also be intended to operate for a 
sufficiently long period to be considered as concentrations. The Commission accepts 
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that having sufficient resources and commercial autonomy normally indicates the 
permanence of the joint venture.
90
 In this regard, if the joint venture is established for 
an indefinite period, it is in principle qualified as full-function.
91
 If the joint venture 
agreement specifies a period for the duration of the joint venture, this period must be 
sufficiently long to bring about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings 
concerned.
92
 The Commission normally treats joint ventures with a period of eight 
years and above as permanent.
93
 In British Airways/TAT,
94
 it considered that just six 
and a half years was sufficient for the permanence condition to be met, on the basis 





On the other hand, the Commission posits that a definite period of three years is very 
short in order to regard the joint venture as operating on a lasting basis.
96
 The 
formation of a joint venture for a short period may be the case particularly where its 





3. Other Considerations regarding the Full-Functionality Criterion 
 
Determining whether the full-functionality criterion is satisfied is particularly 
important if the jointly controlled entity is newly formed, or if joint control is 
established over an entity which previously did not perform all the functions of an 
autonomous entity. On the other hand, according to the Jurisdictional Notice, an 
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acquisition of joint control over another undertaking by two or more undertakings is 
considered as a concentration, regardless of whether the acquired undertaking will 
retain its full-function status after the transaction.
98
 Therefore, such an acquisition 
constitutes a concentration even if the acquired undertaking begins to exclusively sell 
to or purchase from its parent firms, or relies on them in terms of human or material 
resources. The Commission recognises that in such cases there will be a change in 
the control of an undertaking, and it is sufficient to bring about a structural change in 




In the Jurisdictional Notice, the Commission also clarifies at which stage a 
concentration exists, if there are outstanding decisions of third parties that are 
essentially important for the joint venture to start its business activity.
100
 These 
decisions, for example, may be the award of a contract, licences or access rights to 
property. The Commission acknowledges that in these situations a concentration 




Furthermore, an existing partial full-function joint venture may turn into a full-
function joint venture due to a change in its activity. This may be the case, for 
instance, if a joint venture which previously only supplied to, or purchased from, its 
parents subsequently begins to substantially deal with third parties.
102
 A partial 
function joint venture may also gain full-function character where its organisational 
structure is modified in a way which gives it the necessary resources and commercial 
autonomy.
103
 The Jurisdictional Notice emphasises that a concentration arises when a 
decision leading to the joint venture meeting the full functionality criterion is taken 
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Finally, the scope of the activities of a full-function joint venture may be extended 
into other product or geographical markets in the course of its lifetime. Such an 
extension is considered to be a concentration only if it entails the acquisition by the 
parents of the whole or part of another undertaking,
105
 or if the joint venture is 
provided with significant additional tangible or intangible assets which constitute the 
basis or nucleus of that extension. In the latter case, the joint venture is required to 
carry out those extended activities on a full-function basis.
 106
 On the contrary, there 
will be no new concentration if the activities of a joint venture are extended without 




IV. Overview of Procedural Issues 
 
As amalgamation and acquisition situations, the creation of full-function joint 
ventures is also examined according to the procedural rules set out in the Merger 
Regulation. A fundamental distinctive feature of this regime is to provide a ‘one-
stop-shop’ principle. Under this principle, the Commission is granted a monopoly in 
examining concentrations which have a Community dimension. Thus, parties to 
these concentrations are not required to deal with the national competition authorities 
of Member States pursuant to their merger control legislation. The one-stop-shop 
principle also means that such concentrations are analysed exclusively under the 
Merger Regulation, and cannot be challenged with reference to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. The only exception to this rule is provided for the risk of coordination 
between the parent firms in full-function joint venture cases, which is evaluated 
under Article 101 in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation. 
However, these effects are also to be analysed exclusively by the Commission within 
the merger procedure.
108
   
 
As mentioned, only concentrations which have a Community dimension fall within 
the scope of the Merger Regulation. In order to have a Community dimension, a 
concentration must normally satisfy the turnover thresholds provided in Article 1 of 
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the Merger Regulation. The second paragraph of the said article sets forth three 
cumulative threshold requirements: (i) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover 
of all the undertakings concerned must be more than 5 billion Euros; (ii) the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned must be more than 250 million Euros; and (iii) each of the undertakings 
concerned must not achieve more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 




Once the Community dimension criterion is met, the parties are obliged to notify the 
Commission of the transaction before its consummation.
110
 Until the Commission 
gives a decision, the concentration is suspended according to Article 5 of the Merger 
Regulation. To make the decision-taking process of the Commission faster and more 
efficient for the parties, the Regulation sets out some time limits that legally bind the 
Commission. Accordingly, in the first phase, which normally lasts 25 working days, 
the Commission must either clear the concentration or commence the second phase if 
the concentration raises serious doubts about its compatibility with the Internal 
Market. In the second phase, the Commission normally has another 90 working days 
to permit the concentration, with or without commitments, or prohibit it. Upon 
certain conditions, the first phase can be extended up to 35 working days, while the 
second phase can last up to 125 working days.
111
 Therefore, in any event, a decision 
concerning a concentration cannot take longer than 160 days. If the Commission fails 
to reach a decision within these time limits, the concentration is viewed to be 
allowed.
112
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V. Substantive Appraisal of the Creation of a Full-Function Joint Venture 
 
As stated earlier, the creation of a full-function joint venture is normally appraised in 
accordance with two different substantive tests. Firstly, in all cases, it is examined 
under Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, which is the legal test applicable to all 
concentrations. Secondly, if the formation of a full-function joint venture has, as its 
object or effect, the coordination of the competitive behaviour of the undertakings 
concerned, this coordination will essentially be analysed with reference to Article 
101, in combination with Article 2(4) and (5) of the Merger Regulation.    
 
This part firstly explains the substantive appraisal of full-function joint ventures 
under Article 2(3). Since this test applies to full-function joint ventures mainly in the 
same way as mergers, the guidelines and the case law regarding merger analysis are 
explained through highlighting points on which the appraisal of full-function joint 
ventures may have a peculiar feature. Then, it shows how the risk of coordination 
between the parent firms is analysed under Article 101, based on the wording of 
Article 2(4) and (5) and the practice of the Commission. Finally, it discusses whether 
there is an overlap between the analysis under Article 2(3) and that under Article 
2(4).  
 
A- Analysis of Full-Function Joint Ventures under Article 2(3) 
 
1. Legal Test  
 
Article 2(3) of Regulation 4064/89 stated that ‘[a] concentration which creates or 
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market’. According to this provision, a 
merger would be prohibited if two conditions were cumulatively satisfied: (i) the 
merger must create or strengthen a dominant position; and (ii) this must significantly 
impede effective competition.
113
 Since the requirement of the creation or 
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strengthening of a dominant position characterises this test, it has been generally 
called the ‘dominance test’.  
 
The application of the dominance test by the Commission had progressively 
developed from a formalistic approach based on market shares and concentration 
levels to a more economic-based approach, which also took into account other 
economic factors.
114
 Moreover, the Commission and the EU courts recognised that 
the concept of dominance mentioned in Article 2(3) included not only dominance by 
a single firm, but also collective dominance by two or more firms.
115
 Thus, the 
Commission was allowed to prohibit a merger which would result in tacit collusion 
between remaining independent firms in the market, even though the merged entity 
would not become the market leader. 
 
Although this flexible interpretation of the dominance test by the Commission made 
it closer to the substantial lessening of competition (SLC) test used for the control of 
mergers in many jurisdictions including the US, it was questionable whether the 
dominance test provided an effective merger control compared to the SLC test. In its 
2001 Green Paper,
116
 the Commission concluded that the dominance test was similar 
to the SLC test in many aspects, and the vast majority of cases demonstrated a 
significant degree of convergence in the approaches to merger analysis in the EU and 
other jurisdictions using the SLC test.
117
 On the other hand, the Commission 
provided that the dominance test may not constitute an effective tool in some 
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situations where the merged entity, despite remaining smaller than the market leader, 
would gain the ability to raise prices, even if the conditions for a finding of collective 
dominance were not present.
118
 However, it added that such a situation had not been 
encountered, and therefore the discussion was mainly hypothetical.
119
 In the end, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that the application of the dominance test had 
hitherto revealed neither a major loophole in the scope of the merger test, nor a 




Nevertheless, the discussion on whether there was a need to shift from the 
dominance test continued until the adoption of Regulation 139/2004.
121
 The Council 
did not prefer a direct shift to the SLC test by entirely leaving out the concept of 
dominance. Accordingly, in Regulation 139/2004, it has provided a solution by 
extending the scope of the merger test to address all the anticompetitive effects of 
mergers by retaining the existing language and case law.
122
 Article 2(3) of the 
Regulation stipulates that ‘[a] concentration which would significantly impede 
effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in 
particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market’. Under this revised provision, 
significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) becomes the essential 
criterion for merger control, whereas the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position merely constitutes the primary but not the only example of such a significant 
impediment.
123
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With the adoption of Regulation 139/2004, the Commission also published the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines which indicate its approach to merger analysis.
124
 The 
principles and methodology followed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines are quite 
similar to those in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were in force at 
that time in the US.
125
 Accordingly, similar to those in the US, these guidelines use 
the concept of ‘coordinated effect’ in order to refer to the situation of collective 
dominance. In order to refer to what are known in the US as unilateral effects, the 
Commission has provided the term ‘non-coordinated effect’. Non-coordinated effects 
include not only situations where the merged entity would be in a dominant position, 
but also gap cases where it would not be the market leader.  
 
There has been a debate on whether the introduction of the SIEC test has made an 
important difference in the Commission’s approach to merger analysis.
126
 It seems 
that there has not so far been a clear-cut gap case where the Commission prohibits a 
merger that would be allowed under the dominance test.
127
 On the contrary, the 
number of prohibitions and the second phase interventions by the Commission in 
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merger cases appears to have decreased since the shift to the SIEC test.
128
 One 
possible reason for this outcome may be the on-going trend in the Commission’s 
practice, which started before the adoption of the SIEC test, to incorporate more 
economic elements into merger analysis.
129
 Therefore, it is doubtful that the SIEC 
test, in practice, has brought about a radical change in EU merger control.
130
 
Nevertheless, it has had a welcome effect in removing potential uncertainties and 
debate that would arise from an excessively wide interpretation of the dominance test 




The SIEC test essentially applies to full-function joint ventures in the same way as 
mergers. Hence, the Commission firstly delineates relevant markets affected by the 
joint venture. Secondly, it calculates market shares and concentration levels in these 
markets. Thirdly, it analyses possible coordinated and non-coordinated effects 
resulting from the joint venture based on market shares and other economic factors. 
Below this methodology is mainly followed in explaining how the effects of full-
function joint ventures are examined under the SIEC test. 
 
2. Definition of Relevant Market(s) 
 
The delineation of relevant market(s) is a first and fundamental stage in merger 
analysis under EU competition law.
132
 In Kali and Salz, the ECJ states that ‘[a] 
proper definition of the relevant market is a necessary precondition for any 
assessment of the effect of a concentration on competition’.
133
 The Commission 
begins the substantive analysis by identifying possible markets where the 
concentration in question may result in a significant impediment to effective 
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competition. In this respect, defining the boundaries of the relevant market(s) enables 
the Commission to measure the market power of the merging firms based on market 
shares, concentration levels and other market characteristics. Market definition also 
reveals the competitive relationship between the merging parties, thereby 
determining the type of anticompetitive effects- horizontal, vertical or conglomerate- 
arising from the concentration. Despite the importance of market delineation, the 
Commission usually do not define the relevant market precisely, if the concentration 
does not give rise to any concerns under any alternative market definition.
134
   
 
Merging parties usually prefer broader market definitions because the wider the 
relevant market the lower the market share they will have.
135
 Nevertheless, a 
narrower market definition may be preferable from the viewpoint of the parties in 
joint venture cases, if according to the broader market definition two of them would 
be considered to retain significant activities in the joint venture’s market. As 
mentioned above,
136
 the fact that the parent firms continue to operate in the joint 
venture’s market, in itself, does not disqualify the joint venture as full-function. 
However, they may be required to show stronger evidence to demonstrate that the 
joint venture will enjoy commercial autonomy and have a full-function character. 
 
In its Notice on market definition,
137
 the Commission sets out the principles for the 
definition of relevant product and geographical markets based on the existing case 
law. The Notice provides that in identifying relevant product and geographical 
markets, the Commission will normally examine the substitutability between 
different products and geographical areas from both the demand side and the supply 
side by utilising the so-called small but significant non-transitory increase in price 
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 In Form Co annexed to Regulation 802/2004
139
 relating to the pre-
notification of concentrations, the Commission categorises some relevant markets as 
‘affected markets’, and requires the parties to submit some detailed information 
regarding them. According to the Form, affected markets refer to those where two or 
more merging parties have a combined market share of 15 % or more in relation to 
horizontal relationships, or where their individual or combined market share is 25 % 
or more with respect to vertical relationships. 
 
These principles essentially apply to the delineation of relevant product and 
geographical markets in full-function joint venture cases as well. On the other hand, 
special consideration may be given to market definition in joint venture cases, where 
the purpose of the joint venture is to carry out a R&D project, and to produce and 
market the resulting product. This resulting product may replace existing products or 
may create completely new demand.
140
 In the latter case, it may be necessary to 
define a separate market for the product to be developed through identifying, if 
possible, substitutable R&D efforts.
141
              
 
3. Market Shares and Concentration Levels 
 
Market shares and concentration levels are considered to give useful first indications 
of the market structure, and of the competitive positions of the merging parties and 
their competitors.
142
 Recital 32 of the Merger Regulation establishes a presumption 
that a merger is in principle compatible with the common market where the 
combined market share of the merging parties does not exceed 25 %. In the 
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Horizontal Merger Guidelines, however, the Commission recognises that a market 




The Commission also considers concentration levels based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), in order to have an initial view about the impact of mergers 
on competition. Under the HHI, the squares of the market shares of all firms 
operating in the relevant market are summed, and then it is calculated how much the 
combination of the market shares of the merging firms will increase this sum. Such 
increase in the post-merger HHI is called ‘delta’. 
 
The Commission utilises the post-merger HHI and the level of delta as an indicator 
of the absence of competition concerns. Accordingly, if the post-merger HHI is 
below 1000, the merger is likely to be cleared with no further analysis irrespective of 
the delta level.
144
 In addition, a merger is normally allowed if the delta is below 250 
in the case of a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 2000, or below 150 in the case of 
a post-merger HHI above 2000. However, this second safe harbour is subject to 
certain exceptions. The exceptions mentioned as examples in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines are that: (i) one of the merging parties is a potential entrant or a recent 
entrant with a small market share, or an important innovator in ways not reflected in 
market shares, or a maverick firm; (ii) one of the parties has a pre-merger market 
share of 50 % or more; (iii) there are significant cross-shareholdings between firms 





In the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission also sets out certain 
market share and HHI thresholds in relation to vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
The Guidelines state that a non-horizontal merger is unlikely to create any 
competition concern, where the market share of the merged entity in each of the 
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markets concerned is below 30 % and the post-merger HHI is below 2000.
146
 In these 
situations, the Commission will normally not carry out an extensive investigation 
unless any of the exceptional situations similar to those listed above with regard to 




In measuring market shares and concentration levels in full-function joint venture 
cases, different scenarios should be taken into account. If none of the parent firms 
retains activities in the joint venture’s market, market shares and concentration levels 
will undoubtedly be calculated in the same way as in amalgamation and acquisition 
situations. In this respect, the post-merger market share of the merged entity will be 
the combination of the pre-merger market shares of the parent firms and the joint 
venture, in the case that it has already operated in the market.
148
 On the other hand, 
where one or more parents retain some activities in the joint venture’s market, the 
applicability of this approach may become questionable. A more problematic 
scenario may arise if the parent firms continue to operate in the market through their 
joint ventures with third parties. In these circumstances, the crucial question is 
whether the Commission will take into consideration the existence or possibility of 
competition between the joint venture and the parent firms or their joint ventures 
with third parties.  
 
In Gencor v Commission, the General Court founded that even if Gencor had joint 
control over LDP, there had been an effective competition between Implat, a solely 
controlled subsidiary of Gencor, and LDP. On this basis, the Court held that the 
change in the structure of LDP and Implat that eliminated competition between these 
two firms did amount to a concentration.
149
 This decision may be interpreted to 
imply that the likelihood of future competition between the parents and the joint 
venture should be incorporated into merger analysis in joint venture cases. However, 
the Commission generally disregards the possibility of competition between the 
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parent firms and the joint venture, and aggregates their entire market shares in 






 for example, the Commission aggregated the market share of the 
BP-Mobil joint venture with that of Mobil in assessing the competitive effect of the 
Exxon-Mobil joint venture in question.
152
 It dismissed the parties’ argument that BP-
Mobil and Exxon-Mobil had to be treated as two independent firms competing 
against each other. The Commission states that: 
 
[T]he relations between the JV and the parents are considered on the basis of 
the generally correct assumption that they achieve some form of integration and 
that the parent company is in a position to control the commercial policy of its 
JV, so that from a competition point of view they are to be viewed as being not 




The Commission also rejected the parties’ claim that this approach was inconsistent 
with the Gencor decision. It stated that, in Gencor, the Court made an ex-post 
analysis on whether the parent and the joint venture had been in competition before 
the merger, while in the present case it had to carry out an ex ante analysis of the 
likelihood of future competition between Exxon-Mobil and BP-Mobil.
154
 The 
Commission concludes that: 
 
[I]n accordance with the approach which must be followed in the context of the 
merger control review, the Commission is to assume the worst possible 
scenario for antitrust purposes, that is to say the alignment of the competitive 
strategies of Exxon/Mobil and BP/Mobil as a result of the joint control of the 






 the Commission also took into account the market shares of the 
existing joint ventures of each merging firm with third parties in calculating market 
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 In such analysis, the Commission made a distinction according to whether 
the third party parent also operates in the market concerned. It aggregated the entire 
market share of CFMI, a joint venture between General Electric and Snecma, with 
that of General Electric on the basis that Snecma was not an actual or potential 
competitor to General Electric and CFMI.
158
 Nonetheless, in calculating the market 
shares of General Electric’s competitors, RR and P&W, the Commission aggregated 
the market shares of their joint venture IAE equally among these two firms, because 
both were active in the relevant market.
159
 This approach of the Commission was 




It should be noted that in GE/Honeywell, the Commission divided the market share 
of a joint venture equally between its parents which were not party to the merger in 
question. However, it may take a different approach in considering the market share 
of the joint venture of one merging party with a third party that is also active in the 
joint venture’s market. For example, in Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi,
161
 the Commission 
counted twice the market share of the joint venture, Samarco, by attributing its 100 




To sum up, the practice of the Commission and the case law indicate that the worst 
case scenario from the viewpoint of competition is normally taken into account in 
analysing market shares and concentration levels in the case of full-function joint 
ventures. In this regard, the parent firms and the joint venture are usually treated as a 
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single economic unit, and their market shares are combined for the purposes of the 
analysis.     
 
4. Competitive Effects 
 
a) Horizontal Effects 
 
aa) Non-Coordinated Effects 
 
According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, non-coordinated effects may arise 
where a merger removes important competitive constraints on one or more firms in 
the market, thereby increasing their market power to unilaterally raise prices.
163
 This 
is particularly true where the merger leads to the creation or strengthening of a single 
dominant position.
164
 In addition, the Guidelines recognise that a merger may give 
rise to non-coordinated effects as a result of the loss of important competitive 
constraints on the remaining competitors in an oligopolistic market, even in the 
absence of a strong likelihood of coordination among them.
165
 In these so-called non-
collusive oligopoly situations, the merged entity or another member of the oligopoly 
may obtain the ability to significantly increase prices, even though it is not the 
market leader.
166
    
 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines list a number of factors which will be taken into 
account in analysing whether the concentration in question would create non-
coordinated effects. The Guidelines note that not all of these factors have to be 
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The first factor considered in the analysis of non-coordinated effects is whether the 
merging firms have large market shares.
168
 The larger the market share, the more 
likely the merged entity is to be viewed as having market power.
169
 Nonetheless, an 
analysis strictly based on market shares may be misleading with respect to markets 
involving differentiated products where some products are closer substitutes than 
others.
170
 In such situations, the Commission also examines the closeness of 
competition between the products offered by the merging firms. The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines explain that ‘the higher the degree of substitutability between the 
merging firms' products, the more likely it is that the merging firms will raise prices 
significantly’.
171
 Particularly if the products of the merging firms are regarded by a 
great number of customers as their first or second choices, the merged entity may 
enjoy market power to increase prices significantly, even though it does not have 
large market shares.
172
 On the other hand, even where the merging firms possesses 
relatively high market shares, this may not lead to non-coordinative effects if the 
products of the merging firms are not close substitutes, or there is a high degree of 
substitutability between these products and those of competitors.
173
   
 
Other factors listed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which increase the 
likelihood of non-coordinated effects are that (i) customers of the merging parties 
have difficulties switching to other suppliers because of a lack of viable alternative 
suppliers or of substantial switching costs;
174
 (ii) competitors are unlikely to raise 
their supply substantially in response to a price increase by the merged entity;
175
 (iii) 
the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to make the expansion of 
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smaller firms and potential competitors more difficult or otherwise restrict the ability 
of rival firms to compete;
176
 and (iv) the merger eliminates an important competitor 
which has more of an influence on the competitive process than their market shares 
or similar measures indicate.
177
 In evaluating non-coordinated effects, the 
Commission also considers the countervailing buyer power of customers
178
 and the 




These factors are also taken into consideration in analysing the non-coordinated 
effects of full-function joint ventures.
180
 It might be asked whether the fact that the 
parent firms retain independent activities in the joint venture’s market may be 
incorporated as a mitigating factor into this analysis. In EDF/AEM/Edison,
181
 the 
Commission assumed that the parent firms EDF and AEM, which both would have 
independent activities in the relevant market, would 'align to a large extent their 
competitive behaviour to that of the joint venture Edison’.
182
 Nevertheless, it added 
that ‘[i]t cannot be excluded however that in particular circumstances EDF and AEM 
may have different strategic goals, in order to maximise their own profits outside the 
joint venture’.
183
 However, in its analysis, the Commission did not emphasise the 
possibility of the exercise of independent competitive strategies by the parents and 
the joint venture. It found that the joint venture would not give rise to any non-
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bb) Coordinated Effects 
 
The SIEC test has not brought about a significant change in the analysis of 
coordinated effects, namely collective dominance. In this analysis, the Commission 
focuses on whether the merger may enable firms to coordinate their behaviour and 
increase prices, or whether it may make coordination easier for firms that are already 




Based on the case law under the dominance test, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
set out the principles to be taken into account in assessing coordinated effects. 
Accordingly, the Commission firstly examines whether it would be possible for the 
remaining members of an oligopoly to reach the terms of coordination.
185
 The 
Guidelines stipulate that ‘the less complex and the more stable the economic 
environment, the easier it is for the firms to reach a common understanding on the 
terms of coordination’.
186
 In this regard, the Commission considers various factors 
such as the number of players in the market; the homogeneity of products; the 
stability of demand and supply; the role of innovation in the market; symmetry of 
costs, market shares, capacity levels and levels of vertical integration; and structural 




Once it finds that it is possible for firms to agree on the terms of coordination, the 
Commission analyses whether such coordination is likely to be sustainable. For 
coordination to be sustainable, the Commission requires the satisfaction of the three 
conditions set forth in Airtours by the General Court.
188
 First, the market must be 
sufficiently transparent to enable coordinating firms to monitor, to a sufficient 
degree, deviations by any of them.
189
 Some factors involved in the evaluation of 
transparency are the number of active players in the market, the publicity of 
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transactions with customers, and the stability of the market.
190
 The Commission also 
assesses whether coordinating firms use monitoring mechanisms to facilitate the 
detection of any deviations.
191
   
 
In order for coordination to be sustained, secondly, there must be a credible deterrent 
mechanism convincing coordinating firms to adhere to the terms of coordination.
192
 
A deterrent mechanism is regarded as credible only if it is likely that the retaliation 
becomes sufficient to offset the benefits of deviation and is likely to be activated in a 
timely manner.
193
 In this respect, the Commission particularly takes into account the 
frequency and volume of sales in the market, the incentive for non-deviating firms to 
retaliate, and the existence of commercial interactions, such as joint ventures, 
between coordinating firms in the relevant market or other markets.
194
       
 
Thirdly, sustainable coordination requires that non-coordinating active firms and 
potential competitors, as well as customers, must not be able to jeopardise the 
outcome expected from coordination. In respect of this condition, the Commission 
considers the capacities of active competitors, the likelihood of sufficient and timely 




In Impala v Commission,
196
 the General Court suggested a more flexible approach in 
analysing whether these conditions are met. It held that the close alignment of prices 
over a long period in the market before the merger demonstrated the existence of a 
collective dominant position, even in the absence of direct evidence for strong 
transparency.
197
 In the appeal, the ECJ agreed that the four conditions mentioned 
above were required for finding that a concentration is likely to lead to collective 
dominance. The Court also went one step further and gave guidance about how to 
apply these criteria in individual cases.
198
 It emphasised that ‘[i]n applying those 
                                                          
190
 ibid para 50. 
191
 ibid para 51. 
192
 ibid paras 52-55. 
193
 ibid para 53. 
194
 ibid paras 54-55. 
195
 ibid paras 56-57. 
196
 Case T-464/04 [2006] ECR II-2289. 
197
 ibid paras 252-54. 
198
 Case C-413/06P BMG and Sony v Impala [2008] ECR I-4951, para 123. 
118 
 
criteria, it [was] necessary to avoid a mechanical approach involving the separate 
verification of each of those criteria taken in isolation, while taking no account of the 
overall economic mechanism of a hypothetical tacit coordination’.
199
 Based on this 
principle, the Court found that the General Court erred in that it failed to carry out a 
careful investigation by considering ‘a postulated monitoring mechanism forming 




The Commission’s practice and the case law do not indicate any considerable 
difference in relation to the appraisal of coordinated effects in joint venture cases as 
far as the joint venture’s market is concerned.
201
 However, the creation of a full-
function joint venture may also increase the likelihood of tacit coordination in other 
markets where its parents are competitors, by creating a structural link which 
facilitates reaching the terms of coordination as well as monitoring and retaliating 
against deviations. In such situations, it may be questioned whether such 
coordination will, or should, be analysed with reference to Article 2(3) or Article 
101, in combination with Article 2(4), or to both tests.
202
     
 
cc) Efficiency Considerations 
 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide that a merger, which would be prohibited 
otherwise, may be cleared based on efficiencies, only if (i) the merger leads to 
substantial benefits to consumers;
203
 (ii) these benefits are merger specific, ie there is 
no less restrictive alternative that creates the same efficiencies;
204
 and (iii) they are 
verifiable, ie they are likely to materialise and be substantial enough to outweigh the 
potential harm of the merger to consumers.
205
 It should be discussed whether the 
Commission may treat full-function joint ventures differently in relation to the 
application of these conditions.  
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With respect to the first condition, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines specifically 
mention that a joint venture set up to develop a new product may lead to some 
efficiencies that can be considered by the Commission. Nevertheless, this could be 
perceived as an indication of a wider role for efficiency claims in full-function joint 
venture cases than in amalgamation and acquisition cases, only if the former were 
more likely to satisfy the second condition, ie efficiencies were more likely to be 
viewed as merger-specific in the context of a full-function joint venture. 
 
In the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission acknowledges that the creation 
of a joint venture may be regarded as a less restrictive alternative to a notified 
merger. This argument in fact was specifically used by the Commission in 
Inco/Falconbridge.
206
 Therein, the parties claimed that the acquisition of 
Falconbridge by Alcon would bring about efficiencies resulting from the 
combination of their mining activities for nickel in the Sudbury basin in Canada.
207
 
The Commission held that the claimed efficiencies could not be viewed as merger-
specific, because the creation of a partial function joint venture for the mining and 
processing of nickel in the Sudbury basin constituted a viable and less restrictive 
alternative.
208
 This finding of the Commission could also apply if such a joint 
venture were organised to have a full-function character, since in that case the parent 
firms would also maintain their mining and processing activities outside the Sudbury 
basin, and compete at the refining and marketing level.  
 
However, it should be remembered that the Commission, in practice, treats joint 
ventures as forming part of the same economic unit as their parents when assessing 
their anticompetitive effects, even if the parents retain some activities in the market. 
Therefore, despite the Inco/Falconbridge decision, it is difficult to claim that 
compared to full-merger cases, efficiencies are more likely to be considered by the 
Commission as merger-specific in the case of joint ventures leading to a partial 
integration of the parents’ activities in the market.
209
 Furthermore, it should be noted 
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that the Commission is not eager to accept efficiency claims if the concentration 
would result in significant anticompetitive effects.
210
 It has not so far allowed a 
concentration which otherwise would be blocked on the basis of efficiency claims.
211
 
There is no decision indicating that the Commission may soften this approach with 
regard to efficiency claims in the case of full-function joint ventures.         
 
b) Non-Horizontal Effects 
 
The Commission recognises that the non-horizontal (ie vertical and conglomerate) 
aspects of concentrations are usually less likely to raise serious competition concerns 
than their horizontal aspects, because they do not normally result in the loss of direct 
competition, and are more likely to create substantial efficiencies.
212
 However, it 
acknowledges that in specific cases those aspects may also give rise to non-





With respect to vertical aspects, non-coordinated effects may arise, if the merger 
gives rise to foreclosure concerns by hampering or eliminating actual or potential 
rivals' access to supplies or market, thereby reducing these firms' ability and/or 
incentive to compete.
214
 Foreclosure effects may be in the form of input foreclosure 
where the merger is likely to raise the costs of downstream rivals by restricting their 
access to an important input; or in the form of customer foreclosure where the 
merger is likely to foreclose upstream rivals by restricting their access to a sufficient 
customer base.
215
 The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines list three factors to be 
considered in the assessment of input and customer foreclosure. These are: (i) the 
ability of the merged entity to foreclose access to the input or downstream market; 
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(ii) the incentive for the merged entity to foreclose; and (iii) the overall impact of the 




An acquisition of joint control by two firms over another firm may give a greater 
ability to foreclose than an acquisition of sole control over the same firm by only one 
of them, because both parents collectively would have a stronger market position in 
the upstream or downstream market. However, this may increase the likelihood of 
foreclosure only if the parent firms have the incentive to align their competitive 
strategy to that of each other, in order to leverage their collective market power into 
the joint venture’s market. In full-function joint venture cases, the incentive to 
foreclose is less likely to be present than in the case of sole control, due to the fact 
that the parent firms may have different profit-maximising policies and commercial 
interests. In analysing the vertical effects of a joint venture between Amadeus and 
GGL, the Commission held that the three parents of Amadeus (Lufthansa, Air France 
and Iberia) competed with each other, and each of them was a member of different 
airline alliances and, therefore, it was doubtful that they would accept that the joint 





The incentive to foreclose in the context of full-function joint ventures may be 
considered even lower, if only one parent is in a vertical relationship with the joint 
venture, because any foreclosing strategy may not be profitable to the other parent. 
For instance, in SNPE/MBDA,
218
 the Commission stated that MBDA would not use 
the joint venture to reinforce its competitive position in the relevant markets, on the 
ground that this would go against the joint venture's profit maximising strategy, and 
the other parent, SNPE, would oppose it.
219
 Furthermore, if the parent firm was 
already vertically integrated before the transaction, the formation of the joint venture 
may even decrease its incentive to foreclose. In Siemens/Italtel, the Commission 
concluded that the acquisition of joint control by Siemens over Italtel, which was 
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previously solely controlled by STET, would reduce the objective interest of STET 
to favour the joint venture in order to foreclose the joint venture’s competitors.
220
   
 
Considering that full-function joint ventures normally must supply to and purchase 
from third parties and deal with their parents at arm’s length, it should be unlikely 
that they would lead to foreclosure concerns for the parents’ rivals. Although it does 
not ignore the possibility that these joint ventures may give preferential treatment to 
their parents, the Commission often takes into consideration the full-function 
character of the joint venture as a factor mitigating (but not eliminating) the risk of 
foreclosure.
221
   
 
A vertical full-function joint venture may also lead to coordinated effects by 
facilitating tacit coordination among firms in an upstream or downstream market 
from that of the joint venture.
222
 Where two or more parents are active in the same 
upstream or downstream market, the Commission usually analyses whether the joint 
venture may result in coordination between the parents in that market, according to 
Article 2(4) and (5) of the Merger Regulation rather than under Article 2(3).
223
 
Therefore, in the case of vertical joint ventures, the assessment of coordinated effects 
usually appears to be confined to situations where only one parent operates in the 
vertically related market.     
 
The primary competition concern with regard to conglomerate mergers is also 
foreclosure. This may be the case particularly where the merger broadens the range 
of products offered by the merged entity, such that it could leverage its strong market 
position in one product market into another by tying or bundling or other 
exclusionary practices.
224
 In assessing the likelihood of a foreclosure effect in such 
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cases, the Commission also considers the ability and incentive of the merged entity 




Based on the similar reasons mentioned above in relation to vertical effects, a serious 
foreclosure risk is usually less likely to arise in the case of conglomerate joint 
ventures, notwithstanding that this risk is not completely disregarded by the 
Commission.
226
 In GE/Honeywell, General Electric claimed that the products of 
CFMI, its joint venture with Snecma, could not be considered in assessing the 
possibility of bundling between the products of the merging parties, because Snecma 
would not allow the use of CFMI for bundling purposes. The Commission refused 
this claim on the basis that Snecma did not have any incentive to object to the 
involvement of CFMI in any bundling strategy.
227
 Nonetheless, the General Court 
found that Snecma would not have a comparable commercial interest to that of 
General Electric in engaging in bundling. In this regard, the Court stated that ‘the 
merged entity's ‘lever’ on the market for large commercial jet aircraft engines to 
promote its bundled sales would, in principle, be smaller in the case of CFMI engines 
than it would be in the case of engines manufactured by GE alone’.
228
 This may be 
interpreted to mean that in conglomerate joint venture cases, the Commission has to 
consider whether the parent firm, which is not active in the neighbouring product 
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B- Analysis of the Risk of Coordination between the Parents under Article 101 
 
Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation stipulates that if the creation of a full-function 
joint venture has, as its object or effect, the coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, this coordination will be 
analysed with reference to the criteria of Article 101. This appraisal under Article 
101 is in addition to the analysis under Article 2(3). However, if the joint venture 
does not have any market presence for EU customers, the only competition 
assessment may concern the risk of coordination as to the parents’ independent 




It should be noted that not all agreements between the parent firms are subject to 
Article 101 in accordance with Article 2(4). As in Fujitsu/Siemens,
230
 the 
Commission accepts that only those which are directly related to and necessary for 
the formation of the joint venture can be examined under Article 2(4).
231
 Other 
agreements, however, will be analysed separately with reference to Article 101 
within the framework of Regulation 1/2003.
232
 The Commission herein appears to 





Under Article 2(4), the Commission has not so far found that the creation of a full-
function joint venture has an object to coordinate the independent activities of its 
parents. This is not surprising, because it is very unlikely that the parties would 
notify the Commission of a joint venture with an anticompetitive object. Moreover, 
considering that the parent firms normally make significant investments in the joint 
venture, the Commission usually does not give important consideration to the 
possibility that the parents have an anticompetitive object.
234
 Therefore, the analysis 
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under Article 101 usually focuses on whether the joint venture has, as its effect, the 
coordination of the competitive behaviour of independent firms. 
 
The Commission acknowledges that for a restriction of competition within the sense 
of Article 101(1) to be established, it must be shown that (i) the coordination of the 
parent firms' competitive behaviour is likely; (ii) this coordination results in an 
appreciable restriction of competition; and (iii) there is a causal link between this 
restriction and the creation of the joint venture.
235
 When the infringement of Article 





In this analysis under Article 101, the Commission, first of all, identifies candidate 
markets where there may be a risk of coordination. Thus, below, it is firstly 
explained how these markets are identified. Then, it is shown how the Commission 
assesses the conditions required to find a breach of Article 101(1), and the fulfilment 
of the exemption criteria under Article 101(3).   
 
1. Candidate Markets for Coordination   
 
The first subparagraph of Article 2(5) of the Merger Regulation provides that in 
analysing the risk of coordination, the Commission will consider ‘whether two or 
more parent companies retain, to a significant extent, activities in the same market as 
the joint venture or in a market which is downstream or upstream from that of the 
joint venture or in a neighbouring market closely related to this market’.  
 
Through focusing on the coordination of the independent activities of the parent 
firms, the Merger Regulation appears not to concern any coordination between the 
parents and the joint venture. This approach is consistent with the Commission’s 
previous practice, which presumes that there would not be effective competition 
between the parent and the joint venture, since the former would act as the industrial 
                                                          
235
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leader of the latter.
237
 Thus, the joint venture’s market may be identified as a 
candidate market for coordination if at least two parents remain active therein. The 
Commission also assesses the possibility of coordination if the parent firms continue 
to be potential competitors in relation to the joint venture’s market.
238
 This may be 
the case especially if the parents do not undertake not to enter the joint venture’s 




In any case, it may be asked whether the Commission will take into account the risk 
of coordination with regard to the joint venture’s market, if, in analysing the 
coordinated and non-coordinated effects of joint ventures, it has already assumed that 
the parent firms would align their competitive behaviour with each other. 
Wegener/PCM shows that a joint venture may be viewed as leading to both the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position and coordination between the 
parents in the joint venture’s market.
240
 Nonetheless, in EDF/AEM/Edison, as 
explained above,
241
 the Commission assumed that the parents and the joint venture 
would act together for the purposes of the appraisal under Article 2(3), but did not 
analyse separately the likelihood of coordination between the parents according to 
Article 2(4). Even though this decision seems to constitute an exception to the 
general practice of the Commission, it raises confusion about whether the likelihood 
of coordination between the parents will be assessed in respect of markets where the 
joint venture is intended to operate.   
 
Since the parent firms usually withdraw from the joint venture’s markets in order not 
to compete with it, in the vast majority of cases, the risk of coordination is analysed 
with respect to upstream, downstream or neighbouring markets in which the two 
parents are active. In Vodafone/Vivendi,
242
 the Commission found that the joint 
venture was likely to give rise to coordination between the parents in an upstream 
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market from that of the joint venture.
243
 In Areva/Urenco, however, the Commission 





Neighbouring markets may also be regarded as candidate markets for coordination. 
The Commission defines a neighbouring market as ‘a separate but closely related 
market to the market of the joint venture, both markets having common 
characteristics including technology, customers and competitors’.
245
 For example, the 
life insurance market is considered to be a neighbouring market to the non-life 
insurance market,
246
 while the charter air transport market is a neighbouring market 
to the scheduled air transport market.
247
 However, the scheduled air transport market 
is less likely to be viewed as a neighbouring market closely related to the life 
insurance market. Two different geographical markets in respect of the same product 
may also be considered as neighbouring markets from each other. In Yara/Praxair,
248
 
for instance, the Commission analysed the risk of coordination in national markets 
outside the scope of the joint venture, where the parent firms would continue to be 
active.
249
 If the parent firms operate in the same market which is not closely related 
to that of joint venture, the Commission may still identify such a market as a 
candidate market, even though it would be unlikely to give important consideration 




Although the Merger Regulation and the Commission’s practice essentially concern 
horizontal coordination, in some decisions the Commission seemingly also assesses 
the possibility of vertical coordination. In NC/Canal +/CDPQ/Bank America,
251
 the 
Commission decided that the creation of the joint venture NCH, engaged in cable 
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television distribution in France, could lead to vertical coordination between the 
parent firms, with regard to access to the content needed to operate in the pay-tv 
market in Spain.
252
 This decision shows that it may be necessary to identify possible 
markets where the parent firms would vertically coordinate their activities. 





2. Article 101(1) Analysis  
 
a) Likelihood of Coordination 
 
The likelihood of coordination usually depends on the form of possible coordination 
strategy. The forms of coordination listed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
regarding coordinated effects are also relevant herein.
254
 Accordingly, the purpose of 
coordination may be raising prices over a competitive level,
255
 limiting output or 
capacity,
256
 sharing markets or customers,
257
 or conducting exclusionary practices.
258
 
However, it is not rare that the Commission analyses the risk of coordination 
between the parent firms without specifying the possible form of coordination. 
 
In determining whether coordination is likely, the Commission takes into account a 
number of factors. It is however difficult to state that the Commission’s practice is 
consistent in providing a general methodology for considering the significance of 
these factors in each individual case. In some decisions, the Commission decides 
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whether the parent firms are likely to coordinate by using very general terms,
259
 
while, in other decisions, it makes a detailed analysis through giving important 




Its practice shows that in analysing the likelihood of coordination, the Commission 
essentially focuses on the incentive of the parents to coordinate. It does not, however, 
necessarily require that the parents have the ability to coordinate. Such ability seems 
to have more significance in respect of the appreciability of the restriction of 
competition.
261
 Nonetheless, whether the parents have the ability to coordinate is also 
considered as a factor that affects the incentive for the parents to coordinate.
262
   
 
In evaluating whether the parents have the ability to coordinate, the Commission 
firstly assesses their market shares. In Wegener/PCM, when finding that the 
coordination of the parents’ competitive behaviour was likely, the Commission 
principally relied on the fact that the two parents and the joint venture were 
collectively the market leader with a combined market share of 45-55 %.
263
 In TXU 
Europe/EDF, however, the Commission decided that given the parents’ combined 




Nevertheless, if the market is very concentrated, it is not always necessary that the 
parents collectively have a significant market share in order to conclude that they 
have the ability to coordinate. In Fujitsu/Siemens, although the parent firms had a 
combined market share of 20-40% in the financial workstations market, the second 
highest after that of NCR, the Commission considered coordination likely on the 
grounds that this market was highly concentrated.
265
 Moreover, in relation to the 
DRAM market where the parent firms had a market share of less than 25%, the 
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Commission provided that ‘only a relationship of interdependence between the five 
major producers in the DRAM market would allow the conclusion that co-ordination 




It is nevertheless not surprising that besides market shares and the level of 
concentration, other market characteristics may also play an important role in 
determining the ability of the parent firms to coordinate. In Fujitsu/Siemens,
267
 the 
Commission came to the conclusion that the structure of the DRAM market was not 
conducive to coordination, due to the lack of transparency on prices, countervailing 
buyer power,
268
 unstable demand level and rapid technological change in the 
market.
269
 Similarly, in Telia/Telenor/Schibsted,
270
 the Commission found that the 
high market shares of the parent firms in the dial-up internet access market were not 
indicative of their market power, based on the growing character of the market,
271
 
low switching costs ie high price-sensitivity,
272
 and low entry barriers.
273
 In some 
decisions, the Commission also considers the existence of substantial overcapacity in 
the market as a factor which decreases the ability and incentive to coordinate.
274
 
Furthermore, the fact that the market is regulated, or that the pricing or other 
competitive parameters are determined by third parties other than the parent firms, is 
regarded as diminishing the ability and incentive to coordinate.
275
   
 
In addition to the ability to coordinate, another important factor affecting the 
incentive to coordinate is the value of the joint venture’s business to the parent firms. 
The Commission’s practice suggests that the greater the value of the joint venture, 
the greater the incentive the parent would have to coordinate. In NC/Canal 
+/CDPQ/Bank America, the Commission held that the success of the cable business 
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of the joint venture, NC, was very important to the parent Canal+, such that the other 
parent could convince Canal+ to treat it favourably in relation to access to its audio-
visual rights in Spain.
276
 In Vodafone/Vivendi, the Commission found that having 
regard to the importance of the joint venture’s portal for the third generation phones 
businesses of the parent firms and the amount of investments required for the 
development of third generation services, the parent firms would be likely to have 
the incentive to coordinate in the mobile telecommunications market in Spain.
277
 On 
the other hand, in many cases, the Commission decided that coordination was 
unlikely because the value of the joint venture’s activities to the parents was very 





The Commission also takes into consideration the symmetry between the market 
positions of the parent firms. In Yara/Praxair, it viewed that coordination was 
unlikely due to the asymmetric market shares of the parent firms.
279
 Moreover, in 
NC/Canal +/CDPQ/Bank America, the Commission found coordination to be 
unlikely with respect to the pay-tv market in Spain, on the grounds that one of the 





Whether the joint venture facilitates information exchange between the parent firms 
is also considered in analysing the incentive for the parent firm to coordinate. In 
some decisions, the Commission has excluded the risk of coordination, because the 
joint venture does not give the parent firms access to competitive information 
regarding each other’s independent operations, or the parent firms provide certain 
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Some other factors affecting the likelihood of coordination are whether the parent 
firms are members of different alliances which are competing with each other;
282
 
whether the parent firms are active in the candidate market for coordination, only 
through a joint venture with third parties;
283
 and, whether the characteristics of 
products or contracts in the candidate market induces the parent firms to compete 
rather than coordinating.
284
   
 
b) Appreciable Restriction of Competition 
 
Once it considers coordination to be likely, the Commission analyses whether such 
coordination is likely to have an appreciable effect on competition. As stated above, 
this analysis is closely linked with the ability of the parent firms to coordinate 
successfully. In BT/AT&T, after finding that the parent firms would have the 
incentive to coordinate without considering their ability to do it, the Commission 
decided that such coordination would be appreciable on the basis of the market 
structure and the strong market position of the parents.
285
 In Fujitsu/Siemens, the 
Commission relied on the market shares of the parent firms and their 
interdependence with the biggest player in the market, in order to conclude that 
coordination was likely and would be appreciable.
286
 In many cases, although 
coming to conclusion that the parents did not have the ability and incentive to 
coordinate, the Commission explained that even in the worst case scenario where the 
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In some cases, however, the Commission held that coordination was likely, but did 
not discuss whether it would result in an appreciable effect on competition.
288
 Given 
the strong market position of the parent firms as well as the commitments submitted 
by the parties to remove the risk of coordination in such cases, the Commission may 
not have needed to assess the appreciability of the likely coordination.   
 
The appreciability condition should also be understood to require that the 
coordination has an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. Such an 
effect on trade, in general, is required for a transaction to fall within the scope of 
Article 101(1).
289
 In BT/AT&T, for instance, the Commission analysed separately 
whether any coordination would have an effect on trade between Member States.
290
     
  
c) Causal Link  
 
When the coordination is considered to be likely and appreciable, the Commission 
analyses whether it is a direct consequence of the creation of the joint venture. In 
such an analysis, the Commission examines particularly whether the parent firms had 
competed strongly with each other in the market before the formation of the joint 
venture. In this regard, the existence of previous contractual or structural links 
between the parent firms is viewed as an important indicator of the absence of 
competition before the creation of the joint venture, although this does not 
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In Enel/FT/DT, the Commission stated that there had been a joint venture between 
the parent firms FT and DT, and that therefore they had not already competed 
strongly with each other in their respective home countries. Based on this finding, the 
Commission decided that it was not possible to claim that there was a causal link 
between the lack of competition between the parents and the creation of the joint 
venture in question.
292
 Similarly, in Telefonica/Portugal Telecom/Medi Telecom,
293
 
the Commission held that the parent firms had not competed strongly against each 
other because of a general cooperation agreement between them and, thus, there was 
no causal link between the lack of competition and the formation of the joint 
venture.
294
   
 
The Commission usually concludes that it is not necessary to examine the existence 
of a causal link if any coordination is not likely or appreciable.
295
 However, in 
appraising any causal link, it also appears to take into account some factors relevant 
to the incentive to coordinate.
296
 In Boeing/Lockheed Martin/United Launch 
Alliance, the Commission provided that there would be no causal link between the 
joint venture and the coordination, on the basis that the joint venture would not give 
the parents an incentive to coordinate.
297
 In line with this approach adopted in the 
decision, it may be claimed that if it is shown that the joint venture will increase the 
incentive for the parent firms to coordinate the causal link is also likely to be 
considered proven. Indeed, in some decisions where it was found that the joint 
venture would create an incentive for the parent firms to coordinate, the Commission 




3. Analysis under Article 101(3) 
 
If the joint venture causes any coordination caught by Article 101, the Commission 
normally analyses whether the exemption conditions laid down in Article 101(3) are 
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satisfied. Since the parent firms usually give some commitments that exclude the risk 




In Areva/Urenco, nevertheless, the Commission, to some extent, discussed the 
applicability of Article 101(3) to the risk of coordination between the parent firms. 
Although far from providing extensive guidance regarding the appraisal of these 
effects under Article 101(3), it gives some hints about the possible approach of the 
Commission to the issue. In this decision, the Commission held that the conditions of 
Article 101(3) were not fulfilled, particularly because there was no indication that 
any coordination between the parents would be likely to benefit consumers, or that 
the restrictions imposed were indispensable.
300
 This implies that under Article 2(4), 
the Commission will take into account only efficiencies resulting from the 
coordination, but not those arising from integration by the joint venture. This 
approach seems to be compatible with the wording of Article 2(4), which states that 
‘any coordination’ will be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Article 101(1) 
and (3).  
 
Such a distinction may be important in analysing the first exemption condition, 
which requires that the transaction produces economic benefits. As in the 
Areva/Urenco case, it is unlikely that any horizontal coordination creates substantial 
benefits, because it does not involve any integration and usually tends to raise prices 
or exclude competitors.
301
 Even if the benefits resulting from integration by the joint 
venture are included in the appraisal, it would be still very difficult to prove the 
fulfilment of the indispensability condition. Thus, it would be very exceptional that 
any coordination infringing Article 101(1) is exempted under Article 101(3). 
 
C- Overlap between Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) 
 
In some cases, any coordination between the parent firms may theoretically fall 
under both Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation. Considering that 
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compared to the analysis of coordinated effects under Article 2(3) the Commission 
appears to show less evidence to conclude that the coordination infringes Article 101, 
the question of which article(s) applies to the coordination may be of great 
significance.  
 
For the purpose of distinguishing the scope of these two provisions from each other, 
it can be argued that Article 2(3) concerns coordination among all the remaining 
players in the market, whereas Article 2(4) concerns merely coordination between 
the parent firms. However, such an argument would not be sufficiently convincing, 
because in examining the likelihood of coordination and the appreciability of the 
restriction of competition with reference to Article 101, the Commission usually 
takes into account the market structure and the market positions of the competitors as 
well. For example, in Fujitsu/Siemens, the Commission relied on the interdependence 
between the parent firms and their competitors to conclude that the coordination was 




Areva/Urenco provides some indications about how the Commission may approach 
any overlap between the scopes of the two rules. Therein, Areva and Urenco 
established the joint venture ETC, operating in the centrifuge market, which was a 
market upstream to the uranium enrichment market where they would continue to 
compete. According to the joint venture agreement, neither parent would be able to 
purchase centrifuges from the joint venture without the prior explicit approval of the 
other parent. The Commission firstly stated that the ability of the parents to control 
each other’s capacity would enable them to establish successful coordination on 
capacities, and that this would consequently lead to a price increase in the uranium 
enrichment market, at both the EU and global levels.
303
 Furthermore, by applying the 
collective dominance criteria, the Commission found that the joint venture would 
also result in tacit coordination between the parent firms in the EU uranium 
enrichment market.
304
 Based on these findings, it decided that the joint venture 
would create a collective dominance for Areva and Urenco in the uranium 
enrichment market in accordance with Article 2(3). For the same reasons, it also held 
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that the joint venture was also likely to restrict competition appreciably in the market 
within the sense of Article 101.
305
   
 
The first implication that can be drawn from Areva/Urenco is that the Commission 
may also appraise the risk of coordination with respect to markets where the parent 
firms do not integrate their independent activities under Article 2(3). It may be 
claimed that this is not surprising because the Commission already makes such 
appraisals in the case of vertical mergers. However, it should be noted that in 
Areva/Urenco, the Commission analysed whether there would be any explicit or tacit 
coordination between the parent firms, but not between the merged entity and its 
competitors which is the focus in the analysis of vertical mergers. As mentioned 
above, the Commission usually examines the risk of coordination between the parent 
firms in markets downstream or upstream to that of the joint venture only according 
to Article 2(4). Therefore, Areva/Urenco may be considered to signal that any 
coordination between the parent firms in relation to neighbouring markets may also 
be subject to the SIEC test laid in Article 2(3).  
 
Another conclusion from this decision can be that the Commission may apply both 
Article 2(3) and Article 101, in combination with Article 2(4), to the same 
coordination situation. Nonetheless, the Commission’s practice may not be consistent 
in this respect. In EDF/AEM/Edison, for example, the Commission applied only the 
coordinated effect test under Article 2(3) to the risk of coordination in the joint 
venture’s market, through assuming that the parents and the joint venture would align 




Given the fact that Areva/Urenco is the only case where the risk of coordination 
between the parents is explicitly analysed under Article 2(3), and that there is not any 
case law regarding the issue, it is doubtful that the Commission would adopt the 
same approach in its future practice. However, the decision still has importance as it 
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shows the possibility that Article 2(3) may also be used to address the risk of 




VI. Assessment of the Conduct and Operation of Full-Function Joint Ventures 
under Article 101 
 
In EU competition law, it is not disputed that the acts and decisions of full-function 
joint ventures constitute unilateral conduct which fall within the scope of Article 
102.
308
 However, it is questionable whether a full-function joint venture forms a 
single economic unit, namely an undertaking, with its parents within the sense of 
Article 101. The answer to this question is especially important in deciding whether 
any agreement between the joint venture and its parent firm is caught by Article 101, 
and whether the parent firms can also be held liable for an infringement of 
competition rules by the joint venture.  
 
The EU courts and the Commission recognise that Article 101(1), in principle, does 
not apply to agreements between a parent firm and its solely controlled subsidiary, if 
the latter enjoys no real economic autonomy from the former. In Centrafarm BV v 
Sterling Drug Inc,
309
 the ECJ held that agreements between a firm and its subsidiary 
do not fall under Article 101, if they ‘form an agreement unit within which the 
subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market, and if 
the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks 




However, it is difficult to determine whether this principle is also applicable to the 
relationship between a firm and its joint venture because the former has only joint 
control over the latter. In Gosme/Martell-DMP,
311
 the Commission provided that 
Martell and its joint venture, DMP, with Piper-Heidsieck were separate undertakings 
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for the purpose of an agreement between them, because Martell did not have the 
ability to individually control the commercial activities of DMP.
312
 It should be noted 
that this decision was given in the early 1990s, when the Commission used to 
consider the risk of coordination between the joint venture and its parent firm, in 
order to determine whether a joint venture was concentrative or cooperative. This 
decision, thus, seems to be in line with that early approach of the Commission. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the Commission later began to assume that there 
would not be effective competition between a firm and its joint venture, and to ignore 
any risk of coordination between them for the purpose of identifying concentrative 
joint ventures.
313
 This change calls into question the relevance of that decision in 
discussing whether a full-function joint venture constitutes a single economic unit 
with its parents. 
 
Indeed, in the original draft of the new Cooperation Guidelines, the Commission 
proposed that a joint venture and its parents formed a single undertaking within the 
meaning of Article 101.
314
 The draft stipulates that:   
 
As a joint venture forms part of one undertaking with each of the parent 
companies that jointly exercise decisive influence and effective control over it, 
Article 101 does not apply to agreements between the parents and such a joint 
venture, provided that the creation of the joint venture did not infringe EU 
competition law. Article 101 could, however, apply to agreements between the 
parents outside the scope of the joint venture and with regard to the agreement 




This principle was proposed to apply not only to full-function joint ventures, but also 
to partial function joint ventures.
316
 However, the Commission did not retain such a 
principle in the final version of the Guidelines.
317
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Very recently, the General Court answered the question of whether a full-function 
joint venture and its parents constituted a single undertaking in a way that the latter 
would be responsible for an infringement of Article 101 by the former.
318
 In the 
contested decision before the Court, the Commission concluded that El DuPont and 
Dow should be held jointly and severally liable for the participation of their full-
function joint venture, DDE,
319
 in a cartel.
320
 The Commission came to this 
conclusion on the basis of 'objective factors demonstrating that DDE did not enjoy an 
autonomous position but, rather, that Dow and DuPont exercised decisive influence 






[I]t is possible to find that the joint venture and parents together form an 
economic unit for the purposes of the application of Article [101 TFEU] if the 
joint venture has not decided independently upon its own conduct on the 
market. The fact that the parents of a joint venture can be held liable is in line 
with the practice of the Commission on this specific issue, following the … 




El DuPont and Dow contested this decision before the General Court. They claimed 
that DDE, as a full-function joint venture, must be considered as an undertaking 
separate from its parents.
323
 They mainly argued that a full-function joint venture 
must be presumed to act autonomously of its parents, and the fact that the parent 
firms have joint control over it without influencing its day-today operations would 
not change this situation. To support this argument, they referred to the Rubber 
chemicals decision
324
 in which the Commission provided that a full-function joint 
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The General Court, however, affirmed the Commission’s decision by dismissing the 
parties’ arguments.
326
 The Court held that the fact that DuPont and Dow had joint 
control of DDE, ie the power to block the strategic commercial decisions of DDE, 
indicated that they had, at least indirectly, exercised decisive influence over the 
conduct of DDE in question. The judgement sets out that: 
 
Although a full-function joint venture, for the purposes of Regulation No 
4064/89, is deemed to perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity, and is, therefore, economically autonomous from 
an operational viewpoint, that autonomy does not mean, as the Commission 
made clear in paragraph 93 of its Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under 
Regulation No 139/2004, that the joint venture enjoys autonomy as regards the 
adoption of its strategic decisions and that it is not therefore under the decisive 
influence exercised by its parent companies for the purposes of the application 




As a consequence, the General Court found that the Commission was correct in 
deciding that DDE formed a single economic unit with each of its parents within the 
meaning of Article 101.  
 
Based on this approach of the General Court, it may be claimed that an agreement 
between a full-function joint venture and its parent firm will be treated as unilateral 
conduct and excluded from the scope of Article 101. Actually, this would also be 
compatible with the Commission’s practice of treating the joint venture and its 
parents as a single economic unit when applying Article 2(3) of the Merger 
Regulation. Nonetheless, this conclusion is unlikely to apply to an agreement 
involving the joint venture and at least two of its parent firms, because the parents do 
not have effective control over each other and do not therefore form a single 
economic unit. In addition, given the general tendency of the Commission and the 
General Court to interpret the relationship between the joint venture and its parents in 
a way which is the detriment of the parties, it is not sufficiently clear that they would 
consider the joint venture and one of its parents as a single economic unit within the 
sense of Article 101 for the purpose of an agreement between them.
328
 Finally, it 
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should be noted that the aforementioned decisions of the General Court have been 
appealed to the ECJ. Hence, the ECJ’s decision should be awaited in order to form a 
more definite opinion on the issue. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The risk of coordination between the parent firms in relation to their independent 
activities has been a key element that distinguishes the substantive analysis of joint 
ventures from that of amalgamations and acquisitions. Until the late 1990s, the 
absence of such a risk had been one of the criteria required in order for a joint 
venture to be treated as a concentration. By the adoption of Regulation 1310/97, as 
also accepted in Regulation 139/2004, having full-function status has been deemed to 
be sufficient for a joint venture to fall within the Merger Regulation. The possibility 
of coordination between the parent firms, however, has become an independent 
consideration taken into account in the analysis of full-function joint ventures under 
the Merger Regulation. This reform was generally welcome because it reduced both 
uncertainties, and legal and administrative costs resulting from the distinction 
between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. Nevertheless, the current 
regime does not seem to be free from problems either. The main problem in this 
respect appears to be the ambiguity as to what the autonomous character of full-
function joint ventures means, and how it should be incorporated into the analysis of 
any competitive relationship between the joint venture and its parents under the 
Merger Regulation. 
 
With regard to the assessment under Article 2(3), the Commission generally does not 
give special consideration to full-function joint ventures due to their autonomous 
character. In examining non-coordinated and coordinated effects in relation to the 
markets of the joint venture where the parent firms retain some activities, it usually 
considers the worst case scenario for competition, and assumes that the parents and 
the joint venture would align their competitive strategies with each other and, 
therefore, form a single economic unit. On the other hand, when evaluating the 
likelihood of foreclosure effects, the Commission sometimes takes into account, as 
mitigating factor, the fact that the joint venture would deal with its parents at arm’s 
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length, or that any foreclosure strategy would not be in the interest of all of the 
parents. It is nonetheless difficult to argue that the Commission would disregard the 
risk of foreclosure, based solely on the assumed autonomy of the full-function joint 
venture. 
 
The fact that it treats the parents and the joint venture as a single entity for the 
purpose of appraisal under Article 2(3) usually does not prevent the Commission 
from also evaluating the risk of coordination between the parents in relation to the 
joint venture’s market under Article 2(4). This indicates an overlap between the 
scope of Article 2(3) and Article 2(4). The Areva/Urenco decision may be considered 
as evidence that such an overlap may be the case, not only in regard to the joint 
venture’s market but also with respect to vertically related or neighbouring markets 
where the parents are in competition. Its practice shows that, in some cases, the 
Commission may find that the coordination is caught by Article 101 without making 
an extensive analysis as is carried out in relation to collective dominance under 
Article 2(3). Therefore, it is an important question as to the extent to which Article 
2(3) either does, or should, apply to the coordination of the independent activities of 
the parent firms.   
 
How to interpret the autonomy of full-function joint ventures may also be an issue in 
analysing whether these joint venture form a single economic unit with their parents 
within the meaning of Article 101. In the El du Pont and Dow Chemical decisions, 
the General Court approved that the parents should be considered to be a single 
undertaking in terms of liability for the participation of their full-function joint 
venture, DDE, in a cartel, because they had joint control of DDE and, thereby, were 
able to exercise effective influence on its operations. These decisions are currently 
pending in the appeal. The ECJ may take a different approach concerning the issue. 
In any case, the inconsistent approach of the Commission in treating the autonomy of 
full-function joint ventures makes it difficult to predict whether the joint venture and 
the parent firms may be viewed as the same undertaking in future cases. This 




THE SUBSTANTIVE APPRAISAL OF PARTIAL FUNCTION JOINT 
VENTURES UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to analyse the substantive assessment of partial function joint 
ventures in the EU, in order to explore the extent to which it differs from that of full-
function joint ventures. This comparison is necessary for a proper discussion on 
whether the full-functionality criterion is suitable to identify joint ventures that are to 
be treated as concentrations according to the Merger Regulation.  
  
This chapter begins with a general overview of the enforcement of Article 101TFEU 
under Regulation 1/2003.
1
 The Commission’s guidelines and notices concerning 
joint ventures have been important instruments reflecting its approach with regard to 
the appraisal under Article 101, particularly since the abolition of the notification 
system by Regulation 1/2003. Therefore, secondly, the chapter explains the essence 
of the current guidelines,
2
 through discussing any significant change in the general 
approach of the Commission compared to the previous guidelines. Based mainly on 
these guidelines, the chapter presents the general principles for the assessment of 
partial function joint ventures under Article 101, and explains the specific application 
of Article 101 to certain types of joint ventures. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
assessment of the conduct and operation of partial function joint ventures, 
particularly in the context of the concept of ‘ancillary restraint’.       
 




 was the first regulation which set out the principles for the 
enforcement of Article 101. One significant feature of this Regulation was that it 
                                                          
1
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
2
 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2010] OJ C11/1. 
3
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17/1962: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty [1962] OJ 13/204. 
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gave the Commission exclusive power to grant exemptions in accordance with 
Article 101(3). National competition authorities and national courts, nevertheless, 
could not apply Article 101(3), although they could decide that an agreement 
infringed Article 101(1). 
 
Regulation 17/1962 also provided a mandatory notification system for restrictive 
agreements to be exempted under Article 101(3). The Commission was to decide 
whether the notified agreement would benefit from a negative clearance if it would 
not restrict competition within the sense of Article 101(1), or from an exemption, if it 
fulfilled the conditions laid out in Article 101(3). Because the Regulation did not 
establish a specific time frame for the Commission to take a decision, the issue of a 
formal decision concerning certain agreements usually took a long time.
4
 In order to 
limit the negative effects of this lengthy duration of proceedings in respect of the so-
called structural joint ventures, including cooperative full-function joint ventures, the 
Commission voluntarily undertook to inform the parties about the first indications of 
its decision within two months following the notification.
5
 In addition, the 
Commission published block exemption regulations and guidelines for certain 
agreements in order to decrease the number of notified agreements which would not 
raise any competition concerns. 
 
The framework of the old regulation was widely criticised on the grounds that it was 
not suitable for effective enforcement of Article 101.
6
 Based on these criticisms, in 
2003, the Council adopted Regulation 1/2003, which has radically changed the 
framework for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102.
7
 Firstly, this regulation has 
abolished the notification system. Therefore, firms now have to make their own 
assessment regarding the legality of their agreement under Article 101(1) and (3). 
                                                          
4
 See Frank Montag, ‘The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62: Problems and Possible Solutions 
from a Practitioner’s Point of View’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 819, 825-26. 
5
 See Form A/B annexed to Commission Regulation (EC) No 3385/94 of 21 December 1994 on the 
form, content and other details of applications and notifications provided for in Council Regulation 
No 17 [1994] OJ L377/28. 
6
 See Montag (n 4); Mario Siragusa, ‘A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC 
Competition Law Enforcement Rules’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 1089; Claus 
Dieter Ehlerman and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart Publishing 2001).   
7
 See also Commission, ‘White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the EC Treaty’ COM (99) 101 final. 
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Furthermore, it has given national competition authorities and national courts, 
besides the Commission, the power to enforce Article 101(3). In order to eliminate 
any inconsistency and other concerns resulting from the decentralisation of the 
application of Article 101, the Regulation provided the establishment of the so-called 
European Competition Network, within which national competition authorities and 
the Commission can discuss and cooperate on Article 101 cases.
8
     
 
It may be argued that the abolition of the notification system has made the 
enforcement regime for partial function joint ventures more advantageous than that 
for full-function joint ventures under the Merger Regulation. Nonetheless, 
considering that partial function joint ventures usually involve large sunk 
investments, the self-assessment of the legality of these joint ventures may pose 
substantial risks for the parties.
9
 The fact that national competition authorities and 
national courts also have the competence to apply Article 101 decreases the 
predictability about the legality of joint ventures, and makes the self-assessment 
more risky.
10
 Actually, these concerns were raised in discussions before the adoption 
of Regulation 1/2003. It was debated whether a voluntary notification mechanism 
should be retained for ‘grey area agreements’ which included considerable 
investments.
11
 Furthermore, in the White Paper on modernisation, it was envisaged 
that partial function production joint ventures would be included in the scope of the 
Merger Regulation.
12
 However, in the Green Paper on the review of Regulation 
                                                          
8
 See A W Kist, ‘Decentralisation of Enforcement of EC Competition Law: New Cooperation 
Procedures may be Necessary’ (2002) 37 Intereconomics 36; Luis Ortiz Blanco (ed), EC Competition 
Procedure (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 35-46; Ivo Van Bael and Jean-Francois Bellis, 
Competition Law of The European Community (5th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2010) 953-71. 
9
 Siragusa (n 6) 1097-99; Norton Rose, ‘Comments on the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review 
of the EC Merger Regulation’ (2002) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2002_council_regulation/norton_rose.pdf> accessed 05 
April 2013, paras 22-23; Christian Growitsch and Nicole Nulsch, ‘Preventing Innovative Co-
operations: The Legal Exemption's Unintended Side Effect’ (2012) 33 European Journal of Law and 
Economics 1. 
10
 D G Goyder, Joanna Goyder and Albertina Albors-Llorens, Goyder’s EC Competition Law (5th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 463.  
11
 Commission, ‘White Paper on Reform of Regulation 17: Summary of the Observations’ (2000) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/wp_on_modernisation/summary_observations.pdf> 
accessed 05 April 2013, part 4.3. See also Siragusa (n 6); Barry E Hawk and Nathalie Denaeijer, ‘The 
Development of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty: Legal Certainty’ in Claus Dieter Ehlerman and Isabela 
Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy 
(Hart Publishing 2001) 138-39. 
12
 White Paper on modernisation (n 7) paras 14 and 79-81. See also Commission, ‘Summary of 





 the Commission changed its opinion so that partial function production 
joint ventures also remained outside the Merger Regulation.
14
      
 
In sum, the framework of Regulation 1/2003 appears to have some drawbacks, 
particularly in terms of legal certainty compared to the enforcement regime under the 
Merger Regulation. Therefore, to the extent that the applicable procedural rules are 
concerned, the creation of a full-function joint venture may be preferable, from a 
business viewpoint, to the creation of a partial function joint venture for the same 
purpose.
15
                  
 
III. Commission Guidelines on the Appraisal of Joint Ventures under Article 
101 
 
Considering the uncertainties resulting from the enforcement regime, the 
Commission has published some guidelines in order to provide more clarity on its 
approach to the assessment of joint ventures under Article 101. The Notice on 
cooperative joint ventures of 1993
16
 was the first in this respect after the adoption of 
the Merger Regulation. In the Notice, the Commission listed the categories of joint 
ventures which would not be considered to infringe Article 101(1),
17
 and explained 
the legal and economic criteria which would be utilised, on a case-by-case basis, in 
analysing joint ventures falling outside these categories.
18
 The Notice also included 
the assessment of full-function joint ventures falling into the category of cooperative 
                                                          
13
 Commission, ‘Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89’ COM (2001) 
745 final.  
14
 ibid paras 102 and 120-24. 
15
 Alec Burnside and Helen Crossley, ‘Cooperation in Competition: A New Era?’ (2005) 30 European 
Law Review 234, 247; Trevor Soames, Geert Goeteyn, Peter D Camesasca and Kristian Hugmark, 
‘EC Competition Law and Aviation: "Cautious Optimism Spreading its Wings"’ (2006) 27 European 
Competition Law Review 599, 603; Michael Walther and Ulrich Baumgartner, ‘Joint Venture Review 
under the New EC Merger Regulation’ (2007) 
<http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/2007_Antitrust_Rev-WaltherBaumgartner-
Joint_Venture.pdf> accessed 05 April 2013, 22.  
16
 Commission Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint ventures pursuant Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty [1993] OJ C43/2. 
17
 ibid para 15.  
18
 The Notice provided that in evaluating whether a cooperative joint venture could lead to an 
appreciable restriction of competition within the sense of Article 101(1), the Commission would take 
into account various factors mostly related to the market power of the parent firms and the joint 




joint ventures. It acknowledged that full-function joint ventures deserved more 
favourable treatment under Article 101 than other types of cooperative joint 
ventures,
19




Following the enactment of Regulation 1310/97 that also brought full-function joint 
ventures into the jurisdiction of the Merger Regulation
21
 and the revision of block 
exemption regulations on R&D and specialisation agreements,
22
 in 2001, the 
Commission issued a set of guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements, which 
replaced the Notice on cooperative joint ventures.
23
 These Guidelines concerned 
‘those types of cooperation which potentially generate efficiency gains’.
24
 Hence, the 
Commission therein explained the application of Article 101, not only to partial 
function joint ventures but also to contractual cooperation agreements in respect of 
R&D, production, purchasing, commercialisation and standardisation, and 
environmental agreements. The Guidelines provided more guidance on the specific 
application of Article 101 to different types of collaborations compared to their 
predecessor, notwithstanding that they did not describe fully the general principles 
for the assessment of these collaborations under Article 101.
25
   
 
                                                          
19
 In the Notice, the Commission also gave guidance on the specific application of Article 101(3) to 
R&D, sales, purchasing and production joint ventures. ibid paras 59-63.   
20
 ibid para 64. For more information about these guidelines, see Matthew P Downs, The Notice 
concerning the Assessment of Cooperative Joint Ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty: 
An Assessment (Leuven University Press 1995). 
21
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97of 30 June 1997  amending Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [1997] OJ L180/1. 
22
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements [2000] OJ L304/3; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of research and development agreements [2000] OJ L304/7. 
23
 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/2. For general comments on these guidelines, see Hans Maks, 
‘The "New" Horizontal Agreements Approach in the EU: An "Economic" Assessment’ (2002) 37 
Intereconomics 28; Mario Siragusa and Cesare Rizza, ‘Joint Ventures and Cooperation between 
Undertakings’ in Valentine Korah (ed), Competition law of the European Community, vol 2 (2nd edn, 
Lexis Publishing 2001) sec 6.03-07. 
24
 2001 Cooperation Guidelines (n 23) para 10. 
25
 This was one of the aspects of the Guidelines criticised by practitioners. See eg Freshfields 
Bruckhous Deringer, ‘Response to the European Commission’s Questionnaire on the Current Regime 
for the Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements’ (30 January 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_horizontal_agreements/freshfields_bruckhaus_de
ringer_en.pdf> accessed 05 April 2013; Reed Smith, ‘Review of the Current Regime for the 
Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under EU Antitrust Rules’ (30 January 2009)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_horizontal_agreements/reed_smith_en.pdf> 
accessed 05 April 2013.  
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The 2001 Cooperation Guidelines became a very important tool for legal 
practitioners in making their own assessment of the legality of partial function joint 
ventures, especially after the shift to the self-assessment regime under Regulation 
1/2003.
26
 However, because it was published before such a reform, and block 
exemption regulations on R&D and specialisations agreements would be revised in 
2010,
27
 the Commission started to work on drafting new guidelines for horizontal 




The new Guidelines cover cooperation between actual or potential competitors as 
well as horizontal cooperation between non-competitors, for example, those between 
two firms which are active in the same product market but in different geographical 
markets, without being potential competitors.
29
 The Guidelines, in the first part, give 
more elaborate explanations with regard to the general framework for the assessment 
of joint ventures and other horizontal cooperation agreements in accordance with 
Article 101.
30
 Unlike their predecessors, these guidelines also set out the principles 
on the applicability of Article 101 to information exchange.
31
 By appearing to 
embody similar principles to those used under the SIEC test, the new Guidelines 
differ from the previous guidelines, which were adopted at the time when 
concentrations were analysed according to the dominance test.  
 
Given the paucity of decisions concerning partial function joint ventures following 
the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the new Cooperation Guidelines, in conjunction 
with the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3),
32
 constitute the most reliable 




 For the new block exemption regulations on these agreements, see Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements 
[2010] OJ L335/36; Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain 
categories of specialisation agreements [2010] OJ L335/43. 
28
 See n 2 above. 
29
 ibid para 1. 
30
 In this chapter, the term partial function joint venture is used instead of horizontal cooperation 
agreement by highlighting the differences between the approaches to joint ventures and other 
horizontal cooperation arrangements, if necessary. 
31
 ibid 13-25. Unlike their predecessors, the new Guidelines do not contain a separate chapter on 
environmental agreements. They state that depending on the competition issues they give rise to, these 
agreements are generally to be assessed under the relevant chapters on R&D, production, 
commercialisation or standardisation agreements. See ibid 7 fn 1. 
32
 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/97. 
150 
 
evidence regarding the Commission’s current approach to the assessment of those 
joint ventures. The principles set forth in these guidelines are explained elaborately, 
together with the relevant case law, in the later parts of this chapter.   
 
IV. General Principles for the Assessment of the Formation of Partial Function 
Joint Ventures 
 
Article 101 sets out a two-step analysis. In the first step, it is assessed whether the 
agreement in question has, as its object or effect, the restriction of competition within 
the meaning of Article 101(1). It should be noted that this step does not normally 
include the analysis of the procompetitive effects of the agreement. This analysis is 
essentially made under Article 101(3).
33
 In this second step, it is examined whether 
the agreement, which is found to be restrictive within the sense of Article 101(1), 
fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 101(3), in order to be exempted from 
Article 101(1) and (2). 
 
The legal test under Article 101 is viewed by some commentators to be stricter than 
that under the Merger Regulation.
34
 The Commission’s position in its 1966 
Memorandum was that mergers should enjoy more lenient treatment than that 
provided under Article 101 in relation to agreements.
35
 The adoption of the 
                                                          
33
 Prior to Regulation 1/2003, the difference between falling outside Article 101(1) and being 
exempted under Article 101(3) was very important, because the Commission had exclusive power to 
enforce Article 101(3). To solve this problem, some commentators claimed that national courts and 
competition authorities should apply a rule of reason, as in the US, under Article 101(1). See eg 
Valentine Korah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity- The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC 
Antitrust’ (1981) 3 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 320; Christopher Bright, 
‘EU Competition Law Policy: Rules, Objectives and Deregulation’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 535. However, in Métropole Télévision (M6) and others v Commission, the General Court 
clearly stated that the rule of reason did not exist in EU competition law so that it was not required to 
analyse the procompetitive effects of an agreement offsetting its anticompetitive effects under Article 
101(1). Case T-112/99 [2001] ECR II-2459, para 72. The Court provided that such an analysis would 
result in the loss of the effectiveness of the assessment under Article 101(3). ibid para 74. Despite this 
decision, it is still argued that procompetitive effects can be incorporated into the analysis under 
Article 101(1). See eg Renato Nazzini, ‘Article 81 EC between Time Present and Time Past: A 
Normative Critique of "Restriction of Competition" in EU law’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law 
Review 497. 
34
 See Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (9th edn, Hart 
Publishing 2007) 429; Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay (eds), Faull & Nikpay: The EC Law of 
Competition (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 665-667. 
35
 Commission, ‘The Problem of Industrial Concentration in the Common Market’, Competition 
Series No 3 (1966), reprinted in Frank L Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and 
Policy of the EEC (2nd edn, Graham & Trotman/MartinusNijhoff 1994) 691-713. 
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dominance test under Regulation 4068/89
36
 could be considered as reflecting that 
approach.
37
 However, in the Notice on cooperative joint ventures, the Commission 
set forth that: ‘The determination of the cooperative character of a JV ha[d] … no 
substantive legal effects. It simply mean[t] that the JV [was] subject to the 
procedures set out in Regulation No 17 in the determination of its compliance with 
Article [101] (1) and (3).’
38
 This was an indication that the Commission did not have 
a general policy of considering the test under Article 101 to be stricter than that 
under the Merger Regulation as far as joint ventures were concerned. Nevertheless, 
the Commission may have used such a statement particularly for full-function joint 
ventures which, at that time, were treated as cooperative joint ventures. Indeed, in the 
Green Paper on the review of Regulation 4064/89, the Commission opposed 
including partial function production joint ventures in the scope of the Merger 
Regulation, on the basis of not only procedural reasons but also substantive ones.
39
    
 
The 2001 Cooperation Guidelines did not include any general statement that 
compares the assessment of partial function joint ventures with that of full-function 
joint ventures. The new Guidelines however clearly stipulate that ‘[t]here is often 
only a fine line between full-function joint ventures that fall under the Merger 
Regulation and non-full-function joint ventures that are assessed under Article 101 
[so that] their effects can be quite similar’.
40
 This indicates that the Commission is, in 
theory, in line with its approach in the Notice on cooperative joint ventures with 
respect to partial function joint ventures as well. The similarities between the 
principles set out in the Guidelines for the appraisal of partial function joint ventures 
under Article 101, and those for the analysis of full-function joint ventures under the 
Merger Regulation, are explained in the relevant points below.   
 
 
                                                          
36
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [1989] OJ L395/1, corrected version [1990] OJ L257/13. 
37
 See Barry E Hawk, ‘Joint Ventures under EEC Law’ (1992) 15 Fordham International Law Journal 
303, 309. 
38
 Notice on cooperative joint ventures (n 16) para 11. 
39
 See (n 13) paras 120-24. See also Chapter 6/II/C/2 below. 
40
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 21. 
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A- Assessment under Article 101(1) 
 
1. Restriction of Competition by Object or Effect 
 
Article 101(1) prohibits agreements which restrict competition through either their 
object or effect. For the purpose of this prohibition, the anticompetitive object and 
effect are alternative, not cumulative conditions.
41
 Therefore, once it is established 
that an agreement has an anticompetitive object, it is not necessary to consider its 
actual or potential effects on competition in order for it to be caught by Article 
101(1).
42
 Whether an agreement restricts competition by its object is determined 
based on its objective meaning and purpose, which are taken into account in its 
economic and legal context.
43
 In this regard, the subjective intention of the parties 
does not constitute a necessary factor, but may be considered by the Commission and 




Given the fact that it usually leads to an efficiency enhancing integration of the 
parties, the creation of a partial function joint venture, in itself, is unlikely to be 
deemed as having an anticompetitive object, unless it is sham, ie established to 
disguise an otherwise prohibited restriction, such as price fixing, market sharing or 
the control of outlets.
45
 Accordingly, in the vast majority of cases, it is necessary to 
examine whether the joint venture restricts competition by its effect.  
 
In order to find that an agreement restricts competition by its effect, it is required to 
demonstrate the presence of factors showing that ‘competition has in fact been 
                                                          
41
 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, 249; Joined Cases 
C-501, 513,515 and 519/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v Commission and 
others [2009] ECR I-9291, para 55. 
42
 Joined Cases C-56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 342; Case 
45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission [1987] ECR 405, para 39; GlaxoSmithKline (n 41) 
para 55. 
43
 GlaxoSmithKline (n 41) para 58. 
44
 Joined Cases 29 and 30/83 CRAM and Rheinzink v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, para 26; Case C-
551/03P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-1373, paras 77-78; GlaxoSmithKline (n 41) 
para 58. See also Okeoghene Odudu, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intention’ 
(2001) 26 European Law Review 60. 
45
 See Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services and others 
v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, para136. See also new Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) paras 128, 
160-61, 205-06, 234-36. 
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prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent’.
46
 Whether competition 
is actually restricted is assessed in comparison to the context in which competition 
would occur in the absence of the agreement concerned.
47
 If the agreement leads to 
less competition in the market compared to this counter-factual situation, it is 
normally regarded as having restrictive effects.
48
 The new Cooperation Guidelines 
provide that this may happen, if the agreement has, or is likely to have, ‘an 
appreciable adverse impact on at least one of the parameters of competition on the 
market, such as price, output, product quality, product variety or innovation’.
49
 This 




2. Potential Restrictive Effects of Partial Function Joint Ventures  
 
Compared to their predecessors, the new Cooperation Guidelines give more detailed 
guidance about the possible anticompetitive effects of partial function joint ventures. 
These effects are quite similar to those of full-function joint ventures which are 
analysed with reference Article 2(3) and (4) of the Merger Regulation. This is 
especially true for partial function production joint ventures which the Guidelines 
appear to use as a basis in establishing the general framework for the assessment of 




The Guidelines first of all recognise that the creation of a partial function joint 
venture may limit competition between the parties through reducing their decision-
making independence for the integrated activities. They state that these effects, 
corresponding to those of full-function joint ventures analysed under Article 2(3), 
may arise in three main ways. Accordingly, a partial function joint venture may: (i) 
‘be exclusive in the sense that it limits the possibility of the parties to compete 
                                                          
46
 Société Technique Minière (n 41) 249. 
47
 ibid 250. See also new Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) 29.  
48
 In this analysis, not only the actual effects of the agreement, but also its potential effects, must be 
taken into account. See Case 31/85 ETA v DK Investment [1985] ECR 3933, para 12; Joined Cases 
142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds [1987] ECR 4487, para 54; Case C-7/95P John Deere Ltd v 
Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, para 77. 
49
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 27. 
50
 For more information about the general assessment under Article 101(1), see Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3) (n 32); Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The 
Scope of Article 81 (Oxford University Press 2006) 97-127; Faull and Nikpay (n 34) 218-269; Richard 
Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 115-40.  
51
 See V/B below. 
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against each other or third parties as independent economic operators or as parties to 
other competing agreements’; (ii) ‘require the parties to contribute such assets that 
their decision-making independence is appreciably reduced’; or (iii) ‘affect the 
parties’ financial interests in such a way that their decision-making independence is 
appreciably reduced’.
52
 The first limitation can actually be the case if the joint 
venture agreement includes non-compete clauses. The other two effects, however, 
essentially depend on the importance of the combined assets and operations into the 





Once it is found that the partial function joint venture leads to the loss of competition 
between the parties in such ways, the evaluation of its impact on overall competition 
in the market will be quite similar to the analysis of the non-coordinated effects of 
full-function joint ventures. According to the Guidelines, the Commission will assess 
whether the parties or their competitors may ‘benefit from the reduction of 
competitive pressure that results from the agreement and may therefore find it 
profitable to increase their prices’.
54
 This language is quite similar to that used for 




The Guidelines also acknowledge that partial function joint ventures may reduce 
competition between the parties by facilitating coordination between them outside 
the joint venture. They explain that: 
 
A horizontal [joint venture] may … decrease the parties’ decision-making 
independence and as a result increase the likelihood that they will coordinate 
their behaviour in order to reach a collusive outcome but it may also make 
coordination easier, more stable or more effective for parties that were already 
coordinating before, either by making the coordination more robust or by 
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 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 33. 
53
 These limitations are considered by the US authorities in analysing the likelihood of competition 
between the parent firms and the joint venture under the rule of reason standard set out in the 
Collaboration Guidelines. See Chapter 5/IV/B below. 
54
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 34. 
55
 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
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56
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 37. 
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These effects apparently correspond to the risk of coordination examined in 
accordance with Article 101, in combination with Article 2(4). The Guidelines state 
that a partial function joint venture may lead to such a collusive outcome in two 
ways: (i) ‘lead[ing] to the disclosure of strategic information thereby increasing the 
likelihood of coordination among the parties within or outside the field of the co-
operation’; and (ii) ‘achiev[ing] significant commonality of costs, so the parties may 




With regard to significant commonality of costs, the Guidelines provide that it may 
enable the parties to coordinate more easily only if: they have market power; the 
market characteristics are conducive to such coordination; the area of cooperation 
accounts for a high proportion of the parties’ variable costs in a given market; and 
the parties combine their activities in the area of joint venture to a significant 
extent.
58
 The Commission requires the presence of these conditions for finding any 
coordination likely. Its practice regarding the analysis of coordination in full-function 
joint venture cases, nevertheless, indicates that these factors may sometimes be more 
relevant for the assessment of the appreciability of the restriction of competition.
59
 
The Commission may use this approach in the Guidelines more systematically in the 
case of full-function joint ventures as well. 
 
Moreover, the fact that the Commission lists these conditions only in the context of 
significant commonality of costs may be understood to mean that it focuses on the 
risk of coordination in relation to the joint venture’s market and those downstream or 
upstream to that. Nevertheless, as in NC/Canal +/CDPQ/Bank America,
60
 the 
Commission generally recognises that a full-function joint venture may enable the 
parent firms to coordinate more easily in neighbouring markets, due to the high value 
of the joint venture compared to those of their overall activities or their activities in 
the market concerned.
61
 Because the situations listed as leading to a collusive 
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outcome in the Guidelines are not exhaustive, the Commission may also examine 
such a risk of coordination in relation to partial function joint ventures.
62
      
 
Furthermore, the Guidelines state that joint ventures do not normally cause negative 
effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1), if, based on objective 
factors, the parties would not have the ability to independently carry out the project 
concerned, provided that there would be no less restrictive alternative for the same 
project.
63
 The Commission herein does not seem to consider the possibility that such 
a joint venture may facilitate coordination between the parties outside the area 
covered by the joint venture. It may be claimed that in such cases, it is likely that less 
restrictive alternatives exist. However, this assessment should be made with regard to 
the indispensability condition under Article 101(3), rather than under Article 101(1). 




Finally, as explained above, the Guidelines only emphasise unilateral effects that are 
similar to the non-coordinated effects of full-function joint ventures. However, they 
do not separately explain the analysis of coordinated effects in relation to partial 
function joint ventures. The reason behind this may be that such effects are to be 
considered in the context of a collusive outcome, given the fact that in the case of 
partial function joint ventures, the parties usually do not combine their entire 
activities in the market.        
 
In addition to the loss of competition between the parties, the Guidelines briefly 
mention that partial function joint ventures may also result in anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects.
65
 They provide more elaborate information about these effects in 
the relevant chapters for each category of joint ventures. These effects are actually 
                                                          
62
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3. Appreciability of the Restriction of Competition 
 
An agreement normally falls outside Article 101(1) if it has only an insignificant 
anticompetitive effect on the market.
67
 In the Notice on agreements of minor 
importance,
68
 the Commission sets out certain market share thresholds in order to 
create safe harbours for agreements, which are presumed not to have an appreciable 
adverse effect on competition. Accordingly, a horizontal agreement is considered not 
to restrict competition appreciably, if the combined market share of the parties does 
not exceed 10 % in any of the relevant markets.
69
 The Notice states that the fact that 





However, until the late 1990s, the Commission had had a tendency to automatically 
hold that the joint venture appreciably restricted competition, if the thresholds set 
forth in the Notice on agreements of minor importance, in force at that time, were 
exceeded, although the Notice on cooperative joint ventures suggested a more 
sophisticated analysis for that purpose.
71
 In European Night Services, the General 
Court found this practice of the Commission to be erroneous. The Court held that 
‘the Commission must provide an adequate statement of its reasons for considering 
such agreements [exceeding the thresholds in the Notice on agreements of minor 




The 2001 Cooperation Guidelines recognised that whether a joint venture could lead 
to an appreciable restriction of competition would depend on the market position of 
                                                          
66
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the parties and the structure of the market.
73
 The Commission therein used the HHI 
as an indicator of the impact of the joint venture on competition.
74
 The new 
Cooperation Guidelines mainly follow the same approach as their predecessors, 
notwithstanding that they do not include the use of HHI.
75
    
  
In line with the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3),
76
 the new Guidelines 
stipulate that an anticompetitive effect is likely to arise, if the parties individually or 
jointly possess some degree of market power, and if the joint venture leads to the 
creation, maintenance or strengthening of this market power or enables the parties to 
exploit it.
77
 The Commission states that a degree of market power less than that 
required for a finding of dominance under Article 102 may be sufficient to decide 
that an agreement is caught by Article 101(1).
78
 On the other hand, the Guidelines 
indicate that the Commission may seek the degree of market power required under 
the SIEC test in relation to non-coordinated effects, in order to decide that the joint 
venture would lead to an appreciable restriction.
79
 Considering its past practice,
80
 
however, the Commission, in individual cases, may decide that Article 101(1) is 
infringed, even if the parties have less of a degree of market power than that, and it 
may analyse the anticompetitive effects of the joint venture more extensively under 
Article 101(3).  
 
In measuring the degree of market power, the Commission firstly takes into account 
the market shares of the parties. In addition to the Notice on agreements of minor 
importance, the Guidelines establish the market share thresholds, which indicate that 
the cooperation is unlikely to lead to an appreciable restriction.
81
 They do not, 
however, set out what market share presents the risk of an appreciable restriction. 
                                                          
73
 2001 Cooperation Guidelines (n 23) paras 27-30. 
74
 ibid para 29. 
75
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) paras 39-47. 
76
 Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) (n 32) para 25. 
77
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 28. 
78
 ibid para 42. 
79
 See Chapter 3/A/1 above. 
80
 See Bright (n 33); Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EU Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 158; Whish and Bailey (n 
50) 115-16. 
81
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) para 44. Therein, the Commission especially utilises the 




They provide that ‘[g]iven the variety of horizontal co-operation agreements and the 
different effects they may cause in different market situations, it is not possible to 
give a general market share threshold above which sufficient market power for 




The Guidelines also state that ‘if one of just two parties has only an insignificant 
market share and if it does not possess important resources, even a high combined 
market share normally cannot be seen as indicating a likely restrictive effect on 
competition in the market’.
83
 This may be construed as suggesting that in order for a 
joint venture to restrict appreciably competition, it must strengthen market power to a 
significant extent. This requirement seems to be similar to the delta criteria used in 
the application of the HHI in merger cases.
84
 Nevertheless, in the Guidelines, the 
Commission does not establish an indicative level for this assessment.  
 
In analysing whether the parties or their competitors would gain market power to 
increase prices independently, the Guidelines list factors which are almost the same 
as those provided in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. These factors include: 
whether the parties have high market shares; whether they are close competitors; 
whether the customers have limited possibilities of switching suppliers; whether 
competitors are unlikely to increase supply if prices increase; and whether one of the 
parties is an important competitive force.
85
 The Guidelines also explain that in this 
analysis, the Commission will take into account other factors, including the stability 
of market shares over time, entry barriers and the likelihood of market entry, and the 




B- Exemption Analysis under Article 101(3) 
 
Once it is found that an agreement infringes Article 101(1), it is examined whether it 
may benefit from an exemption under Article 101(3). Agreements satisfying the four 
cumulative conditions listed in Article 101(3) are exempted regardless of whether 






 See Chapter 3/V/A/3 above. 
85
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they restrict competition by their object or effect.
87
 Accordingly, it is also normally 
required to consider the precise effect of agreements having an anticompetitive 




The first condition of Article 101(3) requires that the agreement concerned 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to promoting 
technical or economic progress. For the purpose of this condition, the claimed 
benefits must be objective, ie they must have ‘such a character as to compensate for 
the disadvantages which they cause in the field of competition’.
89
 Therefore, the 
subjective viewpoint of the parties is not decisive in this assessment.
90
 These benefits 
can be lower costs, new or improved products or services.
91
 The Cooperation 
Guidelines recognise that horizontal cooperation may lead to substantial economic 





The second exemption condition stipulates that a restrictive agreement and its 
individual restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of the efficiencies.
93
 
The decisive factor for the assessment of this condition is ‘whether or not the 
restrictive agreement and individual restrictions make it possible to perform the 
activity in question more efficiently than would likely have been the case in the 
absence of the agreement or the restriction concerned’.
94
 In this regard, if it appears 
that there is an economically practicable and less restrictive alternative which would 
achieve the same efficiencies, the agreement or its individual restriction will not 
satisfy the indispensability condition. It should be noted that only realistic and 
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The third exemption condition is that consumers receive a fair share of the resulting 
benefit.
96
 To be exempted under Article 101(3), the resulting benefits must be 
appreciable to compensate for its harm to consumers.
97
 It is sufficient that the overall 
effect of the agreement is neutral from the viewpoint of those consumers affected by 
the agreement.
98
 In determining the ultimate effect of the agreement, its negative 
effects and positive effects on consumers are balanced in respect of each relevant 
market. Therefore, if the agreement has anticompetitive effects in one relevant 
market while having procompetitive effects in another market, these effects cannot 
be balanced under Article 101(3), unless the consumers affected by the agreement in 
both markets are substantially the same.
99
 This issue may arise in particular if the 





Finally, according to the fourth condition, the agreement must not eliminate 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. Up until the 
last decade, the Commission had considered the elimination of competition as equal 
to dominance, and presumed that if one party was dominant or would become so as a 
result of the agreement, the agreement was unlikely to be exempted because it would 
eliminate competition.
101
 Nevertheless, in Atlantic Container Line and others v 
Commission,
102
 the General Court explained that ‘[a]s the concept of eliminating 
competition is narrower than that of the existence or acquisition of a dominant 
position, an undertaking holding such a position is capable of benefiting from an 
                                                          
95
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 Based on this decision, the Commission also has recognised that ‘not 
all restrictive agreements concluded by a dominant undertaking constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position’.
104
 As a result, the fact that a dominant firm is party to a 
partial function joint venture, in principle, does not disqualify it from being 
exempted under Article 101(3). However, if such a joint venture forms an abuse of 




The Commission often exempts an agreement only for a limited period of time. The 
question of which criteria must be used in determining the duration of the exemption 
was discussed in European Night Services. The Commission granted the joint 
venture an eight-year exemption, essentially based on ‘the period for which it [could] 
reasonably be supposed that market conditions [would] remain substantially the 
same'.
106
 The General Court, on the other hand, overruled the Commission’s decision 
because it disregarded the length of time necessary to enable the parties to achieve a 
satisfactory return on their investment. In the decision, the Court particularly 
highlighted the fact that the parties had entered into financial commitments covering 
a period of twenty years.
107
 Consistent with this decision, in the Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3), the Commission links the duration of exemption to the 
indispensability condition. It states that: 
 
In some cases a restriction may be indispensable only for a certain period of 
time, in which case the exception of Article [101](3) only applies during that 
period. In making this assessment it is necessary to take due account of the 
period of time required for the parties to achieve the efficiencies justifying the 
application of the exception rule. In cases where the benefits cannot be 
achieved without considerable investment, account must, in particular, be taken 
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 Night Services (Case IV/34.600) Commission Decision 94/663/EC [1994] OJ L259/20, paras 71-
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107
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It should be noted that as far as R&D and production joint ventures are concerned, it 
must firstly be examined whether the joint venture falls under the scope of the 
relevant block exemption regulations. The agreements covered by these regulations 
are presumed to meet the four conditions laid out in Article 101(3). Being outside 
those block exemptions does not mean that the joint venture infringes Article 101(1) 
or does not fulfil the conditions of exemption, but that it will be analysed in its 
individual context in accordance with the general principles explained above. 
 
V. Specific Application of Article 101 to Certain Types of Joint ventures 
 
A- R&D Joint Ventures 
 
The Commission acknowledges that most R&D joint ventures, particularly those 
between non-competitors
109
 and pure R&D joint ventures, do not give rise to any 
anticompetitive effect within the meaning of Article 101(1).
110
 Rather, these joint 
ventures are generally considered to be procompetitive, because they usually 
integrate complementary skills and assets, or provide a wider dissemination of 
knowledge, thereby leading to the introduction of new or improved products or 





On the other hand, the Commission recognises that R&D joint ventures, in some 
limited situations, may raise competition concerns in relation to existing product 
and/or technology markets,
112
 and/or new product markets if the joint venture is 
directed at the development of new products.
113
 In particular, they may have adverse 
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effects on competition in innovation by retarding innovation and reducing the 
number or quality of products coming to the market later.
114
 In addition, R&D joint 
ventures may result in the risk of coordination between the parties outside the joint 
venture.
115
 This effect may be the main competition concern with respect to existing 
markets, if the joint venture aims at the development of products creating new 
markets.
116
 Moreover, if the R&D joint venture includes the exclusive exploitation of 




Pure R&D joint ventures may be anticompetitive only if they appreciably reduce 
competition in innovation by leaving only a limited number of credible competing 
R&D poles. If, nevertheless, the joint venture includes different stages of the 
exploitation of the results, such as licensing, production or marketing, the 
Commission examines its impact on competition more closely.
118
 However, in any 
event, these effects are unlikely to emerge if the parties do not have market power in 




R&D joint ventures in which the parties’ combined market share does not exceed 25 
% benefit from the safe harbour of the R&D Block Exemption Regulation, provided 
that they do not include the hard core restrictions listed in Article 5 of the 
Regulation.
120
 R&D joint ventures exceeding the market share threshold of 25 % are, 
nevertheless, examined in their individual context under Article 101(1) and (3). In 
this regard, the higher the market power of the parties the more likely the joint 
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The general principles explained above regarding the measurement of market 
power
122
 also apply in R&D joint venture cases. However, if the joint venture is 
intended to develop a new product which would create completely new demand, 
those traditional principles may not be sufficient to measure the negative effects of 
the joint venture on competition in innovation.
123
 For this purpose, it may be 
necessary to consider additionally the number of credible competing R&D efforts, if 
it is possible to identify them. The 2001 Cooperation Guidelines presumed that an 
R&D joint venture would eliminate competition in innovation if it combined the only 
two existing poles of research, because this could lead to a dominant position.
124
 
Considering the General Court’s approach in Atlantic Container,
125
 the Commission 
has not included such a presumption in the new Guidelines. However, the new 
Guidelines retain the example given in the old Guidelines,
126
 in which it is 
considered that such an R&D joint venture leading to a dominant position is unlikely 




The new Guidelines stipulate that any exemption given to a R&D joint venture will 
normally cease to apply, if any of the criteria of Article 101(3) are no longer met.
128
 
As held in European Night Services, in applying this principle, the Commission 
normally considers the initial sunk investments made by the parties, and the time and 
restraints needed for making and recouping an efficiency enhancing investment.
129
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However, the Commission adds that this subsequent review of the exemption will not 




B- Production Joint Ventures 
 
Although agreements including price-fixing and limiting output are normally 
considered to restrict competition by their object, this principle does not apply to 
limitations concerning the capacity and production volume of production joint 
ventures or to the joint setting of the sales prices if the joint venture also covers the 
joint distribution of the products.
131
 Therefore, the creation of production joint 





A production joint venture is unlikely to restrict competition within the sense of 
Article 101(1) if the parents are not competitors,
133
 or if it leads to a new market, in 
other words, it enables the parents to launch a new product which, on the basis of 
objective factors, they could not create otherwise.
134
 Moreover, a production joint 
venture is not likely to infringe Article 101(1) if the parent firms do not hold market 
power in the relevant market(s).
135
 The Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation 
provides a safe harbour for production joint ventures, with or without the joint 
distribution of the products, in which the parties’ combined market share does not 
exceed 20 %.
136
 If the market share threshold of 20 % is exceeded, whether a 
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production joint venture is likely to give rise to anticompetitive effects will depend 
on the concentration level and other factors explained above with regard to the 




According to the Guidelines, the primary possible anticompetitive effect of 
production joint ventures is the direct limitation to competition between the parent 
firms.
138
 Such direct limitation can arise in various ways. Firstly, the parent firms 
may limit the output of the joint venture, thereby decreasing the total output in the 
market that would have been brought to the market in the absence of the joint 
venture.
139
 Secondly, a production joint venture may charge a high transfer price to 
its parents, which eventually could lead to higher downstream prices. The Guidelines 
set out that competitors may also find it profitable to increase their prices in response 




In addition to the direct loss of competition, production joint ventures may result in 
the coordination of the parties’ competitive behaviour.
141
 The likelihood of such 
coordination depends on the parents having market power and the existence of 
market characteristics conducive to such coordination, including high concentration 
levels and symmetrical market shares.
142
 The Commission recognises that this effect 
may, first of all, result from commonality of costs. Accordingly, a production joint 
venture is more likely to lead to a risk of coordination, if the parents already have a 
high proportion of variable costs in common, and/or if the production costs of the 
product, subject to the joint production, constitute a large proportion of the total 
variable costs concerned.
143
 In contrast, if the cooperation concerns products which 
require costly commercialisation or form an intermediate product amounting to a 
                                                          
137
 ibid paras 168-73. 
138
 ibid para 157. See eg Ford/Volkswagen (n 62) para 20; Exxon/Shell (Case IV/33.640) Commission 
Decision 94/322/EC [1994] OJ L144/20. See also Alcan/Alusuisse (Case COMP/M.1663) [2000] 
paras 56-84. 
139
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) paras 174 and 187. 
140
 ibid para 174. 
141
 ibid para 158. See eg Ford/Volkswagen (n 62) para 21; Philips/Osram (n 62) para 18. 
142
 New Cooperation Guidelines (n 2) paras 158 and 188. 
143
 ibid paras 176-78. 
168 
 
small proportion of the variable costs of the final product, it is less likely that the 




According to the Guidelines, secondly, production joint ventures can give rise to the 
risk of coordination, if they involve an exchange of commercially strategic 
information.
145





Lastly, production joint ventures may lead to an anticompetitive foreclosure of third 
parties in downstream or upstream markets from those of the joint venture.
147
 The 
Commission recognises that through the formation of a production joint venture, the 
parent firms may gain market power in the upstream market, which enables them to 
raise the costs of their rivals in the downstream market by increasing the price of a 




Production joint ventures are, in general, regarded to bring about efficiency gains in 
the form of cost savings or better quality products.
149
 They can provide cost savings 
in particular by eliminating the duplication of production costs and/or by achieving 
economies of scale and scope. Furthermore, the Commission acknowledges that 
production joint ventures may enable the parent firms to improve product quality or 
increase product variety, if they put together their complementary skills and 
technologies.
150
 The Guidelines stipulate that cost savings resulting from a 
production joint venture are less likely to be passed on to consumers to meet the 
criteria of Article 101(3), if they are related to the fixed costs of the parent firms 
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 ibid para 185. For decisions in which the Commission examined a production joint venture in 




C- Purchasing Joint Ventures  
 
With respect to purchasing cooperation, the Cooperation Guidelines focus more 
extensively on the creation of a joint purchasing company or organisation in which 
many firms have non-controlling stakes, and on contractual joint buying agreements. 
Nonetheless, the principles explained in the Guidelines concerning joint purchasing 
are, in general, applicable to joint ventures formed for this purpose as well.
152
   
 
The Commission considers that purchasing joint ventures are usually procompetitive, 
because they provide firms with buying power which can lead to lower prices or 
better quality products for consumers.
153
 On the other hand, it acknowledges that 
these joint ventures may give rise to restrictive effects on competition in purchasing 
markets or downstream selling markets. One main anticompetitive concern with 
regard to purchasing markets is the foreclosure of competing purchasers to efficient 
suppliers, particularly if there are a limited number of suppliers and, if there are 
barriers to entry on the supply side of the upstream market. Furthermore, the parties 
with buying power may restrict competition through forcing suppliers to reduce the 
range or quality of products, by such means as quality reductions, lessening of 




Purchasing joint ventures are however viewed to raise more serious anticompetitive 
concerns regarding downstream selling markets, especially through facilitating 
coordination between the parties in these markets. The Guidelines provide that such a 
collusive outcome may arise, subject to the parties having market power and the 
presence of the market characteristics conducive to coordination, if the parties 
achieve a high degree of commonality of costs through joint purchasing.
155
 There 
may be also a risk of coordination, if the cooperation requires the exchange of 
commercially sensitive information, such as purchase prices and volumes. The 
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Commission nonetheless states that this risk may be minimised, if the information is 




The Guidelines provide that a purchasing joint venture is less likely to result in a 
restriction of competition within the sense of Article 101(1), if the parties do not 
have market power in the selling market.
157
 In this regard, purchasing cooperation 
between firms which are not active in the same selling market is unlikely to have 
restrictive effects on competition, unless the parties have a strong position in the 
purchasing markets that may harm the competitive position of other players in their 
respective selling markets.
158
 Furthermore, the Guidelines set out that purchasing 
cooperation between firms that have a combined market share of 15 % in any 
purchasing or selling market does not normally infringe Article 101(1) or, in any 
event, it fulfils the criteria of Article 101(3). Purchasing joint ventures which do not 
fall within this safe harbour, on the other hand, require a detailed assessment of their 
effects on the market, based on factors such as concentration levels and the possible 
countervailing power of strong suppliers.
159
 The higher the market power of the 
parties, particularly in selling markets, the less likely the lower purchase prices 
achieved by the joint venture will be passed on to consumers and, therefore, the less 




D- Sales Joint Ventures 
 
The Commission normally approaches sales joint ventures more negatively 
compared to other categories of joint ventures.
161
 The Cooperation Guidelines 
provide that joint selling collaborations are, in general, likely to restrict competition 
by their object, particularly if they contain the joint determination of the sales prices 
or volume to be jointly sold, or if they amount to market sharing between the 
parents.
162
 This principle apparently applies to sales joint ventures which do not 
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bring about substantial integration.
163
 These joint ventures are unlikely to result in 
any efficiency being passed on to consumers and therefore they are unlikely to 
satisfy the criteria of Article 101(3).
164
 Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges 
that price fixing can be justified if it is indispensable for the integration of other 
marketing functions, and if this integration will generate substantial efficiencies to an 




The Commission, in principle, does not consider sales joint ventures between non-
competitors as having an anticompetitive object.
166
 It even recognises that they are 
normally unlikely to fall under Article 101(1), ‘if it is objectively necessary to allow 
one party to enter a market it could not have entered individually or with a more 
limited number of parties than are effectively taking part in the co-operation, for 




If a sales joint venture does not include the joint setting of prices or output or market 
allocation, it is analysed whether it restricts competition by its effect. These joint 
ventures may lead to restrictive effects on competition, particularly if they give rise 
to a risk of coordination by means of an exchange of strategic information or 
commonality of costs.
168
 However, for these anticompetitive effects to arise, the 
parties, in any case, must have some degree of market power. The Guidelines 
establish that if the parties have a combined market share that does not exceed 15 %, 
the sales joint venture is unlikely to fall under Article 101(1) and, in any event, it is 
likely to fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3).
169
 If the parties’ combined market 
share exceeds 15 %, the joint venture will be subject to an individual assessment.  
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The Commission acknowledges that joint distribution may generate significant 
efficiencies, stemming from economies of scale or scope, especially for smaller 
producers.
170
 To be taken into account in the assessment under Article 101(3), any 
efficiency must result from the integration of economic activities.
171
 In this respect, 
cost savings through reduced duplication of resources and facilities may be 
accepted.
172
 However, cost savings resulting only from the elimination of costs that 
are inherently part of competition are not regarded as efficiency gains within the 
meaning of Article 101(3).
173
 In particular, if the joint venture is just a sales agency 
without any investment, it is likely to be treated as a disguised cartel and as such, is 




VI. Assessment of the Conduct and Operation of Partial Function Joint 
Ventures 
 
Because, unlike full-function joint ventures, partial function joint ventures are 
deemed to be agreements between two independent firms, decisions concerning 
price, output, product variety and other competitive parameters in respect of their 
operations are also normally qualified as multiple entity conduct, ie an agreement 
within the sense of Article 101.
175
 However, if these decisions amount to an ancillary 
restraint, they are not analysed separately, but in conjunction with the overall effects 
of the joint venture. In other words, if the formation of a joint venture does not lead 
to a restriction of competition in accordance with Article 101(1), or it fulfils the 
conditions of Article 101(3), ancillary restraints also benefit from this negative 
clearance or exemption.
176
    
 
In EU competition law, the concept of ancillary restraint is defined as any restriction 
which is directly related to, and necessary for, the implementation of a main 
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 The term ‘directly related’ in this definition means that any restraint is 
subordinate to the implementation of that operation, and has an evident link with it. 
The condition of necessity however requires that the restraint is objectively necessary 
for the implementation of the main operation, and is proportionate to it.
178
 This may 
be the case if, on the basis of objective factors, it can be concluded that without the 
restraint it would be difficult or impossible to implement the main operation.
179
 If a 
restraint is objectively necessary to implement a main operation, it must also be 
examined whether it is proportionate to it, that it to say, its duration, and material and 




However, if a restraint is not necessary or proportionate, it will be assessed 
separately under Article 101(3).
181
 For instance, in Métropole Télévision (M6) and 
others, the General Court held that even if the exclusivity clause in relation to the 
broadcasting of the parent’s channels by the joint venture for an initial period of ten 
years was directly related to the operation of the joint venture, it was not necessary 
for it, or in any case, it was disproportionate. The Court concluded that the fact that 
the exclusivity clause would be necessary to allow the joint venture to establish itself 
on a long-term basis in that market is not relevant to the classification of that clause 
as an ancillary restraint and, therefore, can only be taken into account in the 




According to these principles, the parties to a partial function joint venture should 
put forward evidence that decisions on the pricing and output and other competitive 
strategies of the joint venture are directly related to and necessary for its operation. 
This may actually put partial function joint ventures in a relatively worse position 
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Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3 above, although it is controversial, a full-
function joint venture may be considered to form a single economic unit with its 
parents within the meaning of Article 101.
184
 Therefore, there is a possibility that an 
agreement between a full-function joint venture and its parents, such as the 
exclusivity clause discussed in Métropole Télévision (M6) and others, may be 
regarded as unilateral conduct and fall outside Article 101(1). Considering that these 
advantages indicate relatively more flexible treatment in the future, firms may prefer 
to establish a full-function joint venture instead of a partial function joint venture for 
the same project.  
  
VII. Concluding Remarks  
 
Following the abolition of the notification mechanism by Regulation 1/2003, firms 
have been burdened with making their own assessments regarding the application of 
Article 101(1) and (3) to their agreements. This creates legal uncertainties 
particularly with regard to partial function joint ventures including substantial sunk 
investments. The Commission’s guidelines have been primary and useful tools from 
the perspective of firms in reducing these uncertainties.  
 
The new Cooperation Guidelines have improved this role particularly by explaining 
more extensively the general principles applicable to the appraisal of joint ventures 
under Article 101. Therein, the Commission clearly states that there is not a 
significant gap between the effects of partial function joint ventures and those of full-
function joint ventures. Hence, it sets out the principles for the assessment of partial 
function joint ventures which are similar to those provided for the analysis of full-
function joint ventures. The Guidelines, especially, indicate that the Commission 
may require market power sought for the existence of a non-coordinated effect under 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in order for a partial function joint venture to fall 
under Article 101(1). They also reveal that the analysis of the risk of coordination in 
partial function joint venture cases is quite similar to that in full-function joint 
venture cases.       
 





On the other hand, the chapters of the Guidelines on the specific application of 
Article 101 to different types of joint ventures indicate that such an overlap with the 
appraisal of full-function joint ventures, in fact, exists only in relation to partial 
function production joint ventures. The Commission approaches R&D joint ventures 
more positively, whilst taking a more suspicious approach to purchasing and sales 
joint ventures. In particular, sales joint ventures are subject to stricter rules as they 
are likely to be regarded as having an anticompetitive object.   
 
Moreover, in the same way as before the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission may automatically consider that the joint venture restricts competition 
appreciably within the sense of Article 101, if the market share thresholds 
establishing safe harbours are slightly exceeded. In such cases, the parties would be 
burdened with proving efficiencies which are indispensable and which outweigh the 
harm to consumers, according to Article 101(3). This would mean a stricter test, in 
particular for purchasing and sales joint ventures, considering that they are subject to 
a safe harbour with a relatively low market share threshold of 15 %. In any case, 
unlike clearance given to full-function joint ventures according to the Merger 
Regulation, an exemption granted to a joint venture under Article 101(3) may apply 
for a limited duration.  
 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the Guidelines reflect only the Commission’s 
position as to the appraisal of partial function joint ventures. However, because 
national competition authorities and national courts also have the power to enforce 
Article 101(1) and (3), they may take a different approach to such appraisals. 
Therefore, even if it is accepted that the appraisal of partial function joint ventures is 
substantially similar to that of full-function joint ventures as far as the Commission’s 
practice is concerned, such a distinction between joint ventures may still result in 
significant differences from a substantive viewpoint.    









This chapter explains how joint ventures are analysed in US competition 
jurisprudence in order to provide a comparative perspective to the EU regime. This 
comparison is particularly important in order to show the alternative approaches to 
the understanding of the economic nature of joint ventures and to their analysis under 
the merger control rules, which can be relied on in examining the suitability of the 
current EU merger control approach. In this respect, the chapter principally aims to 
reveal how the US regime approaches the three main issues which are focused on in 
Chapter 6 in suggesting a new approach to joint ventures under the EU merger 
control regime. These issues are: (i) which criterion is used in the US to distinguish 
joint ventures for merger control purposes; (ii) how the US courts and authorities 
incorporate the fact that the parents retain some independent activities outside the 
joint venture, into traditional merger analysis; and (iii) how the US courts and 
authorities treat the conduct and operation of joint ventures.  
 
In the US, joint ventures have been ‘an important and increasingly popular form of 
business organisation’.
1
 Despite this popularity as a business model, the analysis of 
joint ventures is also regarded as one of the most uncertain and controversial areas in 
US competition law.
2
 In addition to the intricate economic nature of joint ventures, 
the complexity of the US competition law enforcement system seems to be a 
contributing factor to this confusion. Therefore, this chapter firstly gives a brief 
                                                          
1
 Texaco, Inc v Dagher, 547 US 1, 5 (2006). See also Howard H Chang, David S Evans and Richard 
Schmalensee, ‘Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy towards Joint Ventures’ 
(1998) 1998 Columbia Business Law Review 223, 228-29; Thomas A Piraino, ‘The Antitrust Analysis 
of Joint Ventures after the Supreme Court’s Dagher Decision’ (2008) 57 Emory Law Journal 735, 
735. 
2
 Robert Pitofsky, ‘A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures’ (1985) 54 Antitrust Law 
Journal 893, 893; Chang and others (n 1) 225, Charles D Weller, ‘A “New” Rule of Reason from 
Justice Brandeis’ “Concentric Circles” and Other Changes in Law’ (1999) 44 Antitrust Bulletin 881, 
881; Piraino, ‘The Supreme Court’s Dagher Decision’ (n 1) 738.  
177 
 
description of this system to help to make a proper comparison between US and EU 
competition law. 
 
In the US, section 1 of the Sherman Act, which renders anticompetitive agreements 
illegal,
3
 and section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is specifically directed at mergers,
4
 
are the main statutes that may apply to joint ventures.
5
 In the second part of this 
chapter, the legal tests under these two statutes are examined to show the extent to 
which they overlap with each other. This facilitates a comprehensive understanding 
of US jurisprudence on joint ventures and, thus, the drawing of the correct 
conclusions regarding EU competition law.  
 
After presenting these fundamental characteristics of the US competition law regime, 
this chapter evaluates how the US courts and enforcement authorities approach the 
formation of joint ventures. Because the centre of gravity of this thesis is the analysis 
of joint ventures in the EU merger control regime, for comparison purposes, this part 
primarily focuses on the treatment of joint ventures as mergers in the US. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the US approach to the assessment of the conduct of joint ventures, 
which includes significant ambiguities.  
 
II. Overview of Procedural Issues in the US 
 
Compared to the EU regime, the US competition enforcement regime has two 
distinct features. First, unlike the former, it is judicially enforced, ie the enforcement 
authorities only act as investigators and bring an action in court which decides the 
applicability of competition rules and the prohibition of the collaboration litigated. 
Second, it is characterised by a complex system of decentralised enforcement. 
Federal competition enforcement is the responsibility of both the DOJ and the FTC 
whose authorities significantly overlap.
6
 Besides these federal enforcers, state 
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These two characteristics of the US enforcement regime normally apply not only to 
agreements but also to mergers, notwithstanding that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976 (H-S-R Act)
8
 establishes a pre-merger notification 
regime. According to this regime, mergers that meet the three criteria set forth in the 
H-S-R Act must be notified to the DOJ and the FTC before their consummation. In 
the same way as the EU Merger Regulation, the H-S-R Act sets out certain time 
limits during which the transaction is suspended. In order to permanently prevent the 
transaction, however, the authorities must challenge the merger in court within those 
time periods and obtain preliminary injunctions. This notification system does not 
however eliminate the power of state attorneys general and private parties to 
challenge the merger in court, according to section 7 of the Clayton Act.
9
 Given also 
the fact that the parties may request the DOJ to write a business review letter in 
which it declares its enforcement intention on the application of the Sherman Act,
10
 it 
is difficult to state that there is a significant difference between the procedural rules 
applicable to mergers and agreements in the US.   
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This unique structure of the US enforcement regime generally has two important 
implications with regard to the assessment of joint ventures. Firstly, from a 
procedural viewpoint, whether or not a collaboration is treated as a merger seems to 
be of less significance in the US, compared to the EU where, as mentioned above, 
mergers and agreements are subject to quite different procedural rules. This may be 
one of the reasons why, contrary to the EU, there is no sharp statutory distinction 
between joint ventures for merger control purposes in the US. The second 
implication is closely linked to the first and also to the litigation-oriented character of 
the system. Considering the broad language of US competition statutes, judicial 
interpretation does not often provide clear and coherent guidance on their application 
to certain situations. Guidelines published by the DOJ and the FTC, in this regard, 
may only help to clarify the position of these authorities. They do not, however, 
eliminate many ambiguities in the application of the statutes, because state attorneys 
general and private parties may also bring claims and, in any case, courts retain the 
power to give the final decision on these claims.
11
 As a result, compared to EU 
competition law, US jurisprudence includes serious uncertainties and debates as to 
which statutes and substantive rules apply to which types of joint ventures. 
                    
III. Legal Tests under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act stipulates that ‘[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce […] is 
declared to be illegal’. A literal interpretation of this provision may lead to the 
prohibition of almost all agreements, because every agreement somehow restrains 
trade.
12
 The case law, nevertheless, establishes that Section 1 prohibits only 
agreements which restrict competition ‘unreasonably’.
13
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In deciding whether an agreement results in an unreasonable restraint of competition, 
two different rules are traditionally used by the courts and authorities depending on 
the nature of the agreement concerned.
14
 Certain agreements which have a 
‘pernicious effect on competition and lack […] any redeeming virtue’
15
 or are 
‘manifestly anticompetitive’
16
 are deemed as per se illegal and prohibited without 
any elaborate assessment.
17
 Price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging are the 




Apart from those subject to the per se rule, all agreements are judged according to 
the rule of reason which is the presumptive standard under section 1.
 
According to 
this approach, the question of whether a restraint is reasonable is answered by 
evaluating its precise impact on competition. In this evaluation, courts take into 
account all relevant facts, including market characteristics, the nature of the 
agreement and historical evidence.
19
 If this analysis reveals that the procompetitive 




Section 1 also renders ‘combinations in restraint of trade’ illegal. This wording 
includes mergers as well.
21
 Indeed, some of the early successful Sherman Act cases 
were horizontal merger cases.
22
 However, because of concerns regarding the 
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effectiveness of the application of the Sherman Act to mergers, Congress, in 1914, 
enacted the Clayton Act, whose Section 7 was specifically directed towards those 
transactions.
23
 Currently section 7 of the Clayton Act is the main US competition 





The key question under section 7 is whether the effect of a merger may be 
substantially to lessen competition. The legislative history shows that the purpose of 
section 7 has been ‘to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well 
before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding’.
25
 
In this regard, the word ‘may’ is used in section 7 to allow the prohibition of a 
merger where there is a reasonable probability that its effect will be substantially to 
lessen competition. Based on this feature, some early court decisions provided that 
the required standard of proof under section 7 was lower than that under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act test which requires certainty in restraint of trade.
26
 However, it is 
difficult to state that the subsequent case law supports this approach.
27
 In United 
States v First National Bank of Lexington,
28
 the Supreme Court used the standard of 
section 7 in a Sherman Act case. Similarly, some lower courts regarded the standard 
under the Clayton Act to be the same as that under the Sherman Act.
29
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Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow claim that there is no difference between the 
standards under section 7 and section 1.
30
 They explain that: 
 
[B]oth statutes ask the courts to devise the wisest approach they can manage in 
order to forestall anticompetitive threats while facilitating procompetitive 
arrangements and interfering as little as practicable with natural practices […] 
[O]nce a court’s analysis of a problem has shown it is the best way to resolve 
that problem, no difference in result is mandated by the section 1 concept of 
unreasonable restraint as compared with section 7’s concept of probable 




Accordingly, it appears that there is significant overlap between the legal tests under 
section 1 and section 7, particularly compared to the overlap between the tests under 
Article 101 TFEU and Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation. Indeed, the US courts 
and authorities generally adopt a strict or lenient approach to a collaboration 
according to its nature and purpose, but not to the statute- section 7 or section 1- 
under which they are analysed. In this regard, the treatment of mergers differs from 
those of agreements to the extent that the competitive effect of the former is 
considered to be different from that of the latter. As seen below, the discussion with 
respect to the appraisal of joint ventures also mainly concentrates on which 
competition law approach should apply to the joint venture in question, rather than 
which statute applies to it.   
 
IV. Assessment of the Formation of Joint Ventures 
 
Despite not providing a clear statutory distinction between joint ventures as in the 
EU, US competition law also acknowledges that some joint ventures are to be treated 
as mergers. On various occasions, the Supreme Court and lower courts have analysed 
a joint venture as being analogous to a merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
Similarly, in the Collaboration Guidelines,
32
 the FTC and the DOJ set out some 
criteria to distinguish joint ventures to be reviewed as mergers. In this respect, this 
part firstly examines the treatment of these merger-like joint ventures, by focusing on 
                                                          
30
 Areeda and others, Antitrust law, vol IV (n 21) 44. 
31
 ibid.  
32
 DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors’ 64 Fed Reg 54483 
(1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm> accessed 05 April 2013. 
183 
 
judicial and enforcement approaches in different subparts.
33
 Secondly, it explains the 
analysis of joint ventures as agreements in order to comprehend the difference 
between these two modes of treatment. Thirdly, this part explores the assessment of 
partial acquisitions by the courts and authorities to discuss the applicability of these 
rules to joint ventures. Finally, it shows how the courts and authorities approach the 
risk of coordination between the parent firms in relation to markets other than those 
of the joint venture.    
 
A- Merger Review 
 
1. Judicial Approach 
 
In United States v Penn-Olin,
34
 the Supreme Court, for the first time, analysed the 
legality of a joint venture as analogous to a merger under section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.
35
 Therein, Pennsalt and Olin formed the Penn-Olin joint venture in order to 
produce and distribute sodium chlorate in the Southeastern US where neither parent 
was engaged in the production of sodium chlorate. The DOJ challenged the joint 
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venture under section 7.
36
 Its primary attack was that Penn-Olin would substantially 
lessen competition in the Sousteastern sodium chlorate market, on the grounds that 
Pennsalt and Olin each had the necessary financial resources and other capabilities to 
compete on an individual basis in the market.
37
 The defendants argued that section 7 
could not apply to Penn-Olin because it was not ‘engaged in commerce’. Without 
discussing this defence, the district court rejected the DOJ’s claim on the basis that it 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that both parents would have entered the 
relevant market independently in the absence of the joint venture, and that such loss 





The Supreme Court, however, discussed whether the phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ 
prevented the application of section 7 to the joint venture, which was established as a 
new corporation by two independent firms.
39
 It came to conclusion that section 7 
applied to the joint venture, because ‘the formation of a joint venture and purchase 
by the organizers of its stock would substantially lessen competition -indeed 
foreclose it- as between them, both being engaged in commerce’.
40
 On the other 
hand, the Court did not provide any criteria to distinguish joint ventures which were 
to be treated as mergers. Without doing so, it explained how the doctrine under 
section 7 would apply to joint ventures. The Court stated that even though both 
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mergers and joint ventures may result in similar anticompetitive effects,
41
 they 
differed as ‘[t]he merger eliminate[d] one of the participating corporations from the 




The decision set forth some factors that must be considered specifically in the 
analysis of joint ventures under section 7.
43
 Incorporation of these factors into the 
analysis were interpreted to mean that the Court proposed a more lenient and 
qualitative standard to the treatment of joint ventures, compared to the strict standard 
applied in the early merger decisions,
44
 which merely relied on quantitative factors, 
including market shares and concentration levels.
45
 In particular, the consideration of 
‘the reasons and necessities for [the joint venture]’s existence’ led some 
commentators to claim that, besides the failing firm defence, additional economic 
justifications, such as the pooling of capital and the sharing of risks, could be 
accepted by the courts to allow a joint venture which otherwise would be illegal.
46
 
Nonetheless, in the last decades, in merger cases, both the courts and the authorities 
have shifted to a more sophisticated economic analysis based on both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence.
47
 Therefore, even if Penn-Olin could be regarded as making a 
distinction between the treatment of joint ventures and mergers under section 7 in 
that sense, this hardly applies to today’s situation. 
 




 ibid 170. This difference can actually arise only in relation to joint ventures which, like Penn-Olin, 
are established to enter a new market, or which arise as a new enterprise by, for example, creating new 
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In the same decade as Penn-Olin, Northern Natural Gas Co v Federal Power 
Commission
48
 was another case where section 7 was applied to a joint venture. 
Therein, American Natural and Trans-Canada, two large gas firms, established a 
joint venture to construct and operate a pipeline in an area covering Michigan-
Wisconsin where American Natural enjoyed a monopoly position. The Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) permitted the joint venture under the public interest test 
without giving sufficient consideration to its anticompetitive effect. However, the 
court of appeal concluded that the joint venture was anticompetitive with reference to 
section 7, because it ‘appear[ed] to have effectively prevented competition from 
arising among natural gas suppliers selling to distributors in Michigan and 
Wisconsin, and between the supplier of Canadian gas and those suppliers seeking to 
market domestic gas’.
49
 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the FPC for further 
consideration. 
 
The setting of Northern Natural was different from that of Penn-Olin as the joint 
venture in the former case was formed to operate in a market where one of the 
parents intended to retain its business activities. The court held that this was not of 
significance for the application of section 7, by referring to Penn-Olin’s dictum that 




Another early court decision that should be considered in relation to the merger-like 
treatment of joint ventures is Citizen Publishing Company v United States
51
 in which 
the Supreme Court examined the joint venture as an agreement under the Sherman 
Act. In 1940, Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing, the only newspapers in Tucson, 
set up a joint venture, TNI, in order to integrate all the departments of their 
publishing businesses, except for the news and editorial departments. The term of the 
joint venture was twenty-five years, but this was extended to 1990 in 1953. 
According to the joint operating agreement, almost all the assets held by Star and 
Citizen in relation to producing and advertising their newspaper were transferred to 
TNI. In 1965, the shareholders of Citizen formed a company, Arden Publishing, to 
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acquire Star. The DOJ brought an action against the 1940 operating agreement under 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and against the acquisition of Star by Arden 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court found that the 1940 operating 
agreement was per se illegal under section 1, and that the acquisition of Star by 
Arden was a violation of section 7. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
district court. 
  
Citizen Publishing does not discuss why section 7 was not applied to the formation 
of TNI, which was intended to last for a long term and integrated almost all the 
business activities of the parents in the market. Keeping news and editorial 
departments separate and/or the definite duration of the joint venture may have been 
consequential in this regard. Nevertheless, in Texaco Inc. v Dagher,
52
 the Court 
implicitly approved the application of section 7 to a similar joint venture between 
Texaco and Shell.
53
 Therefore, it is questionable whether Citizen Publishing is 





There has been an increase in the number of lower court decisions which apply 
section 7 to joint ventures since the enactment of the H-S-R Act. In these cases, joint 
ventures were essentially analysed by courts under the same standard as that applied 
in merger cases.
55
 In United States v Ivaco, the defendants asserted, by referring to 
Penn-Olin, that the analysis of joint ventures under section 7 was different from 
merger analysis. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that ‘[t]he analysis of 
whether the proposed transaction [would] injure competition [did] not differ 
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In brief, the case law provides that joint ventures are generally examined in 
accordance with the rule of reason.
57
 In this regard, the real question seems to be 
whether this rule of reason analysis is different from the assessment of mergers under 
section 7. The more recent decisions indicate that joint ventures leading to a full-
integration of the parents’ activities in a given market are essentially analysed as 
analogous to mergers under section 7. Nonetheless, the case law fails to give clear 
guidance on the applicability of the merger standard to joint ventures which partially 
integrate the activities of the parent firms in the market.    
   
2. US Authorities’ Approach 
 
Through their practice from Penn-Olin to 2000, the DOJ and the FTC challenged 
various joint ventures under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Most of these joint 
ventures were intended to substantially integrate the business operations of the 
parents in the market of the joint venture, and were treated by the authorities as 
analogous to mergers.
58
 However, in two cases, the authorities seem to have 
embraced a less strict approach in applying section 7 to joint ventures which lead to a 
partial integration of the parents.  
 
The first case is Alcan Aluminium.
59
 Therein, Atlantic Richfield agreed to sell its 
newly-completed aluminium rolling plant, designed to produce can stock, to Alcan 
Aluminium which was the largest aluminium producer in the world. The DOJ 
challenged this acquisition under section 7. The parties and the DOJ issued a consent 
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decree that reorganised the acquisition as a production joint venture in which Alcan 
had only 45 % ownership. According to the consent decree, the parties could utilise 
the capacity of the plant in proportion to their ownership. The decree also included a 
variety of safeguards to ensure that the parents remained independent in determining 
their own pricing and output strategies.
60
 This consent decree indicates that the DOJ 





The more controversial case regarding the application of section 7 to joint ventures 
is, however, in re General Motors Corporation, which relates to a production joint 
venture, formed by General Motors and Toyota to manufacture new automobiles that 
would be designed by Toyota in consultation with General Motors and sold 
exclusively to the latter.
62
 The FTC investigated the joint venture under section 7 
and, by a 3-2 vote, permitted it upon some modification and with some limitations. 
Although deciding on the application of section 7 to the joint venture, the majority 
concluded that the review of the joint venture should not be the same as traditional 
merger analysis. They stated: ‘The ... venture [was] a limited production joint 
venture, not a merger of GM and Toyota. The extent of continuing competition 
between the companies dwarf[ed] the limited area of cooperation represented by the 
venture.’
63
 Thus, the majority did not apply the HHI used in merger analysis. Instead, 
they analysed the joint venture under a more flexible rule of reason by identifying its 
procompetitive effects and balancing them with its anticompetitive effects.
64
 In the 
end, the FTC approved the joint venture by a consent decree including safeguards 
designed to limit the scope and duration of the joint venture, and to prevent the 




 ABA, Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust Issues (3rd edn, ABA Publishing 
2008) 354-55. 
62
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63
 ibid 11.  
64
 One dissenting commissioner indicated that according to the HHI, the relevant market was a 
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exchange of competitively sensitive information between the parents that may 




These two decisions, particularly in re General Motors-Toyota, demonstrate that the 
authorities can utilise a more lenient standard than the merger standard to analyse 
joint ventures that lead to a partial integration of the parties. This approach is 
seemingly reflected in the Collaboration Guidelines. These guidelines recognise that 
a joint venture may basically differ from a merger on the basis of two factors. Firstly, 
most mergers end all competition between the merging parties in the relevant market, 
while most joint ventures retain some competition among the participants. They 
stipulate that ‘[t]his remaining competition may reduce competitive concerns, but 
also may raise questions about whether participants have agreed to anticompetitive 
restraints on the remaining competition’.
66
 Secondly, the authorities acknowledge 
that mergers are designed to be permanent, whilst most joint ventures have limited 
duration. The Guidelines conclude that this poses ‘the potential for future 
competition between participants [which] requires antitrust scrutiny different from 
that required for mergers’.
67
 They, however, provide that fully-integrated joint 
ventures involving an efficiency enhancing integration which eliminates all 
competition among the parents in the relevant market are normally identical to 





Accordingly, for a joint venture to be treated as a merger, it first of all must not be a 
simple agreement with the purpose of eliminating competition between the 
participants with regard to price or output, ie a sham venture.
69
 Secondly, it must 
encompass ‘the integration of the entirety of the participants’ operations in a 
particular line of business, including manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and 
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 This implies that joint ventures involving integration of only production, 
distribution or marketing operations are also unlikely to be reviewed under the 
merger standard.
71
 For example, in its business review with regard to the joint 
marketing agreement between Olympus and Bard,
72
 the DOJ refused the application 
of the merger standard to the agreement, on the grounds that it would not eliminate 
all competition between the parents as they would retain the independent design and 
manufacture of the product concerned.
73
 Pursuant to this definition, even joint 
ventures which have their own market presence in the market may not be treated as 
mergers, if the parents retain business activities in the same market as the joint 
venture.
74
    
 
With regard to the applicability of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
Collaboration Guidelines also require that the joint venture is designed to continue 
for a sufficiently long period. The authorities generally consider a ten-year term as 
sufficient to treat a joint venture as a merger.
75
 However, it is recognised that this 





It should be borne in mind that the conditions set forth in the Guidelines do not limit 
the types of joint ventures that may be analysed under section 7. Rather, they are 
used to determine whether a joint venture will be evaluated under the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines or the Collaboration Guidelines. Hence, the FTC and the DOJ 
still may challenge partially integrated joint ventures, like the General Motors-
Toyota joint venture, pursuant to section 7, through using the principles in the 
Collaboration Guidelines. Indeed, the Collaboration Guidelines note that these 
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conditions do not determine the obligations arising under the H-S-R Act.
77
 In any 
case, those guidelines are not binding, but only guiding so that the authorities may 
adopt a different approach in challenging a specific joint venture.
78
 Nonetheless, 
since the adoption of the Collaboration Guidelines, to date, the authorities have not 
challenged any joint venture that does not fall into the category of fully-integrated 




B- Agreement-Like Treatment 
 
In Timken Roller Bearing Co v United States,
80
 the Supreme Court held that 
‘agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition 
among themselves and others [could not] be justified by labelling the project a "joint 
venture”’.
81
 In various cases, lower courts have also rendered some so-called joint 
ventures per se illegal, because they did not provide any meaningful integration or 
were simply utilised to shield price-fixing or customer allocation.
82
 Unless it is sham, 





Following Penn-Olin, when courts began to apply section 7 of the Clayton Act to 
joint ventures, there have not been many court decisions concerning the application 
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of section 1 of the Sherman Act to the formation of a joint venture.
84
 Under the 
Sherman Act, courts generally treat joint ventures in the same way as trade or 
professional associations, sports leagues, network firms or non-profit organisations, 
which are not effectively under the joint control of their members within the sense of 
this thesis. Nonetheless, precedents relating to those collaborations do not also 
provide valuable guidance for the analysis of the formation of partially integrated 
joint ventures, because their dicta are essentially limited only to the application of 
section 1 to restraints collateral to the main collaboration.  
 
In the Collaboration Guidelines, on the other hand, the FTC and the DOJ give 
comprehensive and elaborate guidance for the evaluation of the legality of joint 
ventures under the rule of reason standard, which mainly includes the General 
Motors-Toyota principles. The Guidelines do not clarify whether this rule of reason 
analysis is made under section 1 of the Sherman Act or under section 7 of the 
Clayton. The wording and the precedents referred to in the Guidelines imply that 
section 1 is the fundamental competition statute in this regard. Given the fact that the 
same rules are applied by the authorities to the joint venture in either case, this 
question is not normally so crucial.
85
 As mentioned above, the authorities may 
challenge the legality of the joint venture under both statutes.  
 
The Guidelines state that such a rule of reason analysis focuses on the likelihood that 
the joint venture harms competition ‘by increasing the ability or incentive profitably 
to raise prices above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what 
likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement’.
86
 Under this analysis, 
the authorities firstly consider the nature of the joint venture. The Guidelines 
specifically explain possible types of harm to competition that may arise from 
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production, marketing (sales), purchasing and R&D joint ventures. It is recognised 
that though these joint ventures are often procompetitive,
87
 they may create or 
increase market power or facilitate its exercise by limiting independent decision 
making or by combining the key assets or financial interests of their parents, or by 




If the preliminary examination of the nature of the joint venture indicates some 
anticompetitive effects, the authorities will carry out a detailed market analysis in 
order to decide whether or not it should challenge it.
89
 The Guidelines propose a 
methodology for this analysis which is similar to that used in merger analysis. 
Accordingly, the analysis will normally begin with market definition.
90
 However, 
like the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Guidelines note that in some cases it 
may not be necessary to define any particular relevant market.
91
 The authorities use 
market shares and concentration levels as initial indicators of market power.
92
 In this 
respect, the Guidelines refer to the principles set out in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in relation to the evaluation of anticompetitive unilateral and coordinated 





If this assessment, identical to merger analysis, reveals that the joint venture is 
unlikely to lead to any anticompetitive harm, the authorities will normally permit it. 
If, however, it indicates the likelihood of an anticompetitive effect, this will not 
automatically result in the joint venture being challenged. Because partially 
integrated joint ventures do not end all competition between the parents, the 
authorities will also examine whether the parents are likely to compete with each 
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other and the joint venture. The Guidelines, therefore, seem to apply a rule of reason 
standard that is more lenient than that applied to mergers.
94
 They list six factors to be 
taken into account in evaluating whether the parents and the joint venture have the 
ability and incentive to compete. These are: (i) the extent to which the relevant 
agreement is non-exclusive in that participants are likely to continue to compete 
independently outside the collaboration in the market in which the collaboration 
operates; (ii) the extent to which participants retain independent control of the assets 
necessary to compete; (iii) the nature and extent of participants’ financial interests in 
the collaboration or in each other; (iv) the control of the collaboration’s 
competitively significant decision-making; (v) the likelihood of anticompetitive 




The Guidelines state that consideration of each factor may reduce or increase 
competition depending on the facts of each case.
96
 However, in general, a joint 
venture would raise less serious competition concerns, if the combination of the 
participants’ financial interest, control over significant assets and independent 
decision-making is relatively small, and if anticompetitive information sharing 
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If, in the end, it appears that the joint venture is likely to cause anticompetitive 
effects, the authorities will examine whether the joint venture is likely to produce 
procompetitive effects offsetting these adverse effects. The Guidelines recognise that 
joint ventures usually combine participants’ complementary technologies, expertise 
and other assets which may result in cheaper products through the more efficient use 
of those assets, or improved or new products brought to the market faster than would 
be possible in the absence of the joint venture.
98
 As in merger cases, efficiencies 
stemming from a joint venture must be cognisable to be considered by the 
authorities. Therefore, efficiency claims are taken into account, only if they are not 
vague and speculative and can be verified by reasonable means.
99
 The Guidelines 
note that cost savings resulting from anticompetitive output or service reductions are 




For efficiencies to be considered, secondly, the joint venture must be reasonably 
necessary for achieving these cognisable efficiencies, ie there must not be less 
restrictive alternatives that could create the same efficiencies.
101
 Actually, the 
discussion on the assessment of this condition focuses on the necessity of specific 
restraints collateral in the joint venture agreement, rather than that of the formation 
of the joint venture.
102
 Therefore, the formation of a partially integrated joint venture 
may be allowed upon the removal of restraints which are not reasonable related to its 
procompetitive effects.
103
   
 
In the final stage, the authorities will determine whether likely cognisable 
efficiencies arising out of the joint venture are of sufficient magnitude to outweigh its 
anticompetitive effect. The greater the anticompetitive effect the greater the 
cognisable efficiencies must be, in order that the joint venture is not considered as 
anticompetitive overall.
104
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Considering partially integrated joint ventures as often procompetitive, the DOJ and 
the FTC provide safety zones to encourage them. The Guidelines set out two kinds of 
safety zones, one for general and one specifically for R&D joint ventures. According 
to the general safety zone, the authorities will not normally challenge a joint venture, 
if the combined market share of the joint venture and the parents is no more than 20 
% in each relevant market.
105
 The second safety zone provides that the authorities, in 
principle, will not challenge an R&D joint venture due to its effect on competition in 
an innovation market, if three or more independently controlled research efforts in 
addition to those of the joint venture possess the required specialized assets or 
characteristics and the incentive to engage in a close substitute R&D.
106
 The 
Guidelines note that neither type of safety zone applies to either agreements viewed 




C- Partial Acquisitions  
 
US competition law includes some specific rules for the assessment of partial 
acquisitions which do not grant the acquiring firm sole control over the acquired 
firm. Given the fact that the concept of partial acquisition overlaps with joint 
ventures in certain aspects, it is necessary to evaluate how the courts and the 
authorities approach them. 
 
In United States v E I du Pont,
108
 the Supreme Court found that the acquisition of 23 
% stock interest in General Motors by du Pont was a violation of section 7. Based on 
this decision, the district court ordered that du Pont could retain its ownership in 
General Motors, provided that the voting rights deriving from its stocks were 
stripped and distributed pro rata to du Pont shareholders, and that du Pont directors 
did not serve on the General Motors’ board.
109
 The Supreme Court, however, held 
that these remedies were not sufficient to prevent a section 7 violation, because du 
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Pont shareholders could act as a group in using the voting rights, and its mere 
ownership in General Motors could be used by du Pont to retain its special 





The Du Pont decision related to a partial acquisition between vertically related firms. 
In United States v Dairy Farmers,
111
 however, the Sixth Circuit applied the du Pont 
dictum to a partial acquisition between competitors. The Sixth Circuit found that the 
district court erred in holding that the ability to exercise some control over the 
business decisions of the acquired firm is necessary for a Section 7 violation.
112
 The 
court stated that ‘[t]his logic ignores the possibility that there may be a mechanism 
that causes anticompetitive behavior other than control’.
113
 The court concluded that 
the firms in question had ‘closely aligned interests to maximize profits via 
anticompetitive behavior’.
114
 However, the court failed to clarify how a partial 
acquisition may substantially lessen competition by the way of the alignment of the 




Besides Dairy Farmers, the DOJ and FTC have challenged various partial 
acquisitions under section 7
116
 and, finally, have included partial acquisitions in the 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
117
 These guidelines generally reflect the existing 





Firstly, a partial acquisition may give the acquiring firm the ability to influence the 
competitive conduct of the target firm through, for example, voting rights or the right 
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to appoint members to the board of directors. The Guidelines note that ‘[s]uch 
influence can lessen competition because the acquiring firm can use its influence to 
induce the target firm to compete less aggressively or to coordinate its conduct with 




The Guidelines provide that, secondly, partial acquisitions may decrease the 
incentive of the acquiring firm to compete against the target firm, since it would 
share any losses incurred by the latter because of aggressive competition. 
Accordingly, this anticompetitive effect may be the case even if the acquiring firm 
has no influence on the conduct of the target firm. However, the Guidelines 
acknowledge that a unilateral effect is less likely to arise in partial acquisition cases 




Thirdly, the authorities recognise that partial acquisitions may cause adverse 
unilateral or coordinated effects by providing the acquiring firm with access to non-
public and competitively sensitive information from the acquired firm. The 
Guidelines explain that a partial acquisition may enable the firms ‘to coordinate their 
behavior, and make other accommodating responses faster and more targeted.’ This 
risk increases where the acquisition also gives the acquired firm access to 




The authorities examine the likelihood of these anticompetitive effects according to 
the specific facts of each case. Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that because partial 
acquisitions are unlikely to produce any efficiency, they may be considered as 
anticompetitive, even if a complete acquisition involving the same parties would be 
allowed according to section 7.
122
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines also 
recognise that partial acquisitions do not usually have the ability to create most 
efficiencies that mergers may lead to.
123
 Nonetheless, the authorities generally posit 
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 Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, vol V (33) 283-84. 
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that a partial acquisition is likely to be allowed if a full-merger of the same firms 




Given the fact that partial acquisitions resulting in joint control basically constitute a 
joint venture, a question arises about which set of principles apply to them. The 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines note that partial acquisitions leading to effective 
control are analysed in almost the same way as mergers.
125
 In this respect, these joint 
ventures should be normally treated as full-merger because they also confer effective 
control. Nonetheless, the authorities may need to analyse whether the joint venture 
and the parent firm are likely to compete in the relevant market, based on the 
principles applicable to partial acquisitions.
126
 Besides these two approaches set out 
in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the rule of reason standard under the 
Collaboration Guidelines may also apply to these joint ventures. These guidelines 
actually state that: ‘The Agencies also assess direct equity investments between or 
among the participants. Such investments may reduce the incentives of the 
participants to compete with each other.’
127
 This uncertainty with regard to the 
applicable guidelines may not be very consequential to the substantive appraisal of 
those collaborations, because almost identical considerations apply to them under 
either set of guidelines. Nevertheless, the Collaboration Guidelines may be revised 
by the authorities to increase clarity in this respect.  
 
D- Assessment of the Risk of Coordination in Markets Other than those of the 
Joint Venture 
 
Compared to the EU regime, the US regime seems to give less consideration to the 
possibility that joint ventures may facilitate coordination between the parent firms in 
markets where they do not integrate their business activities. This possibility was 
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discussed in Penn-Olin. Therein, although integrating all of their operations in the 
sodium chlorate market into the joint venture, Pennsalt and Olin would continue to 
compete in the sale of five nonchlorates including calcium hypochlorite. The DOJ 
asserted that discussions between these two firms’ representatives in joint venture 
meetings inevitably would spill over into the nonchlorate markets where they 
competed with each other, because chlorate and nonchlorate price policies, 
marketing areas, distribution systems and customers coincide or overlap.
128
 The DOJ 
claimed that it would ‘defy human nature’ for the parents to maintain an unfaltering 
zeal to compete in the nonchlorates markets, while cooperating in the sodium 




The district court selected calcium hypochlorite among the nonchlorates as a ‘guinea 
pig’ in analysing the likelihood of spill-over effects.
130
 Pennsalt and Olin together 
had 88.8 % of the calcium hypochlorite market in 1959, and 76.6 % in 1960. Despite 
these high levels of market share, the court rejected the DOJ’s claim, since there was 
no evidence showing either actual or threatened collusion between the parents as to 
their nonchlorate operations within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
131
 
The court also concluded that there was no sign that the parents’ activities in relation 




The impact of the joint venture on competition in the sale of nonchlorates was not 
raised before the Supreme Court.
133
 Therefore, the Court did not find the opportunity 
to set a precedent for the analysis of the risk of coordination. Since Penn-Olin, 
neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have extensively discussed whether 
the mere formation of a joint venture may constitute a violation of section 7 of the 
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Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act, because it harms competition in 
markets where the joint venture is not intended to operate.   
 
Following Penn-Olin, the DOJ continued to recognise that the formation of a joint 
venture may have anticompetitive effects in other markets in which the parents are in 
competition. In its Guidelines on International Operations of 1988,
134
 which were 
replaced by the Collaboration Guidelines, the DOJ provided that it would analyse 
whether the joint venture or its ancillary restraints were likely to lead to an 
anticompetitive effect in other markets in which the parents competed or would 
compete.
135
 However, these guidelines explained that in most cases this analysis 
would not be necessary because a threat of spill-over effects may be minimised by 




The Collaboration Guidelines also recognise that participation in a joint venture, on 
its own, may change participants’ behaviours in additional markets where they are 
competitors ‘by altering incentives and available information, or by providing an 
opportunity to form additional agreements among participants’.
137
 However, they do 
not give sufficient guidance about how this analysis should be carried out.
138
 The 
Guidelines seem to primarily focus on whether the joint venture will facilitate 
coordination in the joint venture’s market. Therefore, the principles set forth in the 
Guidelines are generally not useful in analysing the risk of coordination in relation to 
markets other than those of the joint venture.   
 
V. Assessment of the Conduct and Operation of Joint Ventures 
 
In the US regime, the analysis of restraints associated with the operation of joint 
ventures appears to be even more complicated and debatable than the analysis of the 
formation of joint ventures. The difficulty arises especially from the ‘substance over 
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 Collaboration Guidelines (n 32) fn 41. See also ibid sec 2.2. 
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 under which courts, the enforcement authorities and 
commentators apply the same rules to joint ventures and a very broad range of 
collaborations, including sports leagues, credit card networks, professional 




Considering the case law, particularly the Dagher and American Needle decisions, it 
is possible to analyse restraints collateral to the operation of joint ventures, by 
dividing them into two groups according to whether they relate to venture or 
nonventure activities. Accordingly, this part firstly explains the assessment of the 
core (venture) activities of joint ventures based on Dagher. Secondly, it discusses 
how the ancillary restraint theory applies to non-venture activities.  
 
A- Core Activities of Joint Ventures: the Dagher Decision 
  
In Dagher, the Supreme Court discussed how to approach price unification by a fully 
integrated joint venture with regard to its two products, under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The decision relates to the Equilon joint venture, formed between 
Texaco and Shell to refine and sell gasoline in the Western US by retaining their 
original brand names. The joint venture ended all competition between Shell and 
Texaco in the market of refining and marketing gasoline in the Western US.
141
 The 
FTC evaluated Equilon’s formation in the same way as a merger under section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, and approved it by consent decree providing some modification to 
the originally proposed joint venture.
142
 After starting the operation, Equilon set the 
same price for gasoline sold under the Texaco and Shell brands. As a response, a 
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class of 23,000 gas station owners brought an action alleging that this price 
unification policy was price-fixing and, therefore, per se illegal under section 1.  
 
The district court held that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, applied to 
the pricing unification, and made no further consideration because the plaintiffs 
failed to claim the rule of reason analysis. The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision by 
applying the ancillary restraint theory, and found that the pricing unification was per 
se illegal on the grounds that it was not necessary to achieve the efficiencies resulting 




The Supreme Court, nevertheless, concluded that the price unification did not fall 
into the per se category.
144
 The Court provided that: 
 
[T]he pricing policy challenged here amount[ed] to little more than price 
setting by a single entity—albeit within the context of a joint venture—and not 
a pricing agreement between competing entities with respect to their competing 
products. Throughout Equilon’s existence, Texaco and Shell Oil shared in the 




The Court added that ‘[a]s a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must 
have the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it [sold], including the 
discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price’.
146
 
Furthermore, the Court did not agree with the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 
ancillary restraint doctrine to the pricing decision of Equilon. It explained that ‘the 
ancillary restraint doctrine ha[d] no application here, where the business practice 
being challenged involve[d] the core activity of the joint venture itself—namely, the 
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Through establishing that the per se rule does not apply to the core activities of joint 
ventures, Dagher forms a significant departure from Citizen Publishing,
148
 in which 
the Court rendered price unification by a similar joint venture per se illegal.
149
 
However, it fails to clarify whether such activities are immune from section 1 at all. 
Because the plaintiffs did not claim the illegality of the pricing unification under the 
rule of reason, the Court did not assess the defendants’ alternative argument that 




The silence of the Supreme Court on this matter has led to a great debate among 
commentators. According to some commentators, Dagher implies that section 1 is 
inapplicable to the internal activities of fully-integrated joint ventures, since they 
constitute unilateral conduct by a single entity, rather than a concerted activity of two 
or more firms.
151
 To support this claim, these commentators refer to Copperweld v 
Independence Tube,
152
 in which the Supreme Court held that there was no 
justification to apply section 1 to the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly 
subsidiary, since they were considered as a single enterprise with a complete unity of 
interest and common objectives. Keyte goes further by claiming that the dictum of 





On the other hand, some commentators assert that Dagher does not clearly exempt 
the core activities of joint ventures from section 1. Rather it requires the application 
of the rule of reason, instead of the per se rule, to them.
154
 Piraino states that this 
dictum may result in the application of a more restrictive rule of reason test to the 
internal activities of a joint venture than the ancillary restraint doctrine applicable to 
their nonventure activities. Therefore, he suggests that in future cases, the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts will be likely to, and should, accept that internal joint 
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venture rules are immune from section 1 scrutiny.
155
 The commentator supports the 
application of the single entity doctrine to the core activities of partially integrated 
joint ventures as well.
156
    
 
Given the fact that the Supreme Court treated Equilon as a single entity and 
recognised that ‘though Equilon’s pricing policy may be price fixing in a literal 
sense, it [was] not price fixing in the antitrust sense’, it may be claimed that section 1 
does not apply to the pricing policy of Equilon at all. However, the decisions referred 
to by the Court in this respect
157
 actually suggest the application of the rule of reason 
analysis to the restraints concerned, rather than exempting them from the section 1 
prohibition. Moreover, the Court stated that ‘if Equilon’s price unification policy 
[was] anticompetitive, then respondents should have challenged it pursuant to the 
rule of reason’.
158
 Therefore, Dagher does not seem to close all doors for the 
application of section 1 to the core activities of joint ventures including fully-
integrated joint ventures. Nonetheless, as predicted by the commentators, it is more 
likely that in future cases, courts will exempt the core activities of fully-integrated 
joint ventures from section 1.  
 
It is difficult to put forward the same argument for partially integrated joint ventures. 
Indeed, in a very recent decision, American Needle, Inc v NFL,
159
 the Supreme Court 
signals that the internal activities of partially integrated joint ventures are subject to 
section 1. In 1963, NFL teams established NFLP to develop, license and market their 
intellectual property. In 2000, NFLP granted a ten-year exclusive licence to Reebok 
International to produce and sell the trademarked headwear of all teams. American 
Needle, which previously had a non-exclusive licence on these intellectual 
properties, challenged NFLP’s decision to give an exclusive license to Reebok, under 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court found that such a decision by 
NFLP was immune from section 1, because ‘with regard to the facet of their 
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operations respecting exploitation of intellectual property rights, the NFL and its 32 
teams [were], in the jargon of antitrust law, acting as a single entity’.
160
 The Seventh 




The Supreme Court, however, concluded that section 1 applied to decisions by NFL 
teams to license intellectual property collectively, because ‘[t]he NFL teams [did] not 
possess either the unitary decision making quality or the single aggregation of 
economic power characteristic of independent action’.
162
 By giving reference to 
Copperweld, the Court found that the teams still competed in the market for 
intellectual property, and that they each acted as ‘separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests’, rather than pursuing the common interests of the 
league.
163
 The Court provided that the rule of reason would apply to the decision 
regarding the licence in question under section 1.
164
 This implies that restraints 
collateral to a joint venture will be subject to section 1, if the parents remain actual or 
potential competitors in the joint venture’s market and pursue separate economic 
goals.
165
   
 
The Collaboration Guidelines do not make any explicit distinction between the 
activities of joint ventures for the purpose of the applicability of section 1. However, 
since fully integrated joint ventures are considered as mergers, the FTC and the DOJ 
may treat the internal activities of these joint ventures in the same way as those of the 
merged entity, and exempt them from section 1.
166
 Restraints associated with the 
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core activities of partially integrated joint ventures are usually examined by the 
authorities in conjunction with the formation of the joint ventures. If they have 
approved the formation of the joint venture, it is unlikely that they would challenge 
those restraints under section 1. 
 
B- Ancillary Restraints 
 
In the US, apart from the exception provided in Dagher, restraints collateral to joint 
ventures are generally classified by courts as ‘naked’ and ‘ancillary’ under section 1 
scrutiny. Naked restraints are normally considered as per se illegal, whereas ancillary 
restraints are analysed under the rule of reason.
167
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Ancillary restraints are generally defined as those ‘subordinate or collateral to 
another transaction and necessary to make that transaction effective’.
168
 In this 
regard, a restraint is regarded to be ancillary and subject to the rule of reason, if it is 
‘reasonably related to and no broader than necessary to effectuate’ the 
procompetitive effects of the joint venture.
169
 Under this test, the courts require that 
there is not any less restrictive alternative to achieve these procompetitive effects.
170
 





Ancillary restraints are in principle subject to a full rule of reason. Nonetheless, in 
some cases, the Supreme Court and lower courts adopt a quick look approach in 
condemning restraints associated with the main collaboration.
172
 American Needle, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/testim~1.shtm> accessed 05 April 2013. Reddick claims that the 
Dagher and American Needle decisions call for an update in this respect. Reddick (n 81) 354-55. 
167
 ABA, Joint Ventures (n 70) 91.  
168
 Robert H Bork, ‘Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act’ (1959) 15 ABA Antitrust Section 211, 
211. See also Rothery Storage & Van Co v Atlas Van Lines, Inc, 792 F 2d 210 (DC Cir 1986). Werden 
provides that ‘a restraint collateral to the formation of a legitimate joint venture is “ancillary” only if it 
has an “organic connection” to the venture’s operations and serves to make the venture operate more 
efficiently or effectively’. Werden, ‘The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine after Dagher’ (n 149) 22. 
169
 ABA, Joint Ventures (n 70) 91. 
170
 Sullivan v NFL, 34 F 3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir 1994). 
171
 See 196 above. 
172
 For the application of this negative quick look approach by the Supreme Court, see Board of 
Regents v NCAA, 468 US 85 (1984); FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 479 US 447 (1986); 
California Dental Association v FTC, 526 US 756 (1999). For criticisms regarding this approach, see 
Jay P Yancey, ‘Is the Quick Look Too Quick? Potential Problems with the Quick Look Analysis of 
Antitrust Litigation’ (1996) 44 University of Kansas Law Review 671; Alan J Messe, ‘Farewell to the 
Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason’ (2001) 68 Antitrust Law 
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however, suggests that the quick look approach may also be used positively to allow 
an ancillary restraint without a detailed market analysis. The Court states that:       
 
When ‘restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at 
all,’ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be 
judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason. ... In such instances, the 
agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason. ... And depending upon the 
concerted activity in question, the Rule of Reason may not require a detailed 




Under the dictum of Dagher, only nonventure activities of fully-integrated joint 
ventures are subject to the ancillary restraint doctrine. In most cases, it is very 
difficult to show that a nonventure restraint is reasonably necessary for the 
procompetitive effects of these joint ventures. Therefore, these restraints are likely to 
be treated as naked restraints. In Yamaha, for example, the Ninth Circuit found that a 
territorial restraint related to nonventure products could not be termed ‘reasonably 
necessary’ for the purpose of the joint venture.
174
   
 
Pursuant to the Collaboration Guidelines, the authorities will most likely incorporate 
ancillary restraints into the analysis of the legality of the joint venture as a factor 
affecting its competitive effects.
175
 If ancillary restraints are analysed separately, they 
will be normally subject to the rule of reason as explained above. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
The assessment of joint ventures is one of the most controversial areas in US 
competition law. The debate mainly arises from the fact that, unlike the EU regime, 
the US regime does not provide any statutory definition to identify joint ventures that 
are treated as mergers. The absence of such a definition may be attributable to the 
litigation-oriented and complex decentralised character of the US enforcement 
regime that does not make a significant distinction between the procedural rules 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Journal 461; Edward Brunet, ‘Antitrust Summary Judgement and the Quick Look Approach’ (2009) 
62 SMU Law Review 493. 
173
 American Needle (n 159) 2216-17. See also Keyte, ‘American Needle’ (n 165) 51; Grush and 
Korenblit (n 165). 
174
 Yamaha (n 55) 981. 
175
 Werden, ‘The Ancillary Restraints’ (n 149) 19. 
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applicable to mergers and agreements, compared to the EU regime. The fact that the 
judicial interpretation does not indicate an important gap between the legal tests 
under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act may also be a factor downplaying the 
need for a sharp categorisation to determine the applicability of these statutes to joint 
ventures. Nevertheless, considering that the US courts and enforcement authorities 
approach mergers and agreements differently, the question of which types of joint 
ventures are to be reviewed in the same way as mergers is still of great importance.  
 
Although, on various occasions, they have analysed a joint venture as analogous to a 
merger, courts seem to fail to give a clear answer to this question. In the 
Collaboration Guidelines, however, the DOJ and the FTC introduce a clearer 
distinction between joint ventures based on the level of integration between their 
parent firms. Accordingly, fully-integrated joint ventures which integrate the entire 
operations of their parents in the market are treated as mergers. Partially integrated 
joint ventures, on the other hand, are analysed under the rule of reason standard 
provided in the Guidelines. Given the fact that these joint ventures do not end all 
competition between the participants in the market, the authorities normally consider 
the likelihood of future competition between the parents and the joint venture as a 
mitigating factor, in analysing their anticompetitive effects. In this context, 
procompetitive partial function joint ventures can be allowed upon the formation of 
safeguards ensuring future competition between the parents and the joint venture. 
This appears to make the standard of the Guidelines more lenient than the merger 
standard under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.          
 
Being a fully-integrated joint venture, nonetheless, may lead to a more permissive 
approach in relation to the assessment of restraints associated with the joint venture. 
Dagher sets out that the per se rule cannot apply to the core activities of fully-
integrated joint ventures, including even the fixing of the prices of their products. 
However, it is not explicit whether section 1 is inapplicable to the internal activities 
of fully integrated joint ventures at all.  
 
All the restraints related to partially-integrated joint ventures, however, are analysed 
as ancillary restraints under the rule of reason, provided that they are reasonably 
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necessary for achieving the procompetitive effects of the joint venture. American 
Needle dictates that some ancillary restraints may be subject to a positive quick look 
approach which does not require a detailed market analysis to permit a restraint. 
Despite these decisions, the analysis of restraints collateral to the operation of joint 
ventures in the US still includes many uncertainties and debates, particularly due to 
the general tendency of both the courts and the authorities to regard joint ventures in 
the same way as a variety of different collaborations, such as sports leagues, credit 
card networks, professional associations and non-profit organisations. 
 
These findings from the analysis of the US regime provide significant grounds for 
exposing the problematic aspects of the current EU approach to joint ventures and for 
putting forward solutions that can address them. In this respect, Chapter 6 discusses 
whether a criterion which, as in the US, relies on the extent to which the joint venture 
integrates its parents’ activities is more compatible with the economic nature of joint 
ventures and thus is more appropriate for classifying them for the purposes of merger 
control, than the full-functionality criterion. Moreover, it examines how such a 
criterion should be formulated and adopted in EU merger control. In this 
examination, it is particularly borne in mind that, unlike the EU regime, the US 
regime does not present an important difference between mergers and agreements in 
terms of applicable enforcement rules and substantive statutes, and that the 
distinction between fully-integrated and partially integrated joint ventures is neither 
conclusive nor binding.  
 
The analysis of the US regime also helps to take into account, in Chapter 6, that, if 
the parents retain some independent activities in the joint venture’s market, it may 
be, from an economic viewpoint, more reasonable to incorporate this fact, into 
traditional merger analysis, as a mitigating factor, rather than an aggravating factor, 
as is currently the case in the EU. 
 
The analysis in this chapter, lastly, reveals that the treatment of the conduct and 
operation of joint ventures under the US regime is more problematic than that under 
the EU regime. This finding indicates that in proposing solutions to improve the EU 
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approach in this respect, its praiseworthy aspects should be retained to avoid the 








This chapter primarily aims to expose the main implications of the analysis of the 
current EU merger control approach to joint ventures, to discuss some alternative 
approaches, and to recommend solutions based on these implications and 
discussions. In this regard, the chapter particularly takes into account the alternative 
approaches adopted in the US regime, explained in Chapter 5, for the purpose of 
identifying which joint ventures should be be treated as mergers, and for the purpose 
of the analysis of the formation and operation of these joint ventures. 
 
This chapter includes three substantive parts. The first part presents the need for a 
reform of the criterion to identify joint ventures falling within the Merger Regulation, 
and proposes an alternative criterion for this purpose. The second part, however, 
points out the problems with the current approach to the analysis of joint ventures 
under the Merger Regulation, and offers solutions that may preclude these problems. 
In addition to these two parts addressing the central questions of this thesis, the third 
part of the chapter reveals the implications of the application of the single economic 
unit doctrine under Article 101 TFEU in relation to the operation of joint ventures, 
and proposes a solution that would increase clarity in this respect. Thus, the chapter, 
in general, intends to offer an integrated approach, which provides the consistency of 
the principles applicable to joint ventures under the Merger Regulation with each 
other and the other principles of EU competition law, and also with economic 
theories.    
 
II. Need for a Reform of the EU Merger Control Criterion to Classify Joint 
Ventures 
 
As elaborately explained in Chapter 3 above,
1
 the concept of full-functionality is the 
current EU merger control criterion to identify which joint ventures will be treated as 
                                                          
1
 See Chapter 3/III/B above. 
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mergers. Although it significantly clarifies the scope of the Merger Regulation, the 
application of this criterion seems to lead to some inconsistencies and complications, 
which render it unsuitable for making such a sharp distinction between joint 
ventures. In this respect, this part suggests a reform of the current criterion to classify 
joint ventures for merger control purposes. It firstly explores these problematic 
aspects of the full-functionality criterion. Secondly, it explains the relevance of the 
chosen criterion to the appraisal of joint ventures, in order to establish a need for 
reform from a substantive viewpoint. Thirdly, the part discusses possible alternatives 
to the current policy and, finally, presents the proposed approach.   
 
A- Problems with the Full-Functionality Criterion 
 
1. Ambiguity about the Autonomy of Joint Ventures 
 
One problematic aspect of the full-functionality criterion is that it uses the 
ambiguous notion of commercial autonomy as its central element. This does not 
mean that it is uncertain what conditions are required for a joint venture to be 
considered as having autonomous character and as being full-function. As described 
in Chapter 3 above, the Jurisdictional Notice
2
 and the existing practice of the 
Commission significantly clarify the criteria used by the Commission, in assuming 
that a joint venture will perform all the functions of an autonomous entity on the 
market. The question herein is rather whether it is proper to require joint ventures to 
act autonomously of their parents for the purpose of merger control. It is true that the 
self-sufficiency element helps to determine joint ventures which, having their own 
personnel and assets, are structurally separable from their parents. However, 
expecting the joint venture to have autonomy in determining its own commercial 
policy, ie to act independently of its parents in dealing with third parties and with the 
parents themselves, contradicts the approaches taken in relation to the autonomy of 
joint ventures in other areas of competition analysis. 
 
                                                          
2
 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EU) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] OJ C 95/1. 
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The first obvious contradiction arises with respect to the joint control requirement. It 
is highly questionable to assume that a joint venture would be independent of its 
parents regarding its commercial decisions, while the latter exercise decisive 
influence over the former.
3
 In the Jurisdictional Notice, the Commission, through 
giving reference to the Cementbouw decision,
4
 discusses the relationship between the 
concepts of autonomous character and joint control. As the General Court recognised 
in the aforementioned decision,
5
 the Commission explains that the fact that a joint 
venture is full-function means that it is economically autonomous from an 
operational viewpoint, but not that it has autonomy as to the adoption of its strategic 
decisions.
6
 The Jurisdictional Notice indicates that such operational autonomy may 
exist in principle, if the joint venture has independence in determining its selling and 
purchasing relations with third parties and if it deals with its parents on an arm’s 
length basis.
7
 Nevertheless, these explanations are far from resolving the ambiguity 
resulting from the autonomy element. 
 
First of all, Cementbouw does not provide that a full-function joint venture can 
determine its operational commercial policies without the decisive influence of its 
parents, if the power of the parents is limited to blocking its strategic decisions. In 
contrast, the General Court recognises that the fact that the decision-making bodies 
of the joint venture are not composed of the direct representatives of the parent firms 
does not preclude the possibility that the parent firms exercise decisive influence 
over the joint venture. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court relies on its finding that 
the members of these bodies are appointed by the parents as shareholders and, 
therefore, will have to take the parents’ views into account in performing their given 
duties.
8
 This finding may actually be used to support the argument that the parent 
firms may also be able to affect the commercial decisions of a full-function joint 
venture, which are assumed to be taken by the joint venture autonomously of its 
parents.  
                                                          
3
 See Laurent Nouvel, ‘The New European Treatment of Joint Ventures: A Shift Towards A More 
Economic Approach’ (2002) 2002 International Business Law Journal 511, 519.  
4
 Case T-282/02 [2006] ECR II-319. 
5
 ibid para 62. 
6
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 2) para 93. 
7
 See Chapter 3/III/B/1/b above. 
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This approach, raising question about the autonomy of full-function joint ventures, is 
more apparent in El du Pont and Dow Chemical.
9
 In these decisions, the General 
Court affirmed the Commission’s finding that the parent firms had exercised decisive 
influence on the joint venture’s participation in a cartel. It emphasised that the 
decision-making body, which was responsible for appointing and dismissing the 
board members and officers of the joint venture and for some other important 
operational decisions, did consist of the representatives of the parent firms.
10
 Based 
on this fact, the Court rejected the parents’ allegations that the joint venture was 
acting autonomously, and that they were not aware of its participation in the cartel.
11
 
These decisions show that joint control may even give the parents the capacity to 
exercise decisive influence over the commercial decisions of the full-function joint 
venture on its very day-to-day operations, including pricing and output policies. In 
this regard, if the ECJ approves this approach in the appeal, it would be much more 
controversial to insist on the assumption that full-function joint ventures are 
autonomous in dealing with third parties and their parent firms.   
 
Indeed, it is not realistic, from an economic viewpoint, to expect a joint venture to 
determine its commercial policy independently of its parents. As explained in 
Chapter 2 above, firms usually set up a joint venture in order to achieve some 
specific objectives, such as overcoming industry-specific problems, and, for this 
reason, they forgo some operational autonomy and control over their assets, capital 
and expertise. Having regard to these aspects of the formation of joint ventures, the 
parent firms should normally be expected to monitor and influence the operation of 
the joint venture in order to achieve these objectives. It is correct that, in some cases, 
having veto rights in relation to some strategic decisions, such as those on the budget 
or the general business plan, may not enable the parent to influence the day–to-day 
                                                          
9
 Case T-76/08 EI du Pont and others v Commission [2012] ECR II-0000; Case T-77/08 Dow 
Chemical v Commission [2012] ECR II-0000. 
10
 The Court particularly considered the fact that this body took the decision to close one of the 
production plants of the joint venture, as an indication that the parents had exercised decisive 
influence over the joint venture’s conduct. EI du Pont and others (n 9) para 71; Dow Chemical (n 9) 
para 86. 
11
 See Chapter 3/VI above. 
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operations of the joint venture.
12
 However, in these cases, the majority shareholder 
may have the ability to direct these operations of the joint venture. Such dependence 
on one of the parents alone can also harm the autonomy of the joint venture.  
 
Moreover, even though the parent firms, at the beginning, intend not to influence the 
day-to-day decisions of the joint venture, and structure it in a way that it can act 
autonomously of its parents, they may change this policy later on, through using their 
joint control over the joint venture. For example, suppose that two firms established a 
full-function joint venture which would sell its products to third parties and would 
deal with the parents at arm’s length. Subsequently these firms may find it profitable 
to force the joint venture to sell exclusively, or give preferential treatment, to them. 
The Commission does not monitor whether the parents comply with their submitted 
plans on the operation of the joint venture in the future. This practice should not be 
surprising, because these plans cannot be considered as commitments within the 
meaning of Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation.
13
 In any case, considering that the 
parents even have the power to terminate the joint venture, it would not be logical to 
limit their ability to change the way the joint venture operates.  
 
On the other hand, it should be asked whether in the case of such a change in its 
operation, the joint venture would lose its autonomy and ultimately its full-function 
character, and, if so, whether it would be treated as a partial function joint venture 
afterwards. If the answers to these questions are no, this could call into question the 
rationale behind requiring the joint venture to act autonomously of its parents in the 
first place. If the answers are yes, this would grant national authorities and national 
courts the power to apply Article 101 to the joint venture. Given the fact that such 
changes, concerning the sales from the joint venture to its parents and third parties, 
are essentially behavioural, it may be very difficult for firms to predict precisely 
                                                          
12
 Veto rights on those issues are however considered to confer joint control. See Chapter 3/III/A 
above. 
13
 According to the Merger Regulation, the parties may offer some commitments that eliminate 
competition concerns resulting from the concentration, and, based on these commitments, the 
Commission may render the concentration compatible with the common market. See Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1, recital 30. Recital 31 provides that the Commission must ensure the 
fulfilment of the commitments by the parties. Conditions for a joint venture to be full-function cannot 
be treated as commitments, because they relate to the existence of a concentration, rather than the 
compatibility of a concentration with the common market. 
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when the joint venture ceases to be autonomous. Therefore, it does not appear 
reasonable to attach such importance to these behavioural changes, which would give 
rise to significant uncertainties with regard to the legality of the joint venture. In 
short, the autonomy-based criterion seems problematic, having regard to the parents’ 
discretion on the continuity of the autonomy of the joint venture. 
 
Furthermore, assuming that full-function joint ventures are autonomous of their 
parents may contradict the Commission’s practice in which it presumes that the joint 
venture and the parents would not compete against each other.
14
 The Commission 
usually aggregates the market share of the joint venture with those of the parent 
firms, as if they belong to the same undertaking.
15
 It may be claimed that the 
autonomy element is not in conflict with this policy, on the grounds that the latter 
relies on a presumption that each parent would individually abstain from competing 
with their own joint venture, in order not to suffer any loss as an investor in the joint 
venture. However, it is reasonable to expect that in such cases, the parents would also 
use their control over the joint venture in order to prevent it from competing against 
them.
16
 This is supported by the Commission’s policy not to analyse the risk of 
coordination if only one parent remains active in the joint venture’s market, because 




In conclusion, the autonomy element of the full-functionality criterion appears 
inconsistent with the joint control requirement and with the general approach of 
treating full-function joint ventures and their parents as a single undertaking in 
merger analysis. In any case, it is usually not practicable to draw a clear line between 
decisions that the joint venture takes autonomously and those that are decisively 
influenced by the parent firms thanks to their control over the joint venture. 
Therefore, it seems problematic to rely on any assumption about the autonomy of 
joint ventures, in order to properly identify those that lead to a lasting change in the 
structure of the parties and which, hence, are to be treated as mergers. 
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 Nouvel (n 3) 519.  
15
 See Chapter 3/V/A/3 above. 
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 See III/B/2 below. 
17
 See Chapter 3/V/B/1 above. 
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Furthermore, such confusion about the autonomy of full-function joint ventures gives 
rise to uncertainties for firms with regard to the legal interpretation of their 
relationship with their joint ventures. Having regard to the assumed autonomous 
character of full-function joint ventures, firms may perceive that they do not form a 
single economic unit with the joint venture within the meaning of Article 101, and 
they may refrain from influencing the operations of the joint venture, in order not to 
harm its autonomy. However, El du Pont and Dow Chemical show that these parents 
can still be considered as forming a single economic unit with the joint venture, and 
they can be held responsible for its infringement of competition rules. This makes it 
difficult for firms to predict and adopt the safest policy from a competition law 
perspective in dealing with their full-function joint ventures.                 
 
2. Limiting the Range of Operations that should Fall within the Merger 
Regulation 
 
Recital 20 of the Merger Regulation defines concentrations as operations which lead 
to a lasting change in the control of the undertakings concerned and, thereby, in the 
structure of the market. It continues that, to be consistent with this definition, it is 
appropriate to include, in the scope of the Merger Regulation, all joint ventures 
performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. 
However, such inclusion of the full-functionality criterion in Article 3(4) rather 
seems to limit the scope of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, which provides 
that a concentration arises where one or more undertakings acquire direct or indirect 
control of the whole or parts of another undertaking. 
 
The reading together of these two provisions, which both relate to operations 
resulting in joint control, creates confusion regarding in which situations the creation 
of joint control falls under Article 3(1) and is exempted from the full-functionality 
test. In the Jurisdictional Notice, the Commission makes its approach clear on this 
issue, by applying Article 3(1) only to those in which two or more undertakings 





 In other situations, however, it requires the joint venture to be 
designed to have full-function character in the future.  
 
This interpretation of the Commission has been subject to strong criticisms, 
particularly on the basis that it makes a distinction between acquisitions of joint 
control over the whole or parts of a third undertaking and those over the parts of the 
parent undertakings. In their article published before the issue of the Jurisdictional 
Notice, Radicati di Brozolo and Gustafsson argued that such a distinction based on 
the historical position of the joint venture was not justifiable, given the structural and 
forward-looking approach of merger control.
19
 They claimed that the term ‘creation 
of a joint venture’ used in Article 3(4), in economic terms, was not different from 
‘acquisition of joint control’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b). In this regard, to 
eliminate any inconsistency and uncertainties, the commentators proposed that in all 
situations involving the acquisition of joint control, it must be verified whether the 




The adoption of this proposal would, nevertheless, give rise to an unjustifiable 
distinction between acquisitions of sole control and those of joint control. Rudolf and 
Leupold explain that in both types of acquisitions, at least one party will acquire 
(sole or joint) control of an undertaking, thereby bringing about a lasting change in 
the structure of the market for the purpose of merger control.
21
 They assert that 
Article 3(4) does not limit the scope of Article 3(1)(b); on the contrary, it broadens it 
by including the creation of full-function joint ventures, to which the parent firms 
contribute their pre-existing assets that do not constitute an ‘undertaking’. However, 
if an ‘undertaking’ is contributed to a joint venture, according to the commentators, it 
should not be necessary to assess whether or not it will retain its full-function 
character in the future.
22
 For this purpose, they suggest that the Commission should 
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 Lars-Peter Rudolf and Bettina Leupold, ‘Joint Ventures – The Relevance of the Full-Functionality 






remove ‘from third parties’ from the last sentence of paragraph 91 of the 
Jurisdictional Notice, and add at the end: ‘and irrespective of whether the whole or 
parts of the undertaking is/are contributed by one of the joint venture partners or 




Although Rudolf and Leupold properly address the inconsistency resulting from the 
distinction between acquisitions of sole and those of joint control, their suggestion 
does not seem very helpful. It is uncertain what they mean by the term ‘undertaking’. 
According to the settled case law, a group of companies under common control 
constitutes a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 101.
24
 This principle 
also essentially applies in merger control.
25
 Therefore, it does not appear appropriate 
to use the term ‘undertaking’ to refer to the contribution of pre-existing assets, 
including subsidiaries, by one parent to the joint venture. This is, in fact, clearly 
acknowledged in paragraph 139 of the Jurisdictional Notice.  
 
Nonetheless, the commentators may actually mean that it should not be necessary to 
verify the full-function nature of the joint venture, if one of the parents contributes its 
pre-existing assets that form a business with a market presence within the sense of 
paragraph 24 of the Jurisdictional Notice. Such a policy could permit the application 
of similar rules to acquisitions of joint control and those of sole control. For instance, 
if one parent transferred its production capacity constituting a business to a 
production joint venture, this joint venture could be considered as a concentration in 
accordance with Article 3(1), even though it would not meet the full-functionality 
criterion.
26
 Under this policy, the fulfilment of the full-functionality criterion would 
be required only if the joint venture was established as a greenfield operation, or if 
assets were contributed to it such that an acquisition of sole control over them would 
not also fall under Article 3(1).  
 
Such a distinction between joint ventures which would operate in the same way 
could also result in some inconsistencies and uncertainties, particularly considering 
                                                          
23
 ibid 448. 
24
 See 138 above. 
25
 Jurisdictional Notice (n 2) para 135. 
26
 In Vattenfall/Elsam and E2 Assets, for example, the Commission regarded the acquisition of sole 
control over the generation capacity as a concentration. Case COMP/M.3867 [2005]. 
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the differences between the backward-looking approach of the concept of ‘business 
with a market presence’ and the forward-looking approach of the concept of full-
functionality. For example, suppose that firm A acquires from firm B the production 
facilities of its subsidiary to which a market turnover can be clearly attributed. If 
these production facilities form the main assets of the subsidiary, the acquisition by 
firm A will be considered as an acquisition of a business with a market presence 
within the meaning of paragraph 24 of the Jurisdictional Notice, even though the 
sales assets and personnel of the subsidiary are not transferred to firm A. In other 
words, the transfer of sales operations is not crucial in the application of the criterion 
for ‘business with a market presence’,
27
 because, with the transfer of the main assets, 
eg production facilities, intellectual property rights etc, the acquirer will effectively 
own the market presence of the acquired business.
28
 Therefore, it is doubtful that the 
concept of full-functionality, which concentrates on sales to third parties in relation 
to the existence of a market presence, could be viewed as being exactly analogous to 
the concept of ‘business with a market presence’.    
 
To sum up, the inclusion of Article 3(4) does not expand the boundaries of Article 
3(1)(b), as proposed in recital 20 of the Merger Regulation. In contrast, the narrow 
interpretation of Article 3(1) in the Jurisdictional Notice appears to unjustifiably 
exclude some operations, particularly partial function production joint ventures, 
which affect the structure of the undertakings concerned in almost the same way as 
those which are currently subject to the Merger Regulation. Some scholarly 
suggestions addressing this inconsistent policy do not seem sufficient to solve all the 




                                                          
27
 It is herein assumed that these sales assets and personnel do not constitute the main assets of the 
business in question. If they do, however, it may not be possible to consider the transfer of other assets 
as an acquisition of the business.  
28
 See eg Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case COMP/M.5727) [2010] paras 12-19; Lotte 
Group/Artenius UK (Case COMP/M.5760) [2010] para 5; Whirlpool/Privileg Rights (Case 
COMP/M.5859) [2010] paras 5-8. 
223 
 
3. Relying on Conditions relevant to the Substantive Analysis for Jurisdictional 
Purposes  
 
As mentioned above, for a joint venture to have autonomous character, it is in 
principle required to have its own management and to deal with third parties. 
Irrespective of whether these requirements actually enable the joint venture to act 
autonomously of its parents, they may be highly relevant to the substantive analysis. 
In general, if the management of the joint venture is autonomous in deciding 
commercial terms with the parent firms and with third parties, this may eliminate 
possible foreclosure concerns and information exchange among the parents, which 
increases the risk of coordination outside the joint venture. In this context, a partial 
function joint venture that would lead to foreclosure of competitors or a collusive 
outcome may be allowed under Article 101(3), upon certain conditions that require 
the establishment of a more independent management,
29
 or the ending of the 
exclusive or preferential supply relationship between the parents and the joint 
venture.
30
 With these conditions, the partial function joint venture in question may 
effectively turn into a full-function joint venture.
31
 This raises the question of 
whether such a joint venture would fall under the Merger Regulation in the light of 




If a joint venture gains full-function character due to such conditions, imposed under 
Article 101(3), it might be abnormal to make it also subject to the Merger 
Regulation. On the other hand, the opposite approach would also be questionable, 
because national competition authorities or national courts may claim the power to 
enforce Article 101 or their national laws against the joint venture, which in fact 
constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation.  
 
                                                          
29
 This condition may be to end any interlocking directorates between the joint venture and the 
parents. 
30
 For instance, in TPS, the Commission required limiting the exclusive rights given by the parent firm 
to the joint venture. Case IV/36.237 Commission Decision 1999/242/EC [1999] OJ L90/6. Obviously, 
a similar condition may be imposed by the Commission, if such an exclusive right is provided by a 
joint venture to its parents.    
31
 A joint venture may also turn into a full-function joint venture, if a national competition authority 
imposes the conditions explained above.  
32
 See Chapter 3/III/B/3 above. 
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In brief, it seems more reasonable to take into account whether these joint ventures 
have an independent management and deal with third parties, in the substantive 
appraisal under the Merger Regulation, rather than in determining the jurisdiction of 
the Regulation. Actually, the Areva/Urenco case indicates that the Commission may 
consider those conditions, not in relation to the full-function status of the joint 
venture but in relation to the assessment of its anticompetitive effects. In this case, 
according to the initial shareholders’ agreement, neither parent would be able to 
purchase from the joint venture without the unanimous approval of the joint 
venture’s board, which would be composed of an equal number of members 
appointed by both parents. Despite this veto right of the parents, which would limit 
the commercial autonomy of the joint venture, the Commission held that the full-
functionality criterion was satisfied. Nonetheless, it decided that such a veto right 
would lead to coordination between the parents in the downstream market. To 
eliminate this concern, the parties submitted some commitments including: (i) 
leaving decisions on entering into new supply agreements with the parents to the 
executives, rather than the board of the joint venture; and (ii) providing an 
independent management structure to prevent information flow between the 
parents.
33
 Given the conditions set forth by the Commission for a joint venture to 
have commercial autonomy,
34
 this joint venture should normally have been 
considered to gain a full-function character once these commitments had been 
fulfilled. The Commission, however, appeared to take a more flexible approach in 
applying the full-functionality test to the joint venture. Nonetheless, having regard to 
contrary decisions,
35
 it is very difficult to state that Areva/Urenco represents the 
general practice of the Commission on this issue.  
 
B- Importance of the Chosen Criterion from a Substantive Point of View 
 
The suitability of the current criterion for identifying joint ventures falling under the 
Merger Regulation is more often debated from a procedural perspective, because 
there are significant differences between the enforcement regimes of the Merger 
                                                          
33
 Areva/Urenco/ETC (Case COMP/M.3099) [2004] paras 226-44. 
34
 See Chapter 3/III/B/1/b above. 
35
 For example, in American Express/Fortis/Alpha Card, which was taken after Areva/Urenco, a 
similar veto right was considered to put into question the full-function character of the joint venture. 
Case COMP/M.5241 [2008] paras 12. 
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Regulation and Regulation 1/2003.
36
 On the other hand, much less emphasis is 
placed on its outcomes in relation to the substantive assessment. Considering that this 
thesis focuses on substantive issues, it is necessary to establish the importance of the 
criterion to classify joint ventures from a substantive viewpoint. 
 
In the 1966 Memorandum,
37
 the Commission emphasised that the test under Article 
101 was too strict to apply to mergers which had to be prohibited only if they 
resulted in excessive market power. Based on this approach that transformed into the 
dominance test under Regulation 4064/89,
38
 it could be stated that joint ventures 
treated as mergers were subject to a more lenient test than that applied to other joint 
ventures under Article 101. This also seemed to be the Commission’s practice, 
notwithstanding that the Notice on cooperative joint ventures
39
 stipulated that the 





In fact, the Commission acknowledges that the degree of market power required for 
the finding of an infringement under Article 101(1) is less than that required for a 
finding of dominance under Article 102. Therefore, Article 101 may require the 
parties to prove the fulfilment of the four cumulative conditions of Article 101(3), 
even though there would not be a dominance situation. This obviously suggests that 
the test under Article 101 is stricter than the dominance test. However, it can be 
argued that the shifting from the dominance test to the SIEC test has closed the gap 
between Article 101 and Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation.
41
 The new 
Cooperation Guidelines
42
 explicitly state that there is often a fine line between the 
effects on competition of partial function and full-function joint ventures, and imply 
                                                          
36
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
37
 See Commission, ‘The Problem of Industrial Concentration in the Common Market’, Competition 
Series No 3 (1966), reprinted in Frank L Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe: The Law and 
Policy of the EEC (2nd edn, Graham &Trotman/MartinusNijhoff 1994) 691-713. 
38
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [1989] OJ L395/1, corrected version [1990] OJ L257/13. 
39
 Commission Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint ventures pursuant Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty [1993] OJ C43/2. 
40
 ibid para 11. 
41
 See Chapter 3/V/A/1 above. 
42
 Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2010] OJ C11/1, para 21. 
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that the Commission may seek proof of the degree of market power required under 





Nonetheless, due to the paucity of the Commission’s decisions since the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003, it is difficult to conclude that the Commission would, in practice, 
apply the same standard to a joint venture under both Article 101(1) and Article 2(3). 
The practice of the Commission before Regulation 1/2003 indicates that it may find 
an infringement under Article 101(1), if the market threshold set forth in the 
Cooperation Guidelines is slightly exceeded. Even if the general practice of the 
Commission would be in line with the approach suggested in the Guidelines, Article 
101(1) would allow the Commission to take a different approach in some specific 
cases, and to rely on market power lower than that required under the SIEC test, in 
order to decide that the joint venture infringes Article 101(1). In such cases, pursuant 
to Article 101(3), the parties would be under the burden of showing the economic 
benefits of the formation of the joint venture and its indispensability to attain these 
benefits. In any case, even if the joint venture was granted an exemption, this would 
not ensure absolute legal certainty for the parties, because, unlike clearance decisions 
in merger cases, any exemption given under Article 101(3) may be withdrawn by the 
Commission in the future.
44
 These may form the reasons to conclude that the test 
under Article 101 is stricter than the SIEC test.  
 
Having said that, this conclusion may, at first glance, appear inconsistent with the 
Commission’s interpretation, in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, of the condition 
that efficiencies must be merger-specific to be considered in merger analysis.
45
 
Therein, the Commission implies that partial function (cooperative) joint ventures are 
in general less restrictive than mergers.
46
 However, it is doubtful that this assumption 
applies with respect to full-function joint ventures. If the extent of integration is the 
same in both cases, a full-function joint venture may be even less restrictive than a 
                                                          
43
 See Chapter 4/IV/A/3 above. 
44
 See Chapter 4/IV/B above. 
45
 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/5, para 85. 
46
 Nicole Tyson, ‘Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update’ (2007) 13 
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partial function joint venture, because, as discussed above, the requirements of 
having full-function character may eliminate some anticompetitive effects that a 
partial function joint venture may have. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that 
the efficiency considerations may only be an issue, if the operation in question has 
been deemed to result in an anticompetitive effect. The Commission’s practice shows 
that this is less likely to happen in merger cases compared to Article 101 cases, since, 
as mentioned above, Article 101(1) is generally applied more strictly than the SIEC 
test. Therefore, the interpretation of the merger-specific requirement in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines does not seem consequential as to the comparison of 
these two tests.    
 
Lastly, it should be remembered that national competition authorities and national 
courts are also empowered to fully enforce Article 101 or their national competition 
legislation against joint ventures falling outside the Merger Regulation. Using this 
power, national authorities may adopt a different approach from those of the 
Commission and of each other, in analysing these joint ventures under Article 101. 
Considering that national competition legislation may differ from EU competition 
rules, the gap between the approaches of the national authorities and the Commission 
may become greater. For example, as happened in relation to the BHP Billiton/Rio 
Tinto production joint venture, a partial function joint venture may be reviewed as a 
concentration by some national authorities, whereas it is analysed under Article 101 




It is true that within the European Competition Network, national authorities and the 
Commission may achieve a significant degree of convergence and consistency. 
However, the fact that private parties can also challenge partial function joint 
ventures in national courts may still lead to some divergence among national and 
Union level competition law enforcement. Indeed, national courts are not normally 
                                                          
47
 Therein, while the Commission found that the joint venture was subject to Article 101, Austrian and 
German competition authorities analysed it in accordance with their merger rules. Since the parties 
quit the transaction, these authorities did not need to give their final decisions on it. See John 
Kallaugher and Andreas Weitbrecht, ‘Developments under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in 2010’ 
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bound by the decisions and guidelines of the Commission and national authorities, 
and, therefore, they may follow a different approach in relation to the assessment of 
joint ventures. Even if this may not seem to pose an immediate risk, due to the small 
number of private actions in the EU,
48
 the situation may change thanks to the efforts 
to promote the private enforcement of EU competition law.
49
 Accordingly, the 
decentralised enforcement of Article 101, at least in theory, downplays the value of 
any guidance given by the Commission about the assessment of partial function joint 
ventures and, hence, increases uncertainty about their legality.  
 
To sum up, the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines seems to substantially 
approximate the test under Article 101 with that under Article 2(3). However, 
whether or not a joint venture falls under the Merger Regulation still has important 
substantive implications, given the fact that Article 101, in theory, allows the 
Commission to apply a stricter approach and that national competition authorities 
and national courts may adopt a different policy in applying Article 101 or their 
national legislations. These make it difficult to ensure the aligned hermeneutical 
application of Article 101 and Article 2(3). In this context, due to the problems 
explained above, the full-functionality criterion does not seem to properly delineate 
the boundaries of the Merger Regulation and, therefore, it can lead to the application 
of different substantive rules to operations which have similar effects on the structure 
of the undertakings concerned and prevent adopting a unified approach to them in 
this respect.  
 
In any event, even if the full-functionality criterion, along with its application by the 
Commission, could be viewed appropriate to determine the scope of the Merger 
Regulation, its autonomy element leads to some terminological problems that have 
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 See Ashurst, ‘Comparative Report: Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules’ (2004) 
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some repercussions on the appraisal of the formation and operation of full-function 
joint ventures under the Merger Regulation and Article 101. Therefore, from a 
substantive point of view, it is necessary to adopt a more suitable criterion to 
determine the boundaries of the Merger Regulation, as far as joint ventures are 
concerned.     
 
C- Possible Alternatives 
 
Considering these problems resulting from the application of the full-functionality 
criterion, it should be discussed which alternative approaches may serve better for 
the purpose of identifying which joint ventures should be treated as mergers. In this 
regard, two options stand out: (i) shifting to an integration-based criterion and (ii) 
including partial function production joint ventures in the scope of the Merger 
Regulation. Below these two alternatives are analysed in more depth.  
 
1. Shift to an Integration-Based Criterion 
 
One possible alternative to the full-functionality criterion may be to take the degree 
of economic integration between the parties as the central criterion. Such an 
integration-based criterion is actually used in the US.
50
 In that regime, fully 
integrated joint ventures which involve an efficiency enhancing integration of 
economic activity, that eliminates all competition among participants in a given 
market, are treated in the same way as mergers under the US Horizontal Merger 





However, as explained in Chapter 5 above, such classification in the US does not 
have significant substantive and procedural consequences, as the distinction between 
full-function and partial function joint ventures has in the EU. First of all, it does not 
determine whether section 7 of the Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act 
                                                          
50
 Chapter 5/IV/A above. 
51
 DOJ and FTC, ‘Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors’ 64 Fed Reg 54483 
(1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm> accessed 05 April 2013, sec 1.3. 
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applies to the joint venture.
52
 Indeed, in the US, besides section 7, section 1 also 
theoretically applies to mergers, and the design of these two provisions allows the 




Secondly, this distinction does not necessarily affect the procedural rules applicable 
to joint ventures in the US. The Collaboration Guidelines explicitly state that such 
distinction does not serve determining the obligations arising from the H-S-R Act.
54
 
Furthermore, unlike in the EU, in the US, mergers are also subject to a decentralised 
enforcement system, in which, besides the federal authorities, state attorneys general 
and private parties may challenge a merger in court. In any case, the court will give 
the final decision on the legality of the challenged merger.
55
 Therefore, this 
distinction made by the US enforcement authorities, in practice, may not be decisive 
for the application of both procedural and substantive rules to joint ventures. 
 
Without taking into account these distinctive characteristics of US competition law, 
any discussion on the suitability of such a full-integration criterion for EU merger 
control may lead to erroneous conclusions. The use of this criterion would actually 
significantly narrow the categories of joint ventures that fall under the Merger 
Regulation and, thereby, resurrect debates regarding the old categorisation that 
disqualified joint ventures as concentrations if the parents were to remain 
competitors in the joint venture’s market.
56
 In this respect, although the full-
integration of the participants in the market may be an essential factor for the 
substantive analysis of joint ventures,
57
 it does not seem appropriate to use this factor 
for making a sharp distinction between joint ventures for the purpose of merger 
control, which would have important substantive and procedural outcomes. 
 
However, it is worth discussing whether an integration-based criterion, which does 
not necessarily require a full-integration of the parties in the market, should replace 
the current autonomy-based criterion for the purpose of merger control. Integration is 
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in fact considered under the full-functionality criterion as well, but to the extent that 
it relates to the autonomy of the joint venture.
58
 Having all the necessary human and 
material resources to be self-sufficient naturally indicates some integration of the 
parents’ economic activities.
59
 In addition, the Commission usually considers 
integration, leading to the permanent withdrawal of the parents from the joint 
venture's market, as evidence of the autonomous character of the joint venture.
60
 
Integration is also emphasised by the Commission in respect of the extension of the 
activities of the joint venture into new product or geographical markets. The 
Jurisdictional Notice acknowledges that a new concentration may arise, if the joint 
venture is provided with significant additional tangible or intangible assets, which 
constitute the basis or nucleus of the extension, and if it carries out these extended 




However, the requirement of having commercial independence shifts the centre of 
gravity of the full-functionality criterion to the autonomy of the joint venture. 
Therefore, even if the contribution by the parent firms to the joint venture remains 
substantially the same, the absence of such autonomy normally disqualifies the joint 
venture as being full-function. The use of integration as the key element may ensure 
that the Merger Regulation catches these situations as well. To that effect, the new 
criterion may be designed to essentially address whether the joint venture involves 
any integration that significantly affects the control of the parent firms over their 
economic activities in the market.  
 
It seems that such a reform could particularly make a difference in respect of partial 
function production joint ventures. These joint ventures usually include substantial 
investments, and form the most important part of the parents’ economic activities in 
the market, which significantly affects the price and output of their products. Indeed, 
they determine the output and price of products to be supplied to the parents, thereby 
basically setting the minimum sale price for the parents’ products. Hence, there is, in 
fact, no significant difference between such production joint ventures and operations 
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which currently fall within the Merger Regulation, in terms of their effect on the 
economic activities of the parties. 
 
The production joint venture between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto constitutes a very 
good example in this respect. With the formation of this joint venture, the parties 
intended to combine approximately 90 % of their competition-relevant production in 
the iron ore markets, which would amount to approximately 90 % of their total costs. 
This joint venture would be expected to eliminate all meaningful competition 
between the parents, even though they would continue conducting their marketing 
activities separately. However, the Commission treated it as a partial function joint 




Another example of how partial function production joint ventures affect the 
structure of the parties can be the Norf joint venture, formed between Alcan and 
VAW in order to build and operate an aluminium rolling plant. In analysing the 
anticompetitive effect of the notified merger between Alcan and Alusuisse, the 
Commission concluded that the existence of the Norf joint venture would result in 




The shift to such an integration-based criterion would allow expanding the scope of 
the Merger Regulation to these production joint ventures. This criterion could catch 
not only production joint ventures, like the BHP Billiton-Rio Tinto and Norf joint 
ventures, which concern products forming a significant portion of the parties’ total 
costs in the market, but also those which constitute a relatively small input for their 
final products. In such cases, the input market ought to be viewed as being separate 
from those of the final products. In this context, the production joint venture should 
be considered to lead to a significant integration of the parties in the input market. 
For example, in the Areva/Urenco case, the joint venture engaged in the development 
and manufacturing of centrifuges, which were used by the parents independently in 
their activities for uranium enrichment. The Commission defined two different 
markets, one for centrifuge technology equipment and one for enriched uranium, and 
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analysed the effects of the joint venture on competition in these markets separately. 




Nonetheless, such an integration-based criterion may not substantially change the 
current position with respect to other types of joint ventures. Notwithstanding that 
R&D joint ventures, including the joint production of the results, could be treated in 
the same way as production joint ventures, pure R&D joint ventures would be 
unlikely to be classified as concentrations even under this criterion, because they 
normally concern a specific project that lasts for a short period. Therefore, they do 
not significantly affect the parents’ control of their economic activities in the market. 
The only exception to this could be joint ventures which are not targeted only at a 
specific project and integrate the R&D activities of the parties on a lasting basis. This 
could happen particularly in the high-technology industries, such as computer 
software, in which innovation constitutes the main input to the parties’ products. In 
such cases, the joint venture may be considered to significantly affect the parties’ 
control over their economic activities in the innovation market, and, therefore, may 
be treated as analogous to production joint ventures.   
 
With respect to sales joint ventures, the conditions required by the Commission 
under the full-functionality criterion would essentially continue to be relevant under 
this integration-based criterion. Accordingly, if a sales joint venture adds only a little 
value to the product supplied from the parent firms, it would be difficult to claim that 
this joint venture involves a significant integration of the parents’ economic activities 
in the market. In this situation, the change in the position of the parents does not 
result from integration, but from a contractual agreement between them. If, however, 
such a joint venture acts as a trade company, as described in the Jurisdictional 





A similar approach would also generally apply to purchasing joint ventures. If a joint 
venture constitutes a wholesale company which has the necessary resources to 
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operate in the wholesale market, it could be considered to result in a significant 
integration of the parents in this market. In this context, the Commission could take 
into account whether the parents also integrate their marketing activities in the 
wholesale market, ie whether the joint venture is also provided with the necessary 
capabilities to supply to third parties. Other purchasing joint ventures, however, 
would not be viewed as leading to significant integration among the parents and 
therefore, they would be treated as agreements. 
 
To conclude, shifting the focus from the autonomy of the joint venture to the 
integration of the parents’ economic activities in the market may extend the scope of 
the Merger Regulation particularly to partial function production joint ventures, and 
may preclude the terminological ambiguity arising from the application of the full-
functionality criterion, explained above. 
 
2. Including Partial Function Production Joint Ventures in the Scope of the 
Merger Regulation 
  
As is apparent from the discussion above, one fundamental problem with regard to 
the application of the full-functionality criterion appears to be the exclusion of partial 
function production joint ventures from the scope of the Merger Regulation. In this 
context, another alternative to the current policy may be to include partial function 
production joint ventures in the Merger Regulation, through simply making an 
addition to the end of Article 3(4) to that effect.  
 
In fact, including partial function production joint ventures in the Merger Regulation 
was also discussed by the Commission. Although it envisaged such a reform in the 
White Paper on modernisation, mainly on procedural grounds,
66
 the Commission 
changed its mind on this issue, in the Green Paper on the review of Regulation 
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 The Green Paper gives some substantive and procedural reasons for 
abandoning this proposal.  
 
It firstly states that ‘it would be very difficult to find an unambiguous legal definition 
of the concept of a partial function production joint venture, particularly in to the 
context of service markets’.
68
 Even if it is accepted that there would be such a 
difficulty, it is doubtful that it could not be eliminated through further decisions and 
guidelines, given the example of how the Commission has dealt with the concept of 
autonomous entity, which can be hardly considered less ambiguous. 
 
Secondly, the Green Paper argues that, besides partial function production joint 
ventures, some other operations such as R&D joint ventures may also involve large-
scale investments, and, thus, it is not justifiable to make a distinction between these 
operations with respect to their suitability for ex ante control.
69
 As mentioned above, 
compared to other types of joint venture, partial function production joint ventures 
lead to a more significant integration of the parties’ economic activities. Hence, they 
should be more readily regarded as bringing about a lasting change in the structure of 
the undertakings concerned, and of the market. This may constitute a justification for 
treating these joint ventures in the same way as full-function joint ventures. 
 
From a substantive viewpoint, however, the Green Paper stipulates that even if 
partial function production joint ventures are included in the Merger Regulation, the 
applicable test would remain the same, ie Article 101, considering that, as they 
would not be active in any market, the only real assessment of such cases would 
relate to coordination between the parent firms.
70
 In the new Cooperation Guidelines, 
the Commission itself appears to refute this argument, by adopting the principles for 
the assessment of partial function joint ventures, which are quite similar to those 
applicable to full-function joint ventures under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
These guidelines provide that partial function joint ventures, besides the risk of 
coordination, may also give rise to foreclosure of competitors and/or to direct 
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limitation on competition between the parent firms. These effects apparently 
correspond to the non-coordinated effects of full-function joint ventures.
71
 The 
relevant chapters of the Guidelines for specific types of joint venture reveal that this 
similarity emerges especially in relation to partial function production joint ventures.  
 
Indeed, given the decisive effect of partial function production joint ventures on the 
outputs and prices of the parents’ products, the mere fact that the joint venture does 
not supply these products to third parties is unlikely to lead to a substantial difference 
between the effects of these joint ventures and those having full-function character. 
Therefore, having regard to the proper approach of the new Cooperation Guidelines, 
that substantive argument in the Green Paper does not seem convincing.           
 
Consequently, the extension of the scope of the Merger Regulation to partial function 
production joint ventures may be viewed as a plausible alternative. This would result 
in almost the same outcome as the adoption of an integration-based criterion, except 
to the extent that it would not eliminate the ambiguity arising from the autonomy 
element of the full-functionality criterion.  
 
D- Proposed Approach 
 
The discussion of the two alternatives above reveals that both solutions would 
improve the current situation in respect of joint ventures under the EU merger control 
regime. However, shifting to an integration-based criterion would be a better 
solution, because it could address all the problems of the current regime more 
effectively. 
 
Firstly, the integration-based criterion would not require the Commission to make an 
assumption on whether the joint venture would be autonomous of the parents. This 
would remove the confusion about the interrelation between the joint control 
requirement and the autonomy element. It would also enable the Commission, based 
on the relevant economic principles, to properly analyse the competitive relationship 
between the parents and the joint venture under both the Merger Regulation and 
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Article 101, without being at the risk of contradicting any assumption made in the 
beginning.  
 
Secondly, such a criterion would give the Commission more flexibility in 
determining the scope of the Merger Regulation. This could provide the adoption of 
a consistent approach to situations resulting in joint control under Article 3(1) and (4) 
of the Merger Regulation. It would also ensure that the Commission could consider 
whether the joint venture has an independent management and supplies to third 
parties, in appraising its impact on competition under the Merger Regulation, and 
that it could accept commitments eliminating any anticompetitive effect in this 
regard. Another obvious positive outcome of determining the scope of the Merger 
Regulation properly, which is closely linked to those above, would be to apply a 
unified substantive approach to similar operations under the Merger Regulation. 
Indeed, the proposed analysis of joint ventures explained in the following part of this 
chapter would be more compatible with an integration-based criterion, which extends 
the scope of the Merger Regulation to partial function production joint ventures. 
 
One may ask whether such a shift to an integration-based approach may be provided 
only with a change in the practice of the Commission, while the wording of Article 
3(4) is retained as it is. Actually, as mentioned above, the Areva/Urenco decision 
indicates that the Commission may interpret the current criterion flexibly with regard 
to how the Merger Regulation applies to a production joint venture whose full-
function character is questionable.
72
 However, having regard to the Jurisdictional 
Notice and the general practice of the Commission, Areva/Urenco seems to form an 
exception in this context. In any case, this decision seems to use the same 
terminology as the Jurisdictional Notice and, therefore, cannot be relied on as 
evidence for a possible shifting of the centre of gravity of the current criterion.  
 
Indeed, it is very doubtful that the Commission can adopt an integration-based 
criterion under the current wording of Article 3(4). It is correct that the conditions set 
out in the Jurisdictional Notice essentially reflect the Commission’s approach to the 
full-functionality criterion. Nonetheless, these conditions have been embraced by the 
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General Court as well.
73
 More importantly, considering the discussions with regard 
to moving from the cooperative-concentrative joint venture distinction
74
 and to the 
inclusion of partial function production joint ventures,
75
 it can be stated that Article 
3(4) is understood by the Council to cover full-function joint ventures as defined by 
the Commission. Hence, the application of such an integration-based criterion by the 
Commission may constitute the extension of its power without the permission of the 
Council. 
 
In sum, the current wording of Article 3(4) does not seem to allow the Commission 
to move from the current autonomy-based criterion to an integration-based criterion. 
Therefore, Article 3(4) should be modified to that effect. This would at least prevent 
any uncertainties and debates that could arise, if the Commission made this shift 
under the current wording.    
 
The new wording of Article 3(4) should be written in a way that it can be consistent 
with Article 3(1)(b) and paragraph 24 of the Jurisdictional Notice and with other 
principles in relation to the concept of concentration. One suggestion in this context 
may be as follows: ‘The creation of a joint venture involving a lasting and significant 
integration of the economic activities of two or more undertakings in a given market 
shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)’. In order to 
provide more clarity, recitals of the Regulation may include more information about 
the application of the new criterion. Firstly, it can be mentioned that all situations 
involving an acquisition of joint control over the whole or parts of an undertaking 
will fall within Article 3(1)(b), regardless of whether such acquisition relates to the 
part of one of the undertakings concerned. It can also be added that Article 3(4) 
intends to expand the scope of the Merger Regulation to the creation of joint ventures 
which do not fall within Article 3(1)(b), but will have the same effects on the 
economic activities of the parties in the market. In this regard, it should be 
emphasised that the new criterion is more expansive than the full-functionality 
criterion, as it particularly catches production joint ventures which did not fall within 
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the Merger Regulation under the latter, due to the reliance of the joint venture on 
supplies to its parents. 
 
Despite the possible benefits of the proposed integration-based criterion above, such 
a reform may be opposed, on the ground that it may render obsolete the established 
practice of the Commission regarding the full-functionality criterion and, therefore, it 
may give rise to uncertainties for the business community that has been used to such 
practice. It is true that this reform would result in some departure from the current 
practice. However, this departure would not be dramatic as it may seem at first 
glance.  
 
First of all, the conditions provided in the Jurisdictional Notice, with respect to the 
self-sufficiency element, would also be required under the new criterion, as an 
indication of significant integration. For example, in respect of production joint 
ventures, the Commission may require the joint venture to have its own management 
and personnel, and the necessary production and financial assets, intellectual 
property rights or licences etc, in order to conclude that the parents actually combine 
their production activities into a separate entity which is under their joint control. 
Therefore, the Commission may retain those conditions provided in the current 
version of the Jurisdictional Notice in drafting new guidelines, by adjusting the 





Secondly, the new criterion would allow the Commission to consider sales to, and 
purchases from, third parties, which have been used as an indication of the autonomy 
of the joint venture under the current criterion, as a factor relevant to the integration 
of the parties. With regard to sales and purchasing joint ventures, such sales and 
purchases would be an indicative of a significant integration of the parents in the 
relevant trade or wholesale markets.
77
 Similarly, joint ventures, which are intended to 
integrate the parents’ R&D and marketing activities for a technology on a lasting 
basis, would be regarded as leading to significant integration in the technology 
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market. Accordingly, the relevant part of the Jurisdiction Notice for sales to and 
purchases from third parties may be substantially retained in the revised notice in 
respect of those joint ventures, upon the necessary adjustments to the terminology of 
the new criterion.      
 
With respect to production joint ventures, however, the new criterion would not 
require the joint venture to supply to third parties, in order for it to fall under the 
Merger Regulation. Nevertheless, the projected sales to third parties could be 
considered as additional, but not necessary, evidence of the presence of significant 
integration. The revised notice can provide a definition for production joint ventures 
in a way that it can also apply in relation to service markets. For this purpose, the 
Commission should particularly focus on whether the joint venture combines the 
parties’ capacities for a product, or a service, to which it adds a significant value 
through applying certain process. This definition, in any case, should exclude 
purchasing joint ventures which resell the purchased products to its parents without 
adding any significant value to them. However, as explained above,
78
 joint ventures, 
which are designed to carry out R&D activities for their parents in the relevant 
innovation market on a lasting basis, may be treated as analogous to production joint 
ventures in this sense.  
 
In conclusion, such an integration-based criterion would enable the Commission to 
adopt a more pragmatic approach in relation to production joint ventures, while 
essentially retaining the existence approach with regard to other joint ventures. 
Considering also the problematic aspects of the full-functionality criterion above, the 
changes brought by the new criterion would rather increase certainty for the business 
community and other stakeholders. This certainty could be further improved by the 
guidelines and decisions of the Commission. In this regard, at least from a 
substantive point of view, the proposed criterion seems to be the most plausible 









III. Refining the Approach to Joint Ventures under the Merger Regulation 
 
The analysis of joint ventures under the Merger Regulation may be expected to differ 
from those of amalgamations and acquisitions, due to the fact that, unlike the latter, 
the former are jointly controlled by two or more firms that remain independent of 
each other. In this respect, in this thesis, the current approach to the appraisal of joint 
ventures in EU merger control is mainly examined from the perspective of two 
questions: (i) how the fact that the parent firms remain competitors in the joint 
venture’s market, or in other markets, affects the approach to the creation of the joint 
venture; and (ii) how the existence of joint control is incorporated into the analysis of 
non-horizontal effects. 
 
The Commission’s practice and the case law, explored in Chapter 3 above, do not 
reveal a significant problem with respect to the second issue concerning the 
assessment of non-horizontal effects. In various decisions, the Commission 
considered the fact that the entity in question was jointly controlled as a mitigating 
factor that diminished the incentive for the parent(s) to engage in foreclosure.
79
 
Although it is difficult to state that the Commission’s practice is totally consistent on 
this issue, these decisions indicate that a more lenient approach can be applied to 
joint ventures under Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, as far as foreclosure 
effects are concerned. This approach should be generally regarded as appropriate, 
because it essentially gives the necessary consideration to the peculiar economic 
nature of joint ventures. Therefore, this part does not provide a further examination 
of this issue. 
 
With regard to the first issue, however, the current EU policy appears to be more 
problematic. As explained elaborately in Chapter 3 above, according to Article 2(4) 
of the Merger Regulation, the risk of coordination between the parents is appraised 
with reference to Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. This policy seems to have two 
negative implications. Firstly, considering that the concept of coordination under 
Article 2(4) basically refers to the same economic situation as collective dominance, 
the application of Article 101 to the former seems questionable. Secondly, the 
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current wording of Article 2(4) and (5), along with the existing practice of the 
Commission, at least in theory, suggests a stricter approach to partial integration, 
compared to full-integration. This part firstly explains these problems with the 
current policy and, secondly, it presents some proposals which would address them. 
 
A- Problems with the Current Policy 
 
1. Two Different Tests for the Same Economic Situation 
 
From an economic point of view, the concept of coordination used under Article 2(4) 
is quite similar to that described in relation to collective dominance, ie coordinated 
effect, under the settled case law and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
80
 As Venit 
rightly states: 
 
In both cases the question is whether two or more economically and legally 
separate entities will be able to collude successfully on a given market. In the 
case of oligopolistic dominance the parties are (i) the merged entity and (ii) one 
or more third parties. In the case of a joint venture, the parties are the parents to 
the joint venture. Seen from this perspective, there is no meaningful analytic or 





Given the overlap of the two concepts, it should be asked whether the best policy is 
to provide Article 101 as the applicable test under Article 2(4). One may support this 
policy, on the basis that the risk of coordination between the parents refers to the 
behavioural aspect of joint ventures. As explained in Chapter 1 above,
82
 the effects of 
mergers and agreements on the economic activities of their participants are generally 
distinguished from each other, such that the former is considered to change the 
structure of the merging parties, whilst the latter is supposed to affect the competitive 
behaviour of the parties. On these grounds, it may be argued that the effects of joint 
ventures on the independent activities of parent firms should be regarded as 
behavioural, and should be subject to Article 101, which is the applicable test for 
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agreements. This argument seems to be the main explanation for the adoption of the 
current policy in the EU. 
 
This reasoning should be, first of all, examined within the historical context of the 
evolution of the EU merger control system. As described in Chapter 3 above, prior to 
the 1990s there was no specific rule concerning merger control in the EU, and Article 
101 was not considered to be applicable to mergers.
83
 At that time, in order to limit 
the number of anticompetitive operations escaping competition law scrutiny, the 
Commission needed to establish the applicability of Article 101 to those which led to 
the risk of coordination between the parties. In this context, the treatment of such 
effects of joint ventures as behavioural was justifiable at that time to allow more 
effective competition law enforcement. However, considering that the adoption of 
the Merger Regulation has addressed these concerns, it is difficult to support the 
same argument for today’s situation.   
 
Indeed, even though the structural-behavioural distinction may help to distinguish the 
effects of mergers from those of agreements and to apply different tests accordingly, 
it does not serve the same purpose in relation to the effects of joint ventures treated 
as mergers. It is, in general, not possible to separate the behavioural aspects of these 
joint ventures from their structural aspects, because the former usually results from 
the significant integration of the parties’ economic activities, which is the reason to 
regard these joint ventures as mergers. In other words, the risk of coordination is also 
a consequence of the change in the structure of the parties and, therefore, it can be 
essentially deemed structural. From this viewpoint, it is questionable to treat 
‘coordination’ differently from ‘collective dominance’, as both relate to the impact of 
a change in the structure of the merging parties on the competitive behaviour of firms 
that are independent of each other. 
 
Another argument in favour of the current policy may be that the scope of Article 
2(4) includes not only tacit coordination, which can be considered identical to 
collective dominance as explained, but also explicit coordination between the 
parents. However, this argument also hardly justifies the application of Article 101. 
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If the parents explicitly decide to coordinate outside the joint venture, in any case, 
this would not fall under Article 2(4) and, therefore, would be analysed according to 
Article 101 within the framework of Regulation 1/2003, because it is not directly 
related to, or necessary for, the formation of the joint venture.
84
 The fact that 
information exchange in relation to the operation of the joint venture may enable the 
parents to implicitly coordinate their independent activities would also not require 
the application of Article 101. It is true that such information exchange can amount 
to a concerted practice, if it is assessed on its own. However, in the context of joint 
ventures, it can be viewed as a factor contributing to tacit coordination and, thus, can 
be analysed under Article 2(3). 
 
In fact, Article 2(3) already applies to the risk of information exchange with respect 
to vertical mergers. The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that ‘[v]ertical 
integration may facilitate coordination by increasing the level of market transparency 
between firms through access to sensitive information on rivals’.
85
 This can be the 
case, for example, if an upstream firm acquires a downstream firm, which is the main 
distributor for the former’s rivals.
86
 More importantly, in Areva/Urenco, the 
Commission applied Article 2(3), to analyse the risk of coordination between the 
parents in a market downstream to that of the joint venture, based on a number of 
factors, including increased scope for information exchange. These examples show 
that Article 2(3) can effectively catch all the situations targeted under Article 2(4). 
 
The last argument in favour of the application of Article 101 may be that there may 
be a risk of coordination between the parents with respect to the joint venture’s 
market, even in the absence of some of the conditions for a finding of collective 
dominance. The fact that each parent would have an incentive to align its pricing 
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policy to that of the joint venture may form a reason for this argument.
87
 However, if 
this argument is accepted, this would mean that a partial integration of the parents is 
less permissible than their full-integration, and, thereby, would make Article 2(4) 
even more problematic.
88
 In this regard, as explained in the subpart below, such an 
argument stands in opposition to the current policy, rather than justifying it. 
 
In summary, there is no strong economic or legal justification to make a distinction 
between ‘coordination’ within the meaning of Article 2(4) and collective dominance 
within the sense of Article 2(3), in terms of applicable tests. Venit argues that the 
traditional application of Article 101 to the risk of coordination may be problematic, 
because the degree of market power required under Article 101(1) is normally lower 
than that under Article 2(3). He also adds that requiring the fulfilment of all the 
conditions of Article 101(3) may result in a very strict approach in this context.
89
 The 
existing practice of the Commission appears to support Venit’s argument, at least for 
some cases. In these cases, the Commission found a risk of coordination within the 
meaning of Article 2(4) without a detailed assessment such as that made under 
Article 2(3).
90
 However, it cannot be stated that these cases represent the general 
approach of the Commission, because in some other cases, it extensively analysed 
the likelihood of coordination based on the same principles as those used in relation 
to collective dominance. This indicates that the Commission may, in practice, enjoy 
more discretion in analysing the risk of coordination with reference to Article 101. 
This approach obviously increases the uncertainty about the legality of joint 
ventures. In any case, the application of Article 101 seems to lead to some significant 
problems as to the assessment of coordination in respect of the joint venture’s 
market, as explained below. All these factors call for a new approach under Article 
2(4) and (5). 
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2. The Lesser the Degree of Integration the Stricter the Approach  
 
As emphasised above, the Commission usually assumes that the joint venture and the 
parent firms form a single economic unit, and it assigns a single market share to 
them.
91
 However, based on the text of Article 2(5) of the Merger Regulation, if at 
least two firms remain active in the joint venture’s market, it also examines whether 
there would be a risk of coordination between the parent firms with respect to this 
market. Therefore, in the EU, the fact that the parent firms retain some business 
activities in the joint venture’s market appears to basically function as an aggravating 
factor, which requires the assessment of the same economic situation under two 
different tests. This leads to a perception that a partial integration of two firms in a 
given market is more dangerous for competition, than their full-integration in the 
same market. 
 
This approach differs from that adopted in the US in relation to partial integration. In 
the Collaboration Guidelines, the DOJ and the FTC imply that a partially integrated 
joint venture will be, in principle, permitted, if a full-integration of the parents with 
respect to the same market would be allowed.
92
 The main rationale behind this 
approach is that if the parents continue to compete with each other or with the joint 
venture, the ability of the joint venture or the parents to increase prices would be less 
than in the event of full-integration.
93
 In this regard, once the authorities find that a 
full-integration of the parents would raise anticompetitive concerns, they consider the 
likelihood of competition between the parents and the joint venture as a mitigating 
factor, based on the criteria listed in the Guidelines.
94
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Considering that a partial integration of two firms in a given market cannot normally 
lead to a higher degree of market power than does their full-integration in the same 
market, it should not be expected, in principle that the former may raise more serious 
anticompetitive concerns than the latter. On this basis, the US approach generally 
seems to make more sense. This conclusion may be challenged, however, on the 
basis that full-integration may bring about more efficiencies than partial integration, 
which may make the former more procompetitive than the latter. This can be true, 
particularly if such a lenient standard is uniformly applied to a broad range of 
collaborations, including those involving no meaningful integration. This approach, 
in fact, appears to lead to some complications in the US.
95
 Nevertheless, these 
concerns are unlikely to arise, if such a standard only applies to joint ventures which 
result in significant integration and are therefore treated as mergers. With regard to 
these joint ventures, such efficiency considerations can be incorporated into the 
analysis, as explained in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, if they give rise to any 
anticompetitive effect. 
 
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that, as explained in the part below, any 
collusion between the parents as to their independent operations in the joint venture’s 
market can also be addressed under Article 101 within the framework of Regulation 
1/2003. This ex post tool may facilitate ensuring a more competitive market structure 
in the market than would exist in the case of full-integration. In this context, partial 
integration should basically lead to a more lenient approach to the formation of the 
joint venture, but to a stricter approach in relation to the operations of the parents 
afterwards. 
 
In brief, the application of both Article 2(3) and Article 101 in relation to the markets 
of the joint venture, at least in theory, suggests a stricter approach to a partial 
integration of the parents than to their full-integration. This policy may encourage 
firms to fully integrate their operations in the market, even though the efficiencies in 
question may also be achieved through partial integration. This outcome is 
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undoubtedly less desirable for competition, because in such cases the likelihood of 
competition between the parents is completely eliminated, while the degree of 
efficiencies achieved remains the same. Therefore, such a policy contradicts the 
policy that efficiencies which can be achieved by less restrictive alternatives cannot 




In any event, the application of both tests with regard to the joint venture’s market 
often seems puzzling for the Commission, and thus makes it more complicated for 
the findings of the Commission’s decisions to be meaningfully interpreted. Hence, a 
more pragmatic methodology should be used to analyse the impact of the joint 
venture on markets where it is intended to operate, based on the aforementioned 
approach to partial integration. 
 
B- Proposed Approach 
 
1. Applying Article 2(3) to the Risk of Coordination between the Parents 
 
On the basis of the reasons above, the risk of coordination between the parent firms 
should be subject to the same test as used for the analysis of coordinated effects 
under Article 2(3). One may suggest that this objective can even be achieved under 
the current wording of Article 2(4) and (5), if the Commission adopts a clear and 
consistent approach to that effect. Venit seems to support this suggestion. He argues 
that ‘the test under Article 2(4) should be the same as the test for evaluating 
oligopolistic dominance under Article 2(1) of the Merger Regulation’.
97
 However, he 
does not clearly propose a change in the current wording of Article 2(4); rather, he 
posits that as far as Article 2(4) is concerned, Article 101 should apply in the same 
way as Article 2(3).
98
 Actually, in many decisions, the Commission has already 
analysed the risk of coordination between the parents, based on the same principles 
applied to collective dominance. This may be considered as an indication that the 
current wording of Article 2(4) may allow the Commission to adopt the 
aforementioned approach to sort out the problems of the current policy. However, 
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even though such a change in the practice of the Commission could improve the 
current situation in the EU, it would not completely preclude the need for replacing 
Article 101 with Article 2(3) as the applicable test under Article 2(4).  
 
First of all, if Article 101 is retained as the applicable test, it is not guaranteed that 
the risk of coordination between the parent firms will be treated in the same way as 
coordinated effects. In some specific cases, the Commission may prefer not to do so, 
in order to oppose the joint venture more easily. Furthermore, the EU courts may 
take a different position in relation to the application of Article 101, if the clearance 
decision of the Commission for a joint venture is challenged by third parties.  
 
Secondly, even if Article 101 were to be applied in the same way as Article 2(3), this 
could lead to some uncertainties and confusion about the application of Article 101 
outside Article 2(4). Indeed, the principles adopted in respect of coordination under 
Article 2(4) could be considered applicable to all Article 101 cases. This could 
decrease the effectiveness of Article 101 in applying anticompetitive agreements. 
The reverse is also possible. Article 101 decisions taken within the framework of 
Regulation 1/2003 may affect the analysis under Article 2(4). In such cases, the 
Commission may find it difficult to decide how to incorporate these decisions into 
the analysis of coordination under Article 2(4). 
 
These concerns are actually not trivial, considering that Article 101 may not be 
suitable to address all of the situations targeted at under Article 2(4). As explained 
above, Article 101(1) can cover information exchange between the parents through 
the joint venture, which constitutes a concerted practice.
99
 However, as seen in 
NC/Canal +/CDPQ/Bank America,
100
 even in the absence of information exchange, 
a joint venture may induce the parent firms to coordinate, due to its high value 
compared to those of their overall activities or of their activities in the candidate 
market for coordination. In such cases, the issue is not whether an agreement restricts 
competition, but whether there is a possibility that the parents may enter into an 
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agreement that would restrict competition.
101
 Even though the joint venture 
agreement itself can be regarded as an agreement in the context of Article 101(1), 
this does not change the fact that Article 2(3) is inherently a more appropriate test to 
analyse such a possibility. 
 
Moreover, it does not seem meaningful to apply Article 101(3) to coordination which 
is found to infringe Article 101(1). Such coordination can hardly bring about any 
agreement-specific efficiencies that can satisfy the efficiency and the indispensability 
conditions of Article 101(3). In fact, in various cases, the Commission itself did not 
find it necessary to make an assessment under Article 101(3), in order to conclude 
that the joint venture was caught by Article 2(4).
102
 One may argue that this finding 
cannot constitute a basis for opposing the application of Article 101 to the risk of 
coordination, given the fact that the same practice is also adopted in relation to 
cartels. However, it should be remembered that, unlike cartels, which restrict 
competition by their object, the Commission treats the risk of coordination in joint 
venture cases, as a restriction by effect.
103
 This difference may suffice to make such 
cartel-like treatment very problematic. Therefore, in addition to complicating the 
analysis of joint ventures under the Merger Regulation, this policy may give rise to 
confusion about the application of Article 101(3) outside Article 2(4). 
 
All these negative implications of the application of Article 101 call for a legislative 
change to Article 2 of the Merger Regulation, which would provide Article 2(3) as 
the only applicable test for the risk of coordination between the parents. For this 
purpose, one option may be to completely remove paragraphs (4) and (5) from 
Article 2, and to explain, in recitals of the Regulation, that the risk of coordination 
between the parents will also be appraised in accordance with Article 2(3). 
Meanwhile, the Commission should make the necessary amendments to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this context, the Commission can, in particular, 
extend the definition of horizontal mergers as far as joint ventures are concerned, in 
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order to include situations where the parents remain competitors in markets closely 
related to those of the joint venture.
104
 Furthermore, the Guidelines may be improved 
by including specific considerations with respect to coordination outside the joint 




2. A More Lenient Standard for Partial Integration 
 
If the parent firms fully integrate their economic activities in the joint venture’s 
market, the assessment of the joint venture in relation to this market will be 
essentially the same as that of amalgamations and acquisitions. However, if the joint 
venture only leads to a partial integration of its parents, this fact should be considered 
as a mitigating factor- as occurs in the US- rather than as an aggravating factor, as 
the current policy in the EU implies.  
 
Accordingly, the Commission should firstly examine whether a full-integration of the 
parent firms in the relevant market would give rise to any coordinated or non-
coordinated effect within the meaning of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. If the 
answer is no, the Commission should clear the joint venture without any further 
assessment. If such an analysis reveals an anticompetitive concern, then the 
Commission should assess whether there would be any meaningful competition 
between the parents, which could eliminate this concern. 
 
That said, it is acknowledged that the Commission’s current practice which 
disregards any competition between the parents and the full-function joint venture is 
not completely erroneous. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the rational strategy 
for each parent will be to follow the same pricing policy as the joint venture, in order 
to avoid reducing the profits of the joint venture.
106
 Where each parent fixes its prices 
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to those of the joint venture, the pricing policies of both parents will also be the 




However, the parent firms may be expected to compete against the joint venture as 
well as each other, only if the revenue generated from the joint venture is relatively 
small compared to that from their independent activities. In this regard, the larger the 
operations of the joint venture, the less likely it is that the parents will have the 
incentive to compete against it.
108
 The parents’ shareholding in the joint venture may 
also be a significant factor for the former to decide whether or not to compete against 
the latter.
109
 If the joint venture has a parent which does not operate in the joint 
venture’s market, this parent may block any business policy which is profitable for 
the parents that remain active in the market, but not for the joint venture itself.
110
 
Nonetheless, in most cases, if there has been a divergence of the pricing policies of 
the parent firms and the joint venture, the latter would not be formed in the first 
place, or would be terminated when the divergence arose.
111
 Thus, even if the parents 
can generate more profits from their independent activities than those from the joint 
venture, mutual trust between them may prevent them from competing against the 
joint venture and each other. 
 
If production joint ventures are included in the scope of the Merger Regulation due 
to a reform of the criterion under Article 3(4), some additional considerations may be 
taken into account. If the production joint venture amounts to the entire production 
capacity of the parents, the likelihood of competition between them should normally 
be ignored, because the joint venture would essentially determine the prices of the 
products in question.
112
 If the parents retain some independent capacities, these 
would decrease the commonality of costs of the parents and, therefore, may enable 
them to compete separately in the market. However, in this scenario, mutual trust 
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among the parents may decrease their incentive to effectively compete against each 
other. 
 
Consequently, it may not be wrong to presume that there will be no meaningful 
competition between the parent firms and between them and the joint venture. 
Nonetheless, this presumption should be rebuttable based on evidence submitted by 
the parties and on other relevant economic factors. In this respect, the commitments 
given by the parties to increase the likelihood of competition, such as the setting up 
of firewalls between the parents and the joint venture, may play an important role in 
the rebuttal of the presumption. 
 
It should be noted that even if evidence and commitments submitted by the parties 
indicates some likelihood of competition, this may not suffice to preclude the initial 
anticompetitive concern. In particular, if the market is conducive to coordination, it is 
unlikely that any likelihood of competition can prevent the parties being treated as 
collectively dominant in the market.  
 
To sum up, partial integration deserves more lenient treatment than that currently 
applied in EU merger control. Therefore, even if the test under Article 2(4) is not 
changed, the risk of coordination in respect of the joint venture’s market should be 
definitely excluded from the scope of Article 2(4) and (5). With respect to this 
market, instead of using the risk of coordination as an aggravating factor, the 
Commission should consider the likelihood of competition as a mitigating factor. 




3. A Familiar Approach to Coordination outside the Joint Venture’s Market 
 
As explained above, Article 2(3) should be the applicable test to the risk of 
coordination between the parent firms. In this context, coordination outside the joint 
venture’s market should also be appraised according to the criteria for the analysis of 
collective dominance. With respect to these markets, coordination may become more 
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likely or stable, not as a result of a decrease in the number of players, but as a result 
of the creation of structural links between competitors. Areva/Urenco, in which the 
Commission applied Article 2(3) to the risk of coordination in a downstream market, 
forms a good example in this respect.
113
 Below it is explained how the creation of a 
joint venture may facilitate or sustain coordination, having regard to the conditions 
for a finding of collective dominance set out in the Airtours and Impala decisions 




a) Reaching the Terms of Coordination and Monitoring Deviations 
 
The formation of a joint venture may, first of all, make it easier for firms to reach a 
common understanding by facilitating information exchange among them. In the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission also acknowledges that information 





In fact, meeting regularly in the decision-making bodies of the joint venture may 
enable the parents to exchange information in relation to their operations outside the 
joint venture’s market and, thereby, to reach the terms of coordination without the 
risk of being detected by competition authorities.
116
 This concern is more likely to 




Information exchange directly related to the operation of the joint venture may also 
help firms to arrive at a common understanding, particularly if the parents remain 
competitors in a downstream or upstream market, and they substantially supply to or 
buy from the joint venture. In these cases, the parents may learn each other’s 
production costs and output and, thus, may be able to regulate their individual output 
and price according to those of each other. However, if the supplies to, and purchases 
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from, the joint venture amounts to a small portion compared to the total supplies and 
purchases of the parents, such information exchange is less likely to lead to a risk of 
coordination. 
 
Information exchange among the parents may also increase the transparency of the 
market, and help the parents to monitor any deviation from the terms of coordination 
more easily.
118
 In Areva/Urenco, for instance, the Commission held that the creation 
of the joint venture would increase transparency between the parents in relation to 
their independent operations in the downstream market, due to the information flows 
from the joint venture to its shareholders; and more particularly to the decisive role 




Its existing practice under Article 2(4) indicates that the Commission views 
information exchange as the primary concern that may contribute to coordination 
between the parent firms outside the joint venture’s market. In this regard, in various 
decisions including Areva/Urenco, the Commission disregarded the risk of 
coordination on condition that firewalls were to be established to eliminate 
information flow between the parents and the joint venture.
120
 This practice should 
generally be considered appropriate, because it allows the creation of procompetitive 
joint ventures, while removing coordination concerns raised by them. Nevertheless, 
the difficulty of monitoring the compliance of the parents with these behavioural 
commitments may still entail a risk that the joint venture could be used in the future 
for information exchange purposes. Therefore, if other market conditions are 
conductive to coordination, the Commission should be more careful in accepting and 
monitoring such commitments.       
 
Besides facilitating information exchange, another way for a joint venture to help the 
reaching of a common understanding may be to increase the degree of symmetry 
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between the parent firms.
121
 This mainly occurs when the joint venture approximates 
the cost structures of the parents to each other, through achieving a significant 
commonality of costs.
122
 In Areva/Urenco, the parties claimed that they would not 
reach a common understanding on the enriched uranium supply, given that they were 
very different firms such that Areva was an integrated supplier, active at various 
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, whilst Urenco was only active in the manufacture of 
centrifuges and in uranium enrichment. The Commission refused this claim on the 





 however, the Commission found 
that the creation of a joint venture which would engage in the printing business 
would not result in a significant risk of coordination in the downstream markets for 
magazine publishing, due to the comparatively limited impact of the printing costs on 
the price of magazines.
125
 This approach may explicitly be acknowledged in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as is made in relation to partial function joint ventures 
under the Cooperation Guidelines. 
 
Lastly, firms may reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination more 
easily, if they have a sufficient level of mutual trust that leads each party to act 
according to these terms.
126
 The long-term relationship of the parent firms within the 
context of the joint venture may enable them to know each other’s business culture 
and, thus, to predict the potential behaviour of each other if they were to collude.
127
 
Moreover, joint ventures may increase the stability of the coordination, through 
institutionalising trust between the parents.
128
 Indeed, in order to decrease the risk of 
being detected by competition authorities, firms often prefer to limit the number of 
their officers who are aware of the cartel. When these persons change, the ones who 
replace them may not be even informed about the on-going cartel or tacit 
coordination. In this respect, joint ventures may create an institutional memory which 
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may enable the parents to internalise those competitive strategies, thereby prolonging 
the life of the coordination.
129
 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognise that 
participation in joint ventures may help in aligning incentives among the 
coordinating firms.
130
 The contribution of the joint venture to the trust between the 
parents may be taken into account in this context. However, given the fact that it is 
extremely difficult to prove such an effect, this ground alone should seldom be used 
to find that coordination may become likely.   
 
b) Forming a Punishment Mechanism 
 
Sharing risks and costs which neither parent could bear individually is normally 
viewed to be a procompetitive aspect of joint ventures. On the other hand, it may also 
serve as a factor aggravating the risk of coordination between parent firms. In other 
words, substantial on-going risks and costs inherent in the joint operation may enable 
the parents to utilise the joint venture as a punishment mechanism, for the purpose of 




The joint venture may be considered as a credible punishment mechanism, if the loss 
from its failure due to the punishment would make any deviation unprofitable.
132
 In 
this regard, the greater the value of the joint venture to the parents, the more likely it 
will form a credible punishment threat. Additionally, as pointed out in Areva/Urenco, 
the joint venture may serve as a retaliation tool, if the decisions of the joint venture 
on its sales to, or purchases from, one parent firm require the consent of the other 
parent.
133
 This may be the case in particular if the management of the joint venture is 




The Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide that ‘the retaliation could take many 
forms, including cancellation of joint ventures or […] selling of shares in jointly 
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 In line with this approach, the Commission should analyse 
whether the formation of joint ventures may facilitate coordination in other markets 
by creating a means of retaliation to punish deviations. Actually, the Commission 
usually considers the high value of the joint venture to the parents in analysing the 
likelihood of coordination in this sense, under Article 2(4).
136
 In NC/Canal 
+/CDPQ/Bank America, for example, it explained that the fact that the success of the 
joint venture was very crucial to one parent may be used by the other parent as a 




Having said that, it may be questionable to presume that if the economic activity of a 
joint venture is highly valuable to its parents, this is sufficient to constitute a credible 
punishment tool and, thereby, to sustain the coordination. Considering that the failure 
of the joint venture may also cause significant loss to the punishing parent as a 
shareholder,
138
 such a punishment may be more costly than responding passively to 
the deviation. Nevertheless, through participating in a joint venture, firms forgo some 
control over their activities in favour of other firms, which usually indicates strong 
trust between them.
139
 Vigorous competition between these firms may weaken such 
trust and, ultimately, may result in the dissolution of the joint venture. If the parents 
perceive that there is such a risk, this may be sufficient to deter them from competing 
effectively against each other outside the joint venture’s market. 
 
IV. The Application of the Single Economic Unit Doctrine in Joint Venture 
Cases: More Certainty through More Consistency 
 
As they related to the centre of the gravity of this thesis, the parts above explored the 
negative implications of the current approach to the formation of joint ventures in EU 
merger control, and proposed solutions in this respect. However, in order to 
complement these parts and show the whole picture about joint ventures treated as 
mergers, this part first presents the uncertainties about the treatment of the operation 
of legitimately formed joint ventures under Article 101. Second, it proposes an 
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approach which could eliminate these uncertainties and, at the same time, would be 
consistent with the proposed approaches in the previous parts. 
 
A- Problem: When Are They the Same?  
 
With respect to the operation of legitimately established joint ventures, the 
application of the single economic unit doctrine leads to two questions: (i) does the 
conduct of a joint venture amount to unilateral conduct subject to Article 102, or an 
agreement between its parents within the meaning of Article 101?; and (ii) does a 
joint venture and its parent(s) form a single economic unit under Article 101 in 
respect of an agreement between them, and of liability for a competition law 
infringement? 
 
The current EU policy in relation to the first issue does not appear problematic. As 
explained above, in the US, it is highly controversial whether the conduct of fully-
integrated joint ventures is exempted from section 1 of the Sherman Act.
140
 
However, in the EU, it is not disputed in principle that the acts and decisions of full-
function joint ventures form unilateral conduct and, thereby, fall outside Article 
101.
141
 This policy creates significant certainty about the legality of the conduct of 
these joint ventures, particularly compared to the US approach to the conduct of 
fully-integrated joint ventures.  
 
Furthermore, in the EU, although the conduct of partial function joint ventures 
essentially falls within Article 101, it is not subject to a separate analysis under 
Article 101 if it is ancillary to the operation of the joint venture.
142
 This approach to 
partial function joint ventures may be considered to be relatively stricter than the 
aforementioned approach to full-function joint ventures. However, considering that 
the acts and decisions of these joint ventures falling within its operational scope 
normally escape further scrutiny under Article 101, such an approach does not seem 
to lead to substantial uncertainties for the analysis of their legitimate conduct.  
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In terms of legal certainty, this approach to the conduct of partial function joint 
ventures in the EU is, in any case, more praiseworthy than the US approach to the 
conduct of partially integrated joint ventures. The latter is stricter than the former 
from two perspectives. Firstly, for a restriction to be ancillary, US competition law 
requires it to be reasonably related to, and necessary for, ‘the attainment of the 
procompetitive effects’ of the main operation. In EU competition law, however, it is 
sufficient if the restriction is only directly related to, and necessary for, ‘the 
implementation’ of the main operation. Secondly, as mentioned above, if the main 
operation is allowed, in the EU, ancillary restraints are exempted from a separate 
analysis under Article 101, while in the US, they are still subject to a separate rule of 
reason analysis.  
 
Bearing all these explanations in mind, it is possible to state that the current EU 
approach with regard to the treatment of the conduct of joint ventures, in general, 
provides sufficient certainty for the operation of joint ventures, through being 
consistent with the approach to the formation of joint ventures. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to come to the same conclusion in respect of the second issue, ie whether a 
full-function joint venture forms a single economic unit with its parents (i) in finding 
the parent firms liable for a competition infringement by the joint venture; and (ii) in 
determining the applicability of Article 101 to an agreement between the joint 
venture and its parent(s). Addressing this issue is inherently more challenging, due to 
the fact that the traditional application of the single economic unit doctrine in relation 
to wholly-owned subsidiaries does not completely fit the analysis of the relationship 
between joint ventures and their parents. The contradiction between the joint control 
requirement and the assumption that full-function joint ventures are autonomous of 




As explained in Chapter 3, the Commission’s practice so far fails to establish a clear 
and coherent position in relation to the applicability of the single economic unit 
doctrine in joint venture cases.
144
 In the original draft of the new Cooperation 
Guidelines, the Commission made a proposal to provide such clarity and coherency; 
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however it did not retain it in the final text, following the 2010 public consultation.
145
 
The judgements of the General Court in the El du Pont and Dow Chemical cases give 
the most recent indications about the applicability of Article 101 to relations between 
a full-function joint venture and its parents. The judgements posit that the parents 
may be held liable for an infringement of the competition rules by a full-function 
joint venture. Nonetheless, it is not certain whether this approach would be approved 
by the ECJ in the appeal. More importantly, it is very doubtful whether such an 
approach would also apply with respect to agreements between a full-function joint 
venture and its parent(s). Therefore, in the EU, there is a need for more clarity and 
consistency with regard to the question of whether a joint venture and its parents 
form parts of the same undertaking under Article 101. 
 
Jones, in her very recent article, makes some suggestions addressing this question. 
She generally opposes the extension of the concept of undertaking to situations of 
joint control, on the grounds that this could enable firms to use joint ventures as a 
vehicle to escape Article 101.
146
 In this context, she firstly suggests that the conduct 
of the joint venture or its parents should be considered to fall outside Article 101 
only if it is within the scope or core activity of the joint venture, ie inherent to the 
working and operation of the joint venture.
147
 However, considering that this 
approach could lead to complex debates about what conduct can be viewed as falling 
within the scope or core activity of the joint venture, she states that ‘[a] better 
approach, therefore, may be to accept a narrower theory of an economic unit, 





Jones accepts that such an approach could bring legitimately established joint 
ventures within the scope of Article 101. However, she claims that this would not be 
a significant problem, because the fact that such conduct falls under Article 101 does 
not necessarily mean that it will be prohibited, but that it will be assessed ‘in the 
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legal and economic context in which it occurs including the legitimate goals and 




Jones’s suggestions do not, however, offer clarity about the analysis of the operation 
of joint ventures in the EU, but rather complicate the current situation further. Her 
first suggestion seems to be influenced by the debate in the US, which arose after the 
Supreme Court’s Dagher and American Needle decisions.
150
 Nevertheless, the 
distinction between core and non-core activities is hardly relevant to the above 
discussion in EU competition jurisprudence, because this distinction mainly concerns 
the question of whether the conduct of joint ventures is exempted from Article 101, 
which, as explained above, has been largely settled in the EU. Therefore, the 
adoption of the first suggestion would unnecessarily bring the uncertainties and 
debates in the US into the EU. The adoption of the second suggestion, however, 
would lead to an even more chaotic situation in the EU for the business community 
as well as the enforcers of Article 101, given that it may empower national 
competition authorities and national courts to decide the legality of the creation of 
joint ventures which fall under the Merger Regulation. 
 
The current uncertain legal environment in the EU with regard to the application of 
the single economic unit doctrine in joint venture cases should be sorted out by the 
adoption of a general policy, which provides sufficient clarity, while allowing the 
consideration of the specific facts of each case, and which is consistent in itself and 
with the rules applicable to the creation of joint ventures. The following subpart 
proposes an approach based on these considerations.   
 
B- Proposed Approach 
 
As explained above, in EU competition law, the analysis of the conduct of joint 
ventures does not involve significant problems, and, therefore, does not require a 
dramatic change. In the case of a shift from the full-functionality criterion, however, 
such a policy should be extended to other joint ventures falling within the Merger 
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Regulation. Given the lenient treatment of ancillary restraints, this proposal implies 
only a minor change.    
 
With regard to the issue of whether the joint venture and the parents constitute a 
single economic unit under Article 101, however, a clearer approach should be 
achieved by ensuring its consistency with the proposed approaches in the previous 
parts of this chapter. In this regard, it should be accepted in principle that a joint 
venture forms a single undertaking with each of its parents, due to the fact that the 
latter enjoys joint control over the former; in other words, both are under common 
control in the context of the single economic unit doctrine.
151
 The shift from the 
current autonomy-based criterion to an integration-based criterion would help the 
application of this principle, through clearly removing the terminological problem 
about the autonomy of joint ventures.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that, in any case, the parents cannot be considered to 
belong to the same undertaking, because they are not under common control. Hence, 
any agreement involving a joint venture and at least two parents should be regarded 
as subject to Article 101. Agreements involving the joint venture and only one 
parent, on the other hand, should fall outside Article 101, provided that they do not 
amount to collusion between the parent firms. Such a policy would be in line with 
the approach of the Commission to disregard the risk of coordination between the 
joint venture and one parent, as long as this coordination is not ‘an instrument for 
producing or reinforcing the coordination between the parent firms’.
152
 This policy 
could also substantially eliminate the risk that joint ventures are used by firms to 
shield any anticompetitive collusion from Article 101 scrutiny. Therefore, it would 
also justify the adoption of a more lenient approach to partial integration under the 
Merger Regulation, by providing an ex post tool to maintain competition between the 




The application of such a principle should be determined on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, a horizontal agreement between a joint venture and one of its parents 
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should normally be considered to fall within the scope of Article 101, where two 
parents are competing in the market of the joint venture. However, such an 
agreement should in principle be treated as unilateral conduct falling within Article 
102, if there is no horizontal overlap between the parents in respect of the joint 
venture’s market. This should also be the case in relation to vertical agreements 
between the joint venture and one of the parents, to the extent that it does not 
facilitate collusion among the parent firms in markets vertically related to that of the 
joint venture. This approach is essentially suggested for joint ventures that fall under 
the Merger Regulation. Nevertheless, it may also apply in the context of other joint 
ventures, as long as they are structurally separable from their parent firms.  
 
With regard to the liability issue, as emphasised by the General Court in El du Pont 
and Dow Chemical, the parent firms should be, in principle, responsible for the 
anticompetitive behaviours of the joint venture, just as if it was a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. This should be the case, in particular, if the parent has decisive influence 
over the appointment of managers or other issues relating to day-to-day operations. 
On the other hand, if one parent firm has only limited veto rights which give the 
ability to influence the day-to-day operations of the joint venture to a lesser extent, it 
may be necessary to make further scrutiny of whether such a parent actually 
exercised decisive influence over the conduct at issue. This may be the case, for 
example, if one parent effectively controls the day-to-day operations of the joint 
venture, while the other parent has only veto rights on decisions concerning the 
major investments. In such situations, the Commission and the courts should 
consider more seriously the evidence put forward by the latter parent to show that it 
did not decisively influence the infringement by the joint venture in question. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on the implications of the analysis in the previous chapters of the thesis, this 
chapter identified the problems with the appraisal of joint ventures under the current 
EU merger control regime, and proposed solutions in order to provide a more 
coherent and integrated approach to joint ventures, which includes less ambiguities 
and complications. In this context, the proposed approach firstly provides that, as in 
265 
 
the US, the extent of integration among the parents, instead of the autonomy of the 
joint venture, constitutes the core element of the criterion which determines joint 
ventures that will be treated as mergers. However, unlike the full-integration criterion 
used in the US, the proposed criterion only requires a significant integration of the 
parties’ economic activities in the market, which does not necessarily amount to their 
full-integration. The adoption of such an integration-based criterion could eliminate 
the ambiguity regarding the autonomy of joint ventures, and could extend the scope 
of the Merger Regulation particularly to partial function production joint ventures.  
  
Secondly, the proposed approach refines the appraisal of joint ventures under the 
Merger Regulation. It suggests that, like coordinated effects, the risk of coordination 
between the parent firms should be analysed with reference to Article 2(3) of the 
Merger Regulation, which forms a more suitable test than that under Article 101 for 
this purpose. In line with this change, if the parents retain some activities in the joint 
venture’s market, according to the proposed approach, this fact is to be considered as 
a mitigating factor, which, at least in theory, implies a more lenient approach to 
partial integration than that to full-integration, as is in the US.  
 
Finally, the proposed approach introduces more clarity about the application of the 
single economic unit doctrine with respect to the operation of legally established 
joint ventures, while ensuring its consistency with the proposals above. Accordingly, 
in order for an agreement between a joint venture and its parent to fall outside Article 
101, the agreement should not lead to collusion between the parents in respect of 
their independent activities. As regards liability for the conduct of the joint venture, 
however, the general rule should be to impute the conduct to the parents, although 
this may exceptionally be softened according to the scope of the parents’ veto rights 







This thesis critically examined the substantive approach to joint ventures under the 
EU merger control regime. The thesis bore in mind that it was dealing with one of 
the most intricate and least understood fields of competition law. Therefore, it firstly 
defined the concept of joint venture, to clarify the scope of the research. In addition, 
it explained the types of joint ventures and their economic role as a business model, 
in order to provide more information about the nature of this phenomenon, and to 
show the importance of researching and providing a proper competition law 
approach in this respect.  
 
With these explanations about the conceptual and economic aspects of joint ventures 
in mind, this thesis elaborately investigated how full-function joint ventures were 
defined and appraised in EU merger control. The thesis also exposed the analysis of 
partial function joint ventures under Article 101 TFEU, in particular, to reveal how 
this analysis differs from that of full-function joint ventures. Furthermore, given its 
strong connection with the analysis of the formation of joint ventures, the thesis 
explained how the conduct and operation of joint ventures were treated in the EU. To 
give a comparative perspective, the thesis also described the analysis of joint 
ventures in the US regime.  
 
The overall assessment of all of the aforementioned analyses and explanations 
indicates some problems with the current approach to joint ventures in EU merger 
control. That said, it is acknowledged that the complicated nature of joint ventures 
itself makes them difficult to tackle under competition law. Indeed, it is hardly 
possible to adopt general rules in relation to joint ventures, which can apply properly 
to all individual cases. A case-by-case approach, however, has the potential to lead to 
an uncertain legal environment for these operations, something which is partly the 
case in the US regime. In any event, it does not seem possible to adopt such a case-
by-case approach in the EU with regard to many issues, due to the procedural rules 
applicable to mergers. Therefore, it is safe to state that whichever approach was 
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adopted for joint ventures in EU merger control, it would lead to some complications 
and uncertainties.  
 
Nonetheless, in the EU, the problems inherent to the complicated nature of joint 
ventures appear to be aggravated, due to inconsistent approaches adopted in relation 
to the same issue in different contexts. This inconsistency has particularly existed in 
relation to how to approach the relationship between the joint venture and its parents 
in the three phases of analysis, which are: (i) determining which joint ventures 
should be treated as mergers; (ii) appraising the effect of these joint ventures on 
competition; and (iii) analysing the conduct and operation of legitimately established 
joint ventures.  
 
In the first phase, for a joint venture to be full-function and fall under the Merger 
Regulation, it is required to be autonomous of its parents. This condition firstly 
contradicts the joint control requirement, and also results in unjustifiable differences 
between the approaches to acquisitions of sole control and those of joint control, in 
deciding the scope of the Merger Regulation. Secondly, it contradicts the 
Commission’s practice, which presumes that the joint venture and the parents would 
align their competitive behaviour with each other, in analysing the effects of these 
joint ventures under the Merger Regulation. Thirdly, the assumed autonomy of full-
function joint ventures contradicts, or at least complicates, the application of the 
single economic unit doctrine in relation to the operation of these joint ventures. In 
any case, considering that, as also acknowledged in the US, the extent of integration 
essentially characterises the structural aspects of joint ventures, such an autonomy-
based criterion does not seem compatible with their economic nature, and excludes 
some joint ventures, particularly partial function production joint ventures, from the 
scope of the Merger Regulation. 
 
Another inconsistency has been observed with respect to the analysis of the risk of 
coordination between the parent firms under the Merger Regulation. Although 
‘coordination’ under Article 2(4) basically refers to the same economic situation as 
‘coordinated effect’, the former is subject to Article 101, which allows the 
Commission to apply a stricter approach than is applied to the latter under Article 
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2(3). Given that Article 101 also applies to the risk of coordination in relation to the 
joint venture’s market, such a policy seems to imply a stricter approach to partial 
integration than to full-integration. Moreover, it complicates the analysis of joint 
ventures in a way that makes it difficult to draw the correct conclusions on the 
general application of Article 101 and Article 2(3), and on their specific application 
in the context of joint ventures. 
 
This thesis considered all of these aspects of the current EU policy, which contribute 
to the problems specific to the nature of joint ventures, and aimed to propose a more 
coherent and integrated policy, which would provide pragmatic solutions based on 
the principles that would be the most compatible with the economic nature of joint 
ventures and with the general principles of EU competition law; and which would 
ensure consistency in the application of these principles in the different phases of 
analysis mentioned above.   
 
In this regard, the thesis firstly proposed a shift from the autonomy-based full-
functionality criterion to an integration-based criterion, which, unlike the criterion 
used in the US, does not necessarily require a full-integration of the parent firms in 
the market. This criterion would not require an assumption about whether the joint 
venture would be autonomous of the parents, and it would therefore eliminate the 
risk of contradiction in approaching the competitive relationship between the joint 
venture and the parents under both the Merger Regulation and Article 101. It would 
also allow the scope of the Merger Regulation to be extended particularly to partial 
function production joint ventures and, thus, preclude inconsistencies and 
uncertainties resulting from the current policy in this respect. 
 
Second, the thesis proposed that the risk of coordination between the parent firms 
should also be analysed under Article 2(3), rather than Article 101. This policy 
would prevent the application of a stricter test to these effects, which could not be 
justified given their overlap with coordinated effects. It would also eliminate any 
confusion regarding the general application of Article 101. Most importantly, such a 
policy would enable the Commission to approach partial integration more 
permissively than full-integration, as takes place in the US. In this context, the thesis 
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suggested that, if the parents retained activities in the joint venture’s market, the 
Commission should consider the likelihood of competition between the parents and 
the joint venture as a mitigating factor. However, considering that, in most cases, the 
parents would not compete against each other in the joint venture’s market, the thesis 
posited that it would be a more pragmatic approach to establish a rebuttable 
presumption in this respect.  
 
In order to produce a more integrated policy, the thesis also proposed an approach to 
the application of the single economic unit doctrine with regard to the operation of 
joint ventures which have been cleared under the Merger Regulation. This approach 
provides that an agreement between a joint venture and one of its parents should fall 
outside Article 101, if it does not lead to collusion between the parent firms. It also 
suggests that both parents should be, in principle, held liable for an infringement of 
competition rules by the joint venture. Such an approach would increase legal 
certainty about the analysis of the operation of joint ventures treated as mergers, by 
ensuring its consistency with the proposals above.   
 
In short, the complicated nature of joint ventures makes it impossible to give a 
perfect answer to the question of how joint ventures should be analysed under the 
merger control rules. Nevertheless, this thesis showed that the current EU policy in 
this respect could be improved significantly by adopting a more integrated policy 
which ensured consistency between the principles applied to joint ventures in 
different contexts; and also their consistency with the general rules of EU 
competition law and with economic theories. This proposed policy would offer the 
best possible solution in relation to the analysis of joint ventures in EU merger 
control, although this analysis would, in general, continue to be one of the most 
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